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Abstract
This dissertation concerns itself with the practice of slavery in the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic
in the second half of the nineteenth and early decades of the twentieth centuries. It places slavery at the
intersection of the new liberal political order that began to form in the mid-1850s, the expulsion of the
Caucasian peoples and their subsequent transplantation in the Ottoman Empire, and the international anti-
slavery law that was taking shape simultaneously. It examines the social and legal (trans)formations at this
particular juncture, traces the legal making and perpetuation of “Circassianness” as an “enslavable” ethnic
category, and consequently argues that slavery bore a key significance in defining what citizenship came to
mean in the Ottoman Empire and Turkish Republic.
Ottoman slavery comprised both male and female slaves, employed respectively for agricultural work in rural
areas and for domestic and sexual services in the large urban centers of the empire. Their social destinies were
markedly different from each other throughout the long course of the practice, but especially so in the “age of
freedom,” which was laden, above all, with the Ottoman state’s promise of equality before the law. Male slaves
demanded their “equality” in conspicuous ways by bringing lawsuits against their owners or through
occasional armed resistance. Female slaves, on the other hand, whose flow towards the elite households of
Istanbul did not cease at least until the second decade of the twentieth century, developed other forms of
relationships both with their owners and slavery as a practice. Clinging on to the slave trade and at times
wielding it as a weapon, they continued building extensive patronage networks across the empire, although
their political participation became marginalized within an increasingly gendered political community, as the
nineteenth century drew near its end.
Based on slave petitions, slaveholding elites’ correspondences, police interrogations, legal records, and
parliamentary minutes, this dissertation probes the entangled histories of slave emancipation and citizenship
in the Ottoman Empire and Turkish Republic. Without dismissing its distinctive features, such as the multiple
legal systems that governed it or the lack of its abolition, my aim is to place the Ottoman practice of slavery in
its larger political context, not only within the Ottoman Empire but also the entire globe, and dismantle the
categories of Islam and nationalism, which respectively essentializes Ottoman slavery and overcodes
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This dissertation concerns itself with the practice of slavery in the Ottoman 
Empire and the Turkish Republic in the second half of the nineteenth and early decades 
of the twentieth centuries. It places slavery at the intersection of the new liberal political 
order that began to form in the mid-1850s, the expulsion of the Caucasian peoples and 
their subsequent transplantation in the Ottoman Empire, and the international anti-slavery 
law that was taking shape simultaneously. It examines the social and legal 
(trans)formations at this particular juncture, traces the legal making and perpetuation of 
“Circassianness” as an “enslavable” ethnic category, and consequently argues that 
slavery bore a key significance in defining what citizenship came to mean in the Ottoman 
Empire and Turkish Republic. 
Ottoman slavery comprised both male and female slaves, employed respectively 
for agricultural work in rural areas and for domestic and sexual services in the large 
urban centers of the empire. Their social destinies were markedly different from each 
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other throughout the long course of the practice, but especially so in the “age of 
freedom,” which was laden, above all, with the Ottoman state’s promise of equality 
before the law. Male slaves demanded their “equality” in conspicuous ways by bringing 
lawsuits against their owners or through occasional armed resistance. Female slaves, on 
the other hand, whose flow towards the elite households of Istanbul did not cease at least 
until the second decade of the twentieth century, developed other forms of relationships 
both with their owners and slavery as a practice. Clinging on to the slave trade and at 
times wielding it as a weapon, they continued building extensive patronage networks 
across the empire, although their political participation became marginalized within an 
increasingly gendered political community, as the nineteenth century drew near its end. 
Based on slave petitions, slaveholding elites’ correspondences, police 
interrogations, legal records, and parliamentary minutes, this dissertation probes the 
entangled histories of slave emancipation and citizenship in the Ottoman Empire and 
Turkish Republic. Without dismissing its distinctive features, such as the multiple legal 
systems that governed it or the lack of its abolition, my aim is to place the Ottoman 
practice of slavery in its larger political context, not only within the Ottoman Empire but 
also the entire globe, and dismantle the categories of Islam and nationalism, which 
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Introduction.   





This study began with broad range of inquiries on how such categories as gender, 
race, ethnicity, class, or age mattered and how their meanings and experience changed 
over time for the Ottoman state, slaveholders, as well as the slaves themselves. 
Navigating through slave petitions, slaveholding elites’ correspondences, police 
interrogations, legal records, and parliamentary minutes from the late Ottoman Empire 
and early Turkish Republic, I tried to understand the ways in which the Ottoman slavery 
was different from other systems of slavery. Although not without overlaps with other 
systems, the Ottoman practice appeared highly distinct with 1) its loose racial and ethnic 
perceptions; 2) its traverse across different social classes which allowed manumitted 
slaves to own and trade in slaves as well as the permeability of class when slavery is 
taken into consideration; 3) its well-entrenched nature that even at the height of 
abolitionist sentiments the Ottoman palace could still consider buying new slaves; 4) its 
peculiar relationship with law that was made up of multiple legal systems; 5) difficulty or 
even impossibility of detecting it, in the presence of slavery-like practices; 6) its 
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linguistic dimension; 7) its demand for mobility; 8) and last but not least, that it involved, 
mostly women.  
The dissertation owes the present course it took, however, to a runaway slave 
named Fatma Leman and a document found at the Başbakanlık Ottoman Archives in 
Istanbul, which contains fragments of her life. The document, which opens chapter 4, 
recorded the voice of the young woman, who fled her mistress’ house in the aftermath of 
the 1908 constitutional revolution to demand her freedom that she believed the newly 
promulgated constitution granted her. Firmly based on the liberal ideal of equality before 
the law, and with sound knowledge (or perhaps an instinctive conviction) that the 
Ministry of Justice was the primary responsible party in the affair, she stated that if the 
revolution brought freedom to each and every Ottoman individual as it claimed it did, 
then she too was free like the rest of her compatriots. Neither slave flights, nor claiming 
freedom was new or unusual in the early twentieth century. The Islamic Şer’i law 
technically allowed slaves to file complaints or demand to be manumitted at the Şer’i 
courts on the basis of ill treatment or fraudulent sale, so much so that students of Ottoman 
slavery had even argued that it had created a “culture of resistance” as early as the 
sixteenth century.1 Yet these were almost all dispersed personal efforts, which mobilized 
personal strategies. Fatma Leman’s claim, on the other hand, made specific use of the 
idiom of “freedom, justice, and equality,” utilized by the constitutional regime to 
legitimize itself. The fact that her story, which she ingeniously placed at the complex 
                                                
1 Hayri Gökşin Özkoray, “Un ‘culture de la résistance’?: Stratégies et moyens d’émancipation des 
esclaves dans l’Empire ottoman au XVIe siècle,” in Mediterranean Slavery Revisited (500–1800), 
eds. Stefan Rank, Juliane Schlel (Zurich, Chronos Verlag, 2014). 
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intersection of the Ottoman practice of slavery, newly (trans)forming political order and 
its justice-administering institutions, ended with her alleged abduction, possible rape, and 
the eventual purchase by a high-ranking provincial officer is indicative of her subject 
position vis-à-vis the Ottoman state practice. In that respect, once Fatma Leman shifted 
the focus of this dissertation from slavery to freedom, the Ottoman practice of slavery 
appeared firmly embedded in the political developments not only within the Ottoman 
Empire, but in many respects, the entire globe. 
Slavery had long been a practice in the Mediterranean, one that was deeply rooted 
in customs shaped by politics and the economics of war, territorial expansion as well as 
commercial circulations. The existence of the practice preceded the formation of the 
Ottoman state itself but in the later centuries the latter’s own politics and the economics 
of war and expansion not only endorsed it but also built a bureaucratic system that relied 
heavily on slave recruits, creating, particularly from its frontier regions, “an almost 
ceaseless stream of prisoners of both sexes.”2 By the late eighteenth century, as the 
Ottoman state’s expansionist advances were brought to a halt and the steady flow of 
slaves as products of war diminished, slave procurement relied more heavily on local 
tensions and larger conflicts in neighboring regions, such as the Caucasian War, 1817–
1864 that caused a major upheaval in the Caucasus and rendered slave trade one of the 
                                                
2 Robert Brunschvig, “Abd,” Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition (Brill online, 2014), 11. 
The moments of war and economic boom notwithstanding, the enslaved population of the 
Ottoman Empire comprised mainly women in the nineteenth century. Gabriel Baer, “Slavery in 
Nineteenth Century Egypt,”The Journal of African History, vol.8, No.3. (1967), 426; Kenneth 
Cuno, “African Slaves in 19th-Century Rural Egypt,”International Journal of Middle East 
Studies, vol, 41, no.2, 186–87; Madeline Zilfi, Women and Slavery in the Late Ottoman Empire: 
The Design of Difference (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), xi–xii. 
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region’s most important sources of income in the first half of the nineteenth century.3 
Throughout the war and the Circassian expulsion that followed,4 during which “even 
people of moderate means were able to pay for a slave with a few pieces of gold,” the 
imperial harem as well as many elite households consisted almost exclusively of young 
Circassian women.5 Coinciding with the Circassian expulsion were Britain’s efforts in 
                                                
3 Liubov Kurtynova-D’Herlugnan, The Tsar’s Abolitionists: The Slave Trade in the Caucasus and 
Its Suppression (Leiden: Brill, 2010); İbrahim Köremezli, “The Place of the Ottoman Empire in 
the Russo-Circassian War (1830–1864),” (Master’s thesis, Bilkent University, 2004). 
4 In the first half of the 1860s, roughly a million Circassian refugees settled in various parts of the 
Ottoman Empire. For a detailed account, see David Cameron Cuthell, “The Muhacirin 
Komisyonu: An agent in the transformation of Ottoman Anatolia, 1860–1866” (Ph.D. 
dissertation, Columbia University, 2005). The word Circassian was and still is used as an 
umbrella term that denoted a variety of ethno-linguistic groups such as Adyghe, Chechen, 
Abkhaz, Kabarday, Ubykh, Ossetian, all originating from the Caucasus. In its proper designation 
and particularly in relation to the slaves brought from the region, it signifies those who lived in 
the area between the Black Sea and Sunja River to the west and east, the Caucasus mountains and 
the steppes north of Kuban and Pyatigorsk plains to the south and north. Köremezli, “The Place 
of the Ottoman Empire in the Russo-Circassian War,” 5–6. For a detailed list of tribes and their 
geographic distribution at the beginning of the nineteenth century see Julius Von Klaproth, 
Travels in the Caucasus and Georgia Performed in the Years 1807 and 1808 (London: Henry 
Colburn, 1814), 249–264; Fedor Fedorovich Tornao, Bir Rus Subayının Kafkasya Anıları, trans. 
Keriman Vurdem (Ankara: Kafkas Derneği Yayınları, 1999), 93–95. By the end of the nineteenth 
century, and especially following the 1908 revolution, the term Circassian was adopted by the 
Circassian intellectuals to signify what they deemed to be a “nation” based on a common 
Caucasian origin. 
5 Leyla Saz, The Imperial Harem of the Sultans: Memoirs of Leyla (Saz) Hanımefendi (Istanbul: 
Peva Publications, 1998), 58–59. Leyla Açba, Bir Çerkes Prensesinin Harem Hatıraları, Haz. 
Harun Açba (Istanbul: L&M Yayınları, 2004), 89. Harem, to briefly describe it, was a physically 
secluded section within the palace buildings or the elite households in Istanbul or provincial 
towns, where not only the women of the household, functioning as wives, concubines, 
handmaidens, servants or wet nurses resided but also where the sovereign himself lived. In the 
Ottoman Empire, by the end of sixteenth century, the imperial harem became an established 
institution, the powerful inmates of which took significant roles in politics. For an elaborate 
discussion on the topic, see Leslie Peirce, The Imperial Harem: Women and Sovereignty in the 
Ottoman Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993). Largely removed from the political 
sphere by the second half of the nineteenth century, the imperial harem continued to function as 
an educational institution for enslaved women. In the late nineteenth century, it contained several 
hundreds of inmates, headed by valide sultan (the mother of the reigning sultan), kadınefendis 
(official wives), ikbals (concubines), followed by the staff of different ranks. While the imperial 
and elite harems differed from each other in size, organization and significance, they were 
connected through an extensive network of slave trade. 
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what Eve Troutt Powell has called “invasive abolitionism” that resulted in the abolition 
of trade in African slaves in 1857.6 However, neither the 1857 British-Ottoman 
agreement nor later anti-slavery measures were automatically and fully extended to 
include Circassian slaves, partly in response to the British insistence on a rigid definition 
of abolitionism, in which the aristocratic or court slavery was lumped together with 
menial or agricultural slavery.7 In the ensuing decades, this discord helped to depict 
African and Circassian slaves as two distinctly separate groups, the abolition of the 
former being a humanitarian issue with an international dimension and regulated by 
numerous conventions and acts, whereas the latter remained largely a domestic matter.  
Different from earlier works on the Ottoman practice of slavery and in accordance 
with the above-mentioned concerns and questions, this dissertation moves away from the 
discursive field of the Ottoman state policy and conception of slavery and emancipation 
(and how that shaped the practice of slavery and slaves’ lives) and focuses on what sense 
slaves, and occasionally slave holders themselves, made of slavery, emancipation, as well 
as the social and political developments at the time. The aim here is not simply to give 
agency to the slaves, or as Ehud Toledano suggests, to put the “‘cameras […] in the 
hands of the enslaved, rather than in those of the slavers, where they have rested in most 
                                                
6 Eve M. Troutt Powell, A Different Shade of Colonialism: Egypt, Great Britain, and the Mastery 
of the Sudan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), 136. 
7 Ehud R. Toledano, Slavery and Abolition in the Ottoman Middle East (Seattle: University of 
Washington Press, 1998), 113. This situation, according to Toledano, perpetuated the suffering of 
domestic and agricultural slaves in the country, as it made the abolition of one type of slavery 
impossible without the abolition of the other. 
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standard documentary accounts,”8 but to have a better grasp of the ways in which their 
subject positions as victims or perpetrators came into contact with the social and political 
change that took place in the second half of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
and the Ottoman state as its main instigator. This is not to write off the concept of agency 
by any means, but rather to point at, as Walter Johnson well elaborates, its negative 
capacity to “overcode” intricate and interconnected layers of “human subjectivity and 
political organization” and dangers in obscuring related questions “about the contexts and 
consequences of human activity...”9 Thus, the question, which Johnson characterizes as 
“persistently mis-posed,” of whether the slaves “were agents of their own destiny or not” 
is not a concern of this dissertation. Rather, it aims to explore slaves’ participation in the 
making of the social and political order in the Ottoman Empire, during the period in 
question. The slaves wrote petitions, used both local and higher courts extensively, 
informed themselves about international legal developments and strategically demanded, 
in compliance with what the increasingly liberal Ottoman governance promised, their 
freedom, equality, justice, and citizenship. That their attempts largely failed determined 
not only their own destiny but also the destiny of the Ottoman society as a whole, as well 
as the very limits of the “liberal governmentality” that the Ottoman Empire was in the 
process of forging.10  
                                                
8 Ehud R. Toledano, As If Silent and Absent: Bonds of Enslavement in the Islamic Middle East 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), 8. 
9 Walter Johnson, “On Agency,” Journal of Social History; Fall 2003; 37, 1, 114. A  
10 Patrick Joyce, The Rule of Freedom: Liberalism and the Modern City (London: Verso, 2003), 
2. 
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By studying the slaves’ attempts and failures, this dissertation aims to unearth and 
highlight the major fault lines in the social and political forces that governed the Ottoman 
Empire and early Turkish Republic. One such fault line that runs through the dissertation, 
and that is particularly central to the second and fourth chapters, is the coexistence of 
multiple legal systems during the period in question. Some Ottoman historians take this 
pluralistic legal order as the manifestation of “flexibility, pragmatic decision making, and 
a measure of freedom that can encourage adaptation and peaceful coexistence.”11 Viewed 
from the slaves’ and slavery’s perspective, however, it becomes clear that this composite 
structure was not made of legal practices that existed in and of themselves but always in 
relation to power.12 Other fault lines include “Ottoman conservatism” in relation to the 
Ottoman government’s strict adherence to Islamic law, as well as their corporate notions 
of citizenship, which crystalized in slaves’ claims to emancipation, and in an indirect yet 
intensifying way, to citizenship.  
Bent, fractured, and at times invented anew along those fault lines were the 
categories of race, ethnicity, and gender. I follow the process that delineated (or, at least 
perpetuated) “Circassianness” as an enslaveable ethnic category and the ways in which it 
interacted with the newly emerging international anti-slavery law, which had the primary 
aim, at least in the Ottoman Empire, of abolishing the trade in African slaves. The 
questions, which this dissertation deals with, spring from the complex intersection of the 
                                                
11 Karen Barkey, “Aspects of Legal Pluralism in the Ottoman Empire,” in Legal Pluralism and 
Empires, 1500–1850, eds. Lauren Benton and Richard J. Ross (New York: New York University 
Press, 2013), 84. 
12 For an elaborate criticism of the concept of legal pluralism, see Kamari Maxine Clarke, 
Fictions of Justice: The International Criminal Court and the Challenge of Legal Pluralism in 
Sub-Saharan Africa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
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Ottoman Reform Edict in 1856 and the subsequent legal reforms; the trade ban of African 
slaves in 1857 and its transforming effects on Islamic law; and the Circassian expulsion 
in the 1860s and the “transplanted” adat (customary law) in the Circassian settlements 
across the Ottoman Empire. I argue that these different, and at times conflicting, legal 
systems interplayed with or worked against each other in delineating the categories of 
race and ethnicity explicitly, setting the limits of slavery and emancipation, and 
cultivating a form of political power that would last for decades to come in the Ottoman 
Empire and its successor states. In this, I offer not only a brand new conceptualization of 
the Ottoman practice of slavery and an insight into the complexities of Ottoman 
citizenship law, but also an intervention to the scholarship on state and citizenship in the 
Ottoman Empire and Turkish Republic, which traditionally approaches the matter from 
the perspective of religion, the corporate structure considered to be the primary category 
that ordered these relationships. Circassian slaves were after all Muslims, whose 
enslavement took place in accordance with the Caucasian customary law, but not 
necessarily in compliance with the Şer’i law, which the Ottoman legal system was, or at 
least deemed to be, largely based on. The very fact that the Ottoman government could 
approve their slave status despite apparent sanctions against enslaving Muslims and 
despite numerous tenacious campaigns run by Circassian slaves starting immediately 
after the Circassian expulsion of the early 1860s, rendered their case no less than a “state 
of exception,” defined at times as “a point of imbalance between public law and political 
fact,” “a no-man’s-land [...] between the juridical order and life” that emerges within an 
“ambiguous, uncertain, borderline fringe, at the intersection of the legal and the 
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political.”13 Here, in place of the suspension of one unitary law and the state as the sole 
authority that exercises it (as the state of exception is usually defined), we encounter 
competing sovereignties and legalities, the careful selection and elimination of which 
determined who could and could not be enslaved in the Ottoman Empire. This way of 
limit setting, in Veena Das’s rendition, determined “what or who is recognized as human 
within a social form and provide[d] the conditions of the use of criteria as applied to 
others,” pointing at “the dangers [... of] withhold[ing] recognition from the other, not 
simply on the grounds that she is not part of one’s own community but that she is not part 
of life itself.”14  
Slavery in the Ottoman Middle East lingered well after the empire’s collapse in 
1918. It existed officially until the early 1930s, when the newly founded republic of 
Turkey became a member of the League of Nations and by that virtue a signatory to the 
1926 Slavery Convention that made it liable “to bring about, progressively and as soon as 
possible, the complete abolition of slavery in all its forms.”15 While the practice involved, 
especially in the urban areas such as Istanbul or Cairo, mostly women whether as victims, 
like Kazal and in others as perpetrators, like Um Mazed, they were not always the main 
actors within it. Nevertheless, they emerged as key agents through which the newly 
                                                
13 Giorgio Agamben, State of Exception (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2005), 1. 
Agamben draws respectively from François Saint-Bonnet and Alessandro Fontana for these 
definitions: François Saint-Bonnet, L’état d’exception (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 
2001), Alessandro Fontana, “Du droit de résistance au devoir d’insurrection” in Le droit 
derésistance, ed. Jean-Claude Zancarini (Paris: ENS, 1999). 
14 Veena Das, Life and Words: Violence and the Descent into the Ordinary (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 2007), 15–16. 
15 Slavery Convention, signed at Geneva on 25 September 1926, article 2b. Accessed through 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/SlaveryConvention.aspx 
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(trans)forming Ottoman “rule of freedom” reached its limits. Scholars of gender and 
sexuality have long been engaged in exploring these limits in other geographic areas. 
Linda Kerber, for instance, examined the extent of what she called the “mythic space” of 
“We the People,” that drew “much of its power by its egalitarian spirit,” in so far as it 
excluded the poor, black men, and women, “whatever their race or class. “16 Pamela 
Haag, on the other hand, explored the meanings of consent and coercion to demonstrate 
how liberal thought and tradition was not only complex but also internally 
contradictory.17 Most recently, in her work on the traffic in women in late imperial 
Russia, Philippa Hetherington treads along similar lines of thought when gauging the 
limits of “governmental freedom” at a time when the “state and social understandings of 
the subject’s freedom, to move across borders or to consent to sex, were being 
reconceptualized.”18 Hetherington emphasizes the importance of “highlighting 
continuities in the development of ‘liberal’ and ‘illiberal’ approaches to a particular 
political question” in non-European and non-Western settings, such as Russia where 
“strict binaries (between liberal and illiberal, sonderweg and shared heritage) obscure 
more than they reveal, embedded as they are in ideological assumptions about the 
‘backwardness’ of Russia and the progressiveness of the West.”19 For Hetherington, 
                                                
16 Linda Kerber, No Constitutional Right to be Ladies: Women and the Obligations of Citizenship 
(New York: Hill and Wang, 2000), 8; Kerber, “The Paradox of Women’s Citizenship in the 
EarlyRepublic: The Case of Martin vs. Massachusetts, 1805,” The American Historical Review, 
vol. 97, no. 2 (Apr., 1992), 350. 
17 Pamela Haag, Consent: Sexual Rights and the Transformation of American Liberalism (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1999), xviii.  
18 Philippa Hetherington, “Victims of the Social Temperament: Prostitution, Migration and the 
Traffic in Women from Imperial Russia and the Soviet Union, 1885–1935,” Ph.D. diss., 
Department of History,: Harvard University, 2014, iii. 
19 Hetherington, “Victims of the Social Temperament,” 16. 
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accentuating the similarities and differences between Russian and non-Russian contexts 
is useful “not so much to say that Russia was liberal like the West, but that liberalism was 
itself an incomplete project in continental Europe and North America, an observation that 
makes binary oppositions and claims of special paths of limited utility.”20 My objective 
and concerns are similar to those expressed by Hetherington, in that at the core of this 
study lies a desire to look at the ways in which liberalism did or did not take root in the 
Ottoman Empire, but not without acknowledging that it was a form of governmentality 
with intrinsic flaws and contradictions, that habitually treated “the poor, black men, and 
women,” as “not part of life itself.” 
In the past five decades of Ottoman slavery studies, the issue of Ottoman or 
Middle Eastern slavery (at times referred to as Islamic slavery) has been largely treated, 
with few exceptions, as an anomalous, even exotic, phenomenon removed from 
contemporary social and political developments. The earlier studies of introductory 
character were followed by those that took the form of general surveys that covered “the 
traffic from Africa and the Caucasus,” as Ehud Toledano put it, “described the main 
routes, determined the types of slaves, their prices, the customs duties levied on them, the 
jobs they performed, the social roles they played, [...] and the problems of suppression 
and abolition.”21 Yet, only few treated slavery not in its own terms but in connection with 
                                                
20 Ibid., 16–17. 
21 Ehud Toledano, As If Silent and Absent, 39–40. Earlier works on Ottoman and Middle Eastern 
slavery comprise Baer, “Slavery in Nineteenth Century Egypt,” (1967); Bernard Lewis, Race and 
Colour in Islam (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1971); Alan Fisher, “Chattel Slavery in the 
Ottoman Empire,” Slavery & Abolition: A Journal of Slave and Post-Slave Studies 1, no. 1 
(1980). Ehud Toledano’s “Slave Dealers, Women, Pregnancy, and Abortion: The Story of a 
Circassian Slave-girl in Mid-nineteenth Century Cairo,” Slavery & Abolition, Volume 2, Issue 1, 
1981 was the first to introduce gender and slave agency in Ottoman slavery studies, although 
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larger structures of power.22 All these works examined the Ottoman policy of slavery and 
abolition, but touched upon the politics of slavery only tangentially. They all made an 
emphasis on the legal aspect of it but they rarely delved into the messiness of the legal 
practice. They heeded Islamic law to be the primary legislative body that regulated all 
phases of slavery, from slave raiding to manumission, and disregarded power dynamics, 
which allowed ample amount of extra-legality particularly within the trade. Last but not 
least, while the importance of gender within the Ottoman practice of slavery has been 
acknowledged from the very start, only a few studies put emphasis on it, and when they 
did, it was to portray women mostly as victims,23 even though a significant portion of the 
Ottoman slave trade was overseen and controlled by powerful women in the nineteenth 
century. Queen mothers and consorts in the imperial harem, wives of bureaucrats across 
the empire, and not the least ordinary matchmakers here and there all extensively 
                                                                                                                                            
Ronald C. Jennings’ 1975 article “Women in Early 17th Century Ottoman Judicial Records: The 
Sharia Court of Anatolian Kayseri,” in the Journal of the Economic and Social History of the 
Orient (Vol. 18, No. 1) featured numerous legal cases that involved enslaved women’s use of the 
Şer’i courts. Survey studies include Ehud Toledano, The Ottoman Slave Trade and Its 
Suppression, 1840–1890 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982) and Slavery and Abolition 
in the Ottoman Middle East, 1998; Ronald C. Jennings, “Black Slaves and Free Blacks in 
Ottoman Cyprus, 1590–1640,” Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 30, no. 
3 (1987); Ralph A. Austen, “The Mediterranean Islamic slave trade out of Africa: A tentative 
census,” Slavery & Abolition: A Journal of Slave and Post-Slave Studies 13, no. 1 (1992); Y. 
Hakan Erdem, Slavery in the Ottoman Empire and its demise, 1800–1909 (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 1996). There is also a fairly large body of apologetic literature on Ottoman/Islamic 
slavery in Turkish that is left outside the scope of this dissertation. For a good example of this 
literature, see Ahmet Akgündüz’s recent book where he reiterates the major apologetic argument 
that Islam did not introduce slavery, but gave its practice a “humane” character. Ahmet 
Akgündüz, Ottoman Harem: The Male and Female Slavery in Islamic Law (Rotterdam: IUR 
Press, 2015). 
22 Powell, A Different Shade of Colonialism; For a more recent study that similarly examines 
imperial hierarchies in the eastern Mediterranean through Ottoman slavery and abolition, see 
Alison Frank, “The Children of the Desert and the Laws of the Sea: Austria, Great Britain, the 
Ottoman Empire, and the Mediterranean Slave Trade in the Nineteenth Century,” The American 
Historical Review (2012) 117 (2). 
23 Zilfi, Women and Slavery in the Late Ottoman Empire. 
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exploited the system they knew so well. Their story was not only about despair but also 
power, in which the dividing lines between the victim and the culprit, were at best thin, if 
they existed at all. The chapters that follow bring these issues to the fore.  
Largely an overview of the Caucasian customary law and the practices of blood 
revenge, princely plunder, and bride kidnapping associated with it, the first chapter 
examines the Caucasus region during the Caucasian wars, particularly at the end of its 
intensified phase between 1817–1864. It places these slave-producing practices in the 
larger social and political context of wartime Caucasus and looks at how they interfered 
with the Islamic Şer’i law, at a time when the meaning of Islam itself was going through 
significant changes in the region. The chapter also establishes that procurement of and 
trade in slaves were two separate processes, not necessarily organized by the same legal 
systems or orders.  Ultimately, it offers a “prehistory” for later chapters that traces the 
making or perpetuation of Circassianness as an enslaveable ethnic category.  
The second chapter follows the process of displacement and transplantation of 
Circassian tribes within the Ottoman domains. Building on the previous one, the chapter 
focuses on the complex intersection of 1) the Ottoman Reform Edict in 1856 and the 
subsequent legal reforms, 2) the trade ban in African slaves in 1857 and its transforming 
effects on Islamic law, and 3) the Circassian expulsion in the 1860s and the 
“transplanted” adat (customary law) in the Circassian settlements across the Ottoman 
Empire. In doing that, it aims to trace how legal practices were carried over with 
Caucasian refugee-immigrants to the Ottoman domains and how these different legal 
systems interplayed with or worked against each other in determining the limits of 
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slavery and freedom. Secondly, navigating within a set of what was literally called 
“freedom suits” (hürriyet davaları), it explores how slaves built their claims in relation to 
different legal terrains, problems, and concepts. Finally, it touches upon the ways in 
which these processes continued to bend the categories of ethnicity, race, and gender in 
the decades that followed the expulsion.  
While women were often central to the claims in these slave petitions, which 
constitute the main source base for the second chapter, they are hardly visible in the 
official documentation that described these legal processes. In fact, the reports on 
instances of conspicuous resistance always listed men as leaders within the Ottoman 
practice of slavery, whether they took up arms or pursued their claims through legal 
channels at the local or higher courts. Women and young girls on the other hand, whose 
flow, especially towards big cities like Istanbul or Cairo, had not ceased until the early 
twentieth century, developed other forms of relationships both with their owners and 
slavery as a practice.  The third chapter looks at a diverse group of women, with different 
racial, ethnic, and class associations to offer a glimpse of how slavery was understood, 
slave trade practiced and at times wielded as a weapon by them.  
Focusing on the immediate aftermath of the 1908 constitutional revolution, the 
fourth chapter explores in what sense slaves, particularly women slaves, made of freedom 
and how they positioned themselves vis-à-vis the new regime’s emancipatory efforts and 
failures that determined the limits of citizenship in the Ottoman Empire. Examining the 
idiom of freedom used by the Ottoman state, slave owners and slaves in distinct and often 
conflicting ways on the one hand and the bifurcated nature of the Ottoman legal system 
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on the other, it offers a glimpse of the social and political conditions that determined who 
was entitled to claim freedom and who was not at the time.  
The fifth and final chapter explores the “republicanization” of slavery and 
freedom after the inauguration of the Turkish Republic in 1923 and how the latter dealt 
with what the contemporary press called the “burdensome inheritance” of slaves and 
slavery in general. Focusing on the portrayals of the “twin relics,” that is slavery and 
polygamy, of an unwanted past embodied in the institution of harem, the chapter traces 
how the republican “project of regulated amnesia”24 dealt with the physical disposal of 
items found in the imperial harems. It also probed the republicanization of the law, in the 
sense that the republic eliminated at least the institutional bifurcation in the legal realm 
and became the sole authority in administering what was now understood as universal 
justice. 
 
                                                
24 Murat Ergin, “‘Is the Turk a White Man?’ Towards a Theoretical Framework for Race in the 
Making of Turkishness,” Middle Eastern Studies, 44:6 (2008), 837. 
 16 
Chapter One.  
Barbarians by Design 
 
“Their subsistence routines, their social organization, their physical dispersal, and 
many elements of their culture, far from being the archaic traits of a people left 
behind, are purposefully crafted both to thwart incorporation into nearby states and 
to minimize the likelihood that statelike concentrations of power will arise among 
them. State evasion and state prevention permeate their practices and, often, their 
ideology as well. They are, in other words, a “state effect.” They are “barbarians by 
design.” They continue to conduct a brisk and mutually advantageous trade with 
lowland centers while steering clear of being politically captured.”  
  James C. Scott, The Art of Not Being Governed1 
 
In late 1887, a group of newly immigrated Georgian families petitioned the palace 
secretariat in Istanbul to complain about an ongoing situation, “known to everyone native 
or foreign,” perpetrated by one of the aides-de-camp to Sultan Abdülhamid II, Çürüksulu 
Ali Pasha. Ali Pasha, himself of Georgian origin from Çürüksu (Kobulety, in today’s 
Georgia), allegedly threatened and frightened many families, particularly those who were 
poor and vulnerable like the ones who filed the petition, and forced them to hand their 
daughters to him. Coercing a number of these girls into slavery each month, the petition 
reported, Ali Pasha ran a slaving business with the help of his family members (most 
notably his brother-in-law, Arslan) between the settlements of Georgian immigrants in 
the eastern Black Sea coast and Istanbul, where the enslaved girls were subsequently 
                                                
1 James C. Scott, The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), 8. 
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brought to, either to be sold in exchange of money or to be presented as gifts to various 
grandee households.2  
The two reports that accompanied the petition, addressed to the palace secretariat 
and the governor of Trabzon, both cautioned the authorities to give utmost care not to 
“favor anyone when looking into the matter,” pointing at Ali Pasha’s high rank and close 
connections to the palace but also hinting at his ill repute, which he inherited from his 
family, known to be “at the center of a lucrative slave trade business” during most of the 
second half of the nineteenth century.3 Shortly after the authorities began investigating 
the case however, favor was no longer necessary for Ali Pasha’s part. During their 
interrogation, the families denied altogether that they filed such a petition and with what 
seems to be a series of false (or at best inconsistent and suspicious) statements, they tried 
to assure the police that they came to Istanbul of their own account. They were left with 
no means to make a living in their (newly adopted) hometown; so, far from being forced 
to leave, they said, they voluntarily traveled to Istanbul in search of jobs as servants or 
wet-nurses. As for their children, that is the three young girls mentioned in the petition, 
they were to be given away as evlatık, which meant fostering or adoption with the 
implicit purpose of servitude, a practice that often constituted a safe haven to all those 
who traded in slaves clandestinely.4  
                                                
2 Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivleri (The Ottoman Archives of the Prime Minister’s Office, hereafter 
BOA), Y.MTV 29/112, 1305.R.26 (11 January 1888). 
3 Oktay Özel, “Migration and Power Politics: The Settlement of Georgian Immigrants in Turkey 
(1878–1908),” Middle Eastern Studies, vol.46, no.4 (July, 2010), 487. 
4 BOA, Y.MTV 29/112, 1305.R.26 (11 January 1888). Nazan Maksudyan talks about an order 
issued by the Council of State in 1887, and an investigation carried out in 1899, against the 
widespread practice of deceiving “destitude girls or some poor and weak parents,” though which 
young female children were “continuously sold from one master to the next, such that they were 
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At the time of this incident, Çürüksulu Ali Pasha held a substantial amount of 
political power (as those who wrote the above mentioned reports were well aware), not 
only because of his high ranking position as the aide-de-camp and the brigadier general 
(his honorific title), but also because of his close connections to the palace and the sultan. 
His power was also due to his former position as the district governor of Ordu province in 
the eastern Black Sea coast, which blended with his services as the military commander 
in the Batum-Çürüksu/Kobulety area during the 1877–78 Russo-Turkish War,5 as well as 
his duties as the chief immigration officer for settling Georgian immigrants in the region 
in its aftermath. In the years that followed the war and the subsequent Treaty of 
Constantinople signed in 1879, Ali Pasha assumed the responsibility of settling 
approximately 150,000 Georgian immigrants in the region.6  
That an Ottoman statesman of Georgian origin was appointed to oversee his 
“fellow” Georgian immigrant subject-citizens was not unprecedented as far as the 
Ottoman state’s Caucasus policies went. In fact, the Ottoman state was accustomed to use 
its subjects of Caucasian origin or ancestry as the mediators in their dealings with the 
Caucasus region and its people. Paul B. Henze pointed out that, as early as the Treaty of 
                                                                                                                                            
engulfed by misery and prostitution.” See Nazan Maksudyan, “Foster-Daughter or Servant, 
Charity or Abuse: Beslemes in the Late Ottoman Empire,” Journal of Historical Sociology, vol. 
21 no., 4 December 2008, 500–501. 
5 The 1877–78 Russo-Turkish War was a watershed moment in late Ottoman history both in 
terms of international developments like the territorial loss and internal political shifts such as the 
prorogation of the 1876 parliament it instigated. It has further significance in relation to the scope 
of this study, as it brought on a second wave of Circassian migration from the Balkan provinces 
towards the Anatolian and Arabian Peninsula in its aftermath, a point revisited in the second and 
third chapters below. 
6 Özel, “Migration and Power Politics,” 478–79. The Treaty of Constantinople finalized the 
provisions of the San Stefano Treaty signed in 1878 and revised by the Congress of Berlin later 
that year, according to which Batumi, among several other south Caucasian localities, was ceded 
to Russia.  
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Küçük Kaynarca in 1774, when Ottomans decided to establish a formal representation in 
the Caucasus, they appointed a former Georgian slave, Ferah Ali Pasha as the first 
governor in the region.7 Later, in the 1860s, when the Ottoman government founded the 
Emigrant Commission to oversee the large inflow of Circassian refugees, it recruited its 
chief officials almost exclusively from among those who had Caucasian ancestry.8 
Çürüksulu Ali Pasha fit in this long-standing pattern. Yet unlike Ferah Ali Pasha, who 
governed parts of the North-Western Caucasus or Hafız Mehmet Ali Pasha who headed 
the Emigrant Commission, “Ali Bey Kobuletskiy”9 was nobility on his own account and 
in the late 1870s, the chief of his family, namely the Tavdgiridze family of Georgian 
nobility. Throughout the process of settling Georgian refugees as well as his earlier 
dealings with the people in his district, Ali Pasha acted not solely within the “classic 
frames of state power,” as Bruce Grant called it, but rather within the framework of a 
mixture of his powers as a statesman and his “princely” privileges and entitlements that 
referred back to the more complex, “varied and often competing Caucasus modes of 
power and authority.”10 Thus, “us[ing] and direct[ing] his fellow Georgian immigrants in 
their new homeland” as Oktay Özel argued, Ali Pasha established a power base for 
                                                
7 Paul B. Henze, “Circassian Resistance to Russia” in The North Caucasus Barrier: The Russian 
advance towards the Muslim world, ed. Marie Bennigsen Broxup, (New York, St. Martin’s Press, 
1992), 74. 
8 David Cameron Cuthell Jr., “The Muhacirin Komisyonu: An Agent in the Transformation of 
Ottoman Anatolia, 1860–1866” (Ph.D. Dissertation, Columbia University, 2005), 103–104. 
9 Candan Badem, “The Ottomans and the Crimean War (1853–1856)” (Ph.D. Dissertation, 
Sabancı University, 2007), 139. 
10 Bruce Grant, The Captive and the Gift: Cultural Histories of Sovereignty in Russia and  the 
Caucasus (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009), xv–xvi. 
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himself.”11 The extensive slave trade network that he inherited from his family (most 
notably his mother) and operated vigorously does not correspond solely to the image of a 
corrupt statesman, but also to what he thought was his noble privileges and entitlements, 
within a larger spectrum of competing sovereignties in the region. 
The incident that opens this chapter was not the first, nor only, recorded instance 
in which Ali Pasha’s name was mentioned in relation to the slave trade. Almost two 
decades prior, in the summer of 1859, Ali Pasha’s mother and the matriarch of the 
Tavdgiridze family, Dendine Hanım filed a petition to the office of the Grand Vizier with 
the purpose of denying all allegations against her son, who was being accused of 
murdering a man named Ibrahim, also a recent immigrant from Georgia to the Ottoman 
empire, and reportedly a recent convert to Islam. According to the brothers of the victim, 
Ali Pasha not only murdered Ibrahim, but also kidnapped two of his children whom he 
subsequently sold into slavery in Istanbul.12 In his defense, Dendine Hanım, “one of the 
most inveterate dealers in slaves” as Frederic Millingen called her,13 refuted on behalf of 
her son, not only the allegations of murder but the very existence of the victim himself. 
The plaintiffs, on other hand, claimed otherwise and by providing ample detail, reported 
that one of Ibrahim’s children, a 7-year-old girl named Ayşe, was sold to a certain Hacı 
                                                
11 Özel, “Migration and Power Politics,” 482. Özel rightly sees the pervasiveness of Georgian 
banditry in the region in the 1880s, which coincided with the process of settlement under Ali 
Pasha’s supervision as the indicator of this power.  
12 BOA, MVL 589/64, 1276 S 30 [sic] (possibly 27 September 1859).  
13 Frederic Millingen, “The Circassian Slaves and the Sultan’s Harem,” Journal of the 
Anthropological Society of London, 8 (1870–1871): cix–cxx, cx. Dendine Hanım’s name has 
several different spellings in archival sources, such as Dendene and Dendane. Millingen calls her 
Dindine. 
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Ismail Ağa in Istanbul by no other than Dendine Hanım herself.14 
Both Dendine Hanım, who “was most highly connected, and intimate with the 
Seraglio, as well as with many of the grandees,”15 and her equally “highly connected” son 
were aware of the illegal nature of their slave capturing and trading activities. In another 
case from October 1863, Dendine Hanım (who already had a bad reputation by that time 
for wrongfully seizing and enslaving Georgian girls from “both sides” of the border) 
reportedly perpetrated the smuggling of four Georgian girls, who were Russian subjects, 
and thus were being requested by the Russian consulate to be returned at once.16 When 
the girls were seized in the Trabzon port by the customs authorities, Dendine Hanım, well 
aware of their unlawful enslavement, did not claim them nor pursued their recovery; in 
fact, she did not even bother to leave the boat that brought her to Trabzon, but continued 
her way to Istanbul.17 Likewise, Ali Pasha was aware that what he was doing was not 
necessarily compliant with Ottoman state policies against the slave trade, which 
prohibited or at least brought limitations to trade both in Caucasian and African slaves, 
beginning with the imperial edicts of 1854 and 1857 respectively.18 Those two edicts and 
subsequent vizirial correspondences were followed by a series of draft laws, conventions 
and acts signed internationally.19 Yet none of these hindered Ali Pasha and his family in 
                                                
14 BOA, MVL 589/64, 1276.S.30 [sic] (27 September 1859). 
15 Millingen, “The Circassian Slaves and the Sultan’s Harem,” cx. 
16 BOA, MVL 658/80, 1280.Ca.1 (14 October 1863). 
17 Ibid. 
18 For a detailed overview of both documents, see Hakan Erdem, Slavery in the Ottoman Empire 
and its Demise, 1800–1909 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996), 102–113. FO 195/946, 
Consular Dispatch #35, 28 September 1869; Memoranda Re: White Slaves and Firman of 1854, 
1970; Consular Dispatch #36, 30 August 1870. 
19 Erdem, Slavery in the Ottoman Empire and its Demise, 125–151. 
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their pursuit of their “princely” entitlements and privileges. 
It was not that the Ottoman government or the palace was strictly enforcing the 
prohibition of the trade in slaves. In an earlier example, for instance, when the British 
consul effected the capture of fifty Circassian slaves at Trabzon port in 1858 and used his 
“endeavours to persuade the Governor General” to stop their shipment to Istanbul and 
“send them back to Circassia” in the following two weeks, the government allowed their 
passage on a Turkish steamer, simply stating that they were families emigrating to 
Istanbul.20 In a more striking example, when the British consular officials asked khedive 
Isma’il Pasha to enforce the prohibition on white slave traffic from Istanbul to Egypt, he 
stated that such traffic was carried mainly in Istanbul, “by the high dignitaries of the 
Turkish Empire,” that at least eighty percent of the pashas had made money by 
purchasing and reselling white slaves and that he himself had bought slaves from the 
present Grand Vizier Aali Pasha.21 Nevertheless, Ali Pasha and his family, and their acts 
of plunder, extortion, and other coercive means in slave procurement (enslaving freeborn 
Georgian girls “as if they were slaves or cariyes,” the families exclaimed in the above 
mentioned petition), stood apart from those manipulations or violations.22 They were 
                                                
20 FO 84/1060, Consular Dispatch #34, 15 April 1858, 130.  
21 FO 195/946, Slave Trade #5, from Colonel Stanton to the Earl of Clarendon, 14 October 1869. 
Similarly, a consular report from Jerusalem mentions a Turkish functionary sending for “a white 
slave from Constantinople itself, where his communication was duly respected.” FO 195/946, 
Moore to Foreign Office, 28 October 1869. 
22 It is important to note that the Tavdgiridze family in general and Ali Pasha in particular were 
not alone in slave procurement business. A consular report issued in Trabzon in 1869 noted that 
the local chiefs were the principal agents in the traffic (“a profitable one, it is said,” as it stated) in 
Georgian slaves, “kidnapped and sold from the Turco–Russian frontier provinces.” FO 195/946 
from Palgrave to Clarendon, 21 September 1869.  Just as the slave trade constituted the primary 
tie between the Caucasian princes and nobles and the Ottoman empire, İbrahim Köremezli 
pointed out that in the first half of the nineteenth century, the 370 families that immigrated to and 
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rather embodiments of, to invoke Bruce Grant once again, “competing sovereignties” in 
what can be called an extensive borderland and the vacuum that formed in between the 
conflicting realms of state, religious and customary law that stemmed from them. This 
chapter aims to trace enslaved bodies as “products” of these competing modes of 
sovereign power; modes that were not always pitted against each other, but sometimes 
cooperated in their coercive practices which Bruce Grant has listed as “raiding, the 
exchange of human proxies during warfare, and bride kidnapping, alongside related 
experiences of voluntary self-abnegation and exile.”23 As Grant further has argued, “to 
understand sovereignty in the Caucasus [of which, the eastern Black Sea coast as well as 
other refugee settlements of the Ottoman empire often functioned as extensions], one has 
to think historically not only about the practices of Russian governance [or Ottoman 
advances to form military or trade alliances] over time but with the equally historicized 
archive of the Caucasus’ many social worlds.”24 Briefly stated, the purpose of this 
chapter is to unpack some of these social worlds and draw connections from such 
practices as blood vengeance, raiding, bride kidnapping, and slavery to larger contexts of 
power and exploitation, with the aim of presenting a prehistory of coercive power that 
shaped not only the slaves’ experiences and their delayed emancipation in the Ottoman 
lands but also, as this dissertation aims to demonstrate, informed such categories of 
gender, age, beauty, as well as ethnic and racial classifications in the decades that 
followed.  
                                                                                                                                            
settled along the Black Sea coast of the empire drew their main source of income and wealth from 
slave trading with the Caucasus. İbrahim Köremezli, “The Place of the Ottoman Empire in the 
Russo-Circassian War (1830–1864),” (Master’s thesis, Bilkent University, 2004), 42, note 103.  





































































































































































































































Tracing the Origins of Slave Trade in the Ottoman Borderlands 
In his short story “Two Months in the Village,” the nineteenth century Adyghe25 
author Kalambii depicted a scene in which a group of young Adyghe girls go strawberry 
picking in the mountains, accompanied by the young men of their village.26 In this 
customary performance of implicit wooing, the narrator of the story (himself a young 
man who had just returned from his military education in St. Petersburg) pairs up with 
Zaliha, the beautiful, orphaned daughter of a noble family. When the group rushes 
altogether up around the hill, where strawberries were said to be plentiful, the narrator 
offers Zaliha a ride on his horse. When Zaliha accepts the offer and attempts to mount the 
horse, however, the horse becomes restless and rears up to throw her off of its back. The 
young man apologizes to Zaliha for his horse’s behavior, but for her it is not his or his 
horse’s fault.  “The horse is not accustomed to ‘women’s skirt,’” she says, “apparently no 
girl was abducted by it.” Abduction, or bride kidnapping as it is often called, first appears 
in passing in the story, as a flirtatious comment,27 but then returns to haunt the lovers, 
when Zaliha is abducted by the prince of the village, to be kept hidden and away from the 
                                                
25 Köremezli, “The Place of the Ottoman Empire in the Russo-Circassian War,” 5–6; Julius Von 
Klaproth, Travels in the Caucasus and Georgia Performed in the Years 1807 and 1808 (London: 
Henry Colburn, 1814), 249–264; Fedor Fedorovich Tornau, Bir Rus Subayının Kafkasya Anıları, 
trans. Keriman Vurdem (Ankara: Kafkas Derneği Yayınları, 1999), 93–95. 
26 Kalembiy (Kalambii, Adil-Girei Keshev, 1837–1872), “Köyde İki Ay” in Kalembiy’den Adıge 
Halk Öyküleri, trans. Abaze Ibrahim (Ankara: Kafdav Yayınları, 2010), 26. The story first 
appeared in 1860 in Russian (with the title “Dva mesiatsa v aule”) in the influential literary 
magazine Biblioteka Dlya Chteniya (The Reader’s Library), published in St. Petersburg from 
1834 to 1865. Writing largely for an urban middle-class Russian audience, and at a time when 
Great Reforms were in progress both in central Russia and the Caucasus, Kalambii’s writings 
were not untouched by the ideological currents of his time. He was presumably in dialog with the 
Russian romantic literature on the Caucasus, in one part transcribing Adyghe cultural practices 
and in another reinscribing Russian views of the Caucasus. Here, I read his stories against the 
grain and in most cases only for the details he mentions in passing. 
27 Zaliha’s comment also playfully mocks the narrator’s lack of knowledge or care of the local 
customs and practices. 
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narrator, a commoner and a Russian educated soldier, deemed unsuitable for the noble 
Zaliha.  
Bride kidnapping, a custom widely practiced in the entire region, appears in 
almost all of Kalambii’s stories also. In his most famous one “Abrecler” (Abreks), the 
kidnapping of a girl serves as the decisive event that shapes the story. When a young man 
kidnaps a girl against her will28 and hides her in his friend’s house, the villagers, 
particularly the elders and the girl’s family, demand the host to give the girl back, to 
which the host finally, and grudgingly, consents. In what follows however, he sets out to 
avenge all those who forced him to act contrary to the customary law (adat or xabze, as 
called by the Adyghe), which orders a host to protect his guests under any 
circumstances.29 In another story, “Kukla/Pipxe” (Puppet), the issue of bride kidnapping 
appears more directly related to a sovereign’s power and authority.30 When an elderly and 
powerful prince uses his power and influence to marry the young and beautiful noble girl 
                                                
28 As opposed to an arranged abduction, which happened occasionally to circumvent the parents’ 
or elders’ opposition to the marriage or a high bride price set for the girl. 
29 Kalembiy, “Abrecler,” 106–109. “Abreks” was first published with the title “Abreki” in 1860, 
in Russkii vestnik for a similarly urban middle-class audience. See Rebecca Gould, 
“Transgressive Sanctity The Abrek in Chechen Culture,” for a brief note on the author in Kritika: 
Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History 8, 2 (Spring 2007), 272. A similar case is 
recounted by John Baddeley, The Rugged Flanks of the Caucasus (Arno Press, New York, 1973), 
2: 136–7, quoted in Kristin Collins-Breyfogle, “ Negotiating Imperial Spaces: Gender, Sexuality 
& Violence in the Nineteenth–century Caucasus,” (Ph.D. Dissertation, The Ohio State University, 
2011), 15. For the significance of the notion of host (or konag) see J.A. Longworth, A Year 
Among the Circassians, vol. 1 (London: Henry Colburn Publisher, 1840), 224, quoted in Paul 
Manning, “Just Like England: On the Liberal Institutions of the Circassians,” Comparative 
Studies in Society and History, vol.51, no.3 (2009), 600. For its connection to slavery, see Liubov 
Kurtynova-D’Herlugnan, The Tsar’s Abolitionists: The Slave Trade in the Caucasus and Its 
Suppression (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 30. 
30 The original medium that this story first appeared remains unclear, but it is very likely that like 
the other two stories that are mentioned above, this one was also published in Russian and for 
similar audience. 
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Naziha, he realizes that what he himself has extorted could easily be snatched away by 
another.31 Not that he particularly cared about Naziha, the author noted. The prince was 
concerned about his own power and authority, which was eventually violated by his son 
with horrific consequences.32  
What also appears as a recurring theme in Kalambii’s stories is stealing, or rather 
the obligation to steal, particularly for the Adyghean aristocracy. Again in “Kukla 
(Pipxe),” when boasting about his righteous life, Prince Tépserıque admits to have 
“driven off nine or ten heads of cattle in his youth.” However, he did not do it to improve 
his property, he explicates, but to keep his name and honor as a prince, unblemished. 
Contrary to what Kalambiĭ exemplifies with Prince Tépserıque, however, stealing was 
more than a heroic act in the Caucasus. In addition to establishing their reputations, the 
princes and the nobility in the Caucasus did in fact make their fortunes or ensured 
privileged status for their offspring through plunder.33 “The ideal image of a Circassian 
noble,” Liubov Kurtynova-D’Herlugnan noted “was that of a lucky predator, who spent 
his time robbing and plundering his neighbors but who was never caught.”34 While being 
caught brought “infinite shame,” Kurtynova-D’Herlugnan added, successful expeditions 
were considered to be the proof of “gallantry and virility.”  Writing in the late 1830s, 
James Stanislaus Bell stated:  
[the princes and the nobility] still indulged in one of the ancient privileges 
of “their order”; that of assembling for exploits of plunder, either in 
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neighbouring provinces or in Russia (notwithstanding their quasi peace 
with her), having their faces masked for fear of discovery, and speaking 
together a language not understood by others, or perhaps a mere “slang” of 
the craft, to prevent the intrusion of the uninitiated.35  
 
Moreover, since the main source of their wealth was slaves, the primary export 
commodity of the region, they stole, more often than not, people and they were, as 
Kurtynova-D’Herlugnan called them, slave traders.36 There were some tribes or clans that 
were ruled by councils of elders, or as Kurtynova-D’Herlugnan noted, popular assemblies 
and elected magistrates. Those too, however, valued “military prowess and gallantry” as 
civic virtue and thrived upon slave raiding and pillaging. The main difference, as 
Kurtynova-D’Herlugnan pointed out, was that raiding, warfare, and as their product, 
slave trading, were not the privilege of the princes and the nobility, but open to all free 
commoners, as well.37 
Abduction, raiding, and pillaging were not particular to the Caucasus but endemic 
to all societies that were “caught up in a process of extreme social stratification,” who 
customarily reduced their less powerful neighbors to slavery, as Pierre Clastres asserted, 
to benefit from a steady inflow of captives, as well as a substantial supply of labor 
power.38 For James C. Scott, economies of raiding and pillaging pertained not only to the 
societies that aimed to circumvent chronic labor shortages, but also those who aimed to 
                                                
35 James Stanislaus Bell, Journal of a Residence in Circassia during the Years 1837, 1838, and 
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keep larger states (as the Russian or Ottoman empires for the case at hand) always “at 
arm’s length.” “Barbarians by design,” as Scott described them, they maintained “a brisk 
and mutually advantageous trade with lowland centers while steering clear of being 
politically captured.”39 Like their North African counterparts, the Berbers, who 
considered raiding as their “agriculture,”40 an economy based on plunder was more than 
incidental in the Caucasus:  
“Most, if not all, the characteristics that appear to stigmatize hill 
peoples—their location at the margins, their physical mobility, their 
swidden agriculture, their flexible social structure, their religious 
heterodoxy, their egalitarianism, and even the nonliterate, oral cultures—
far from being the mark of primitives left behind by civilization, are better 
seen on a long view as adaptations designed to evade both state capture 
and state formation. They are, in other words, political adaptations of 
nonstate peoples to a world of states that are, at once, attractive and 
threatening.”41 
 
The Caucasian societies did not always neatly fit into the description of the nonstate 
peoples where “sovereignty and taxes ended” and “ethnicity and tribes began,”42 as the 
coercive power of the sovereign seems to be a principle aspect of the social relations. Bell 
asserted:  
“[their] princes and the higher class of nobles still possessed considerable 
power over their own serfs even that of life and death, and of transference 
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by sale to others, when they have committed crimes. They also preside at 
public trials and decide upon the fines to be imposed upon persons who 
commit offences; but these fines, and also the proceeds of the sale of 
culprits as slaves, by way of punishment, are appropriated as here. They 
raise no revenue from the people...43 
 
 
Yet they did not clearly fit into the picture depicted by Paul E. Lovejoy in relation to 
emerging or expanding Muslim states in Africa either, which used raiding, plunder, and 
the slave trade as a means to coercive state-making and integration into the regional 
economy and politics.44 Slaves procured in the Sahel in Africa and sold both to the 
Ottoman market and Atlantic system were products of these raiding economies that 
constituted the integral part of their state-building processes. In the Caucasus, on the 
other hand, there was no equivalent to Usman dan Fodio and the Fulani Jihad, but the 
local princes and nobles there too used raiding, plunder, warfare, and the slave trade to 
maintain the existing hierarchies and their own power and authority. 
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Image 1.2 “Cotes de la Mer Noire. Parti tcherkesse allant faire du butin,” in Le Caucase pittoresque 




The act of abduction itself, particularly of women had been, as Leslie Peirce 
argued for the case of the early modern Ottoman world, the core of sovereign power, so 
much so that “to validate [any] dynasty’s claim to “distinguished origin,” [a chronicle] 
listed six points, the second of which was that “the hand of a conqueror never touched 
their spouses.”45 The implication was, Peirce argued, “the unstated presumption of using 
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them for sex,” but the humiliation could also be related to sovereigns’ dependents, 
particularly his wife, being reduced to slavery, as was the case with the wife of Bayezid I, 
who was reportedly forced to perform menial services.46 In fact, the very first military 
victory of Osman (“the eponymous first ruler of the nascent state” as Peirce described 
him) had an abduction story at its center; abduction of a village woman, “the first and 
precipitating event in Osman’s path to power.”47  “By abduction and adultery,” Georges 
Duby argued, “male sexuality undermined the rules governing the society. Abductors of 
women destroyed marriage contracts, committing a public crime that caused hatred 
between families, gave rise to reprisals, and defiled and divided the community.”48 In a 
similar vein, in the Caucasus, abduction of women was tightly knit with the political 
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realm, also serving as one of the main causes that triggered and exacerbated blood feuds 
and blood revenge,49 which, according to Paul Manning, constituted the main pretext for 
pillage and the economy that was largely based on it.50 Both Paul Manning and Georges 
Charachidze identified blood revenge, pillage, and in an indirect way abduction, as the 
core of what they called the “princely commerce” or “princely economies” of the 
Caucasus: 
Commerce was controlled and organized by the nobility, run by the 
intermediation of commercial buyers who were strangers (Turks or Tatars) 
installed on the coast of the Black Sea. The nobles imported manufactured 
goods, weapons, prestige objects, which they redistributed to their 
‘vassals.’ . . . But the ‘commercial balance’ of the Circassian princes 
would have remained in the deficit . . . If they had not had another source 
of revenues, namely pillage. The aristocracy devoted themselves to this 
nearly half of the year, from spring to the end of summer, procuring thus 
regularly weapons, horses, slaves. This surplus allowed them to engage in 
exportation, especially of horses and slaves, also to entertain their vassals, 
an indispensable mechanism for maintaining the social structure. This 
complex and diversified cycle of exchanges combining agricultural 
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production, commerce and pillage has exercised considerable influence on 
the Circassian vendetta, provoking distortions, ‘anomalies,’ . . . distortions 
accentuated by the very nature of political and juridical power, left to the 
discretion of the aristocracy.51 
 
One of these distortions had to do with the corporate nature of the blood feuds. 
Charachidze argued that when a prince, or a member of the aristocracy, was involved in 
such a feud, either as the victim or the perpetrator, all of his dependents (sometimes an 
entire clan or a tribe) took part in taking vengeance.52 “The revenge of the princes and 
nobles,” as Charachidze stated, “was not limited solely to their personal enemies but 
extended to all of their dependents,” as well as their property, and as a result “entire 
villages were decimated, crops destroyed, and people were left without houses or food.”53 
Avenging parties customarily invaded villages of what they deemed the enemy territory, 
burnt everything, killing and capturing prisoners, “seizing the cattle and taking anything 
that could be taken.”54 Blood revenge did not have an expiration date, either. In 1853, a 
prince attacked a village (vassal of another prince with whom the former had a long 
existing feud) and took about forty women and children as slaves. Forty years later, a 
descendant of the wronged prince attacked the village of the opposing party, 
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“exterminated all the men and boys, cut the breasts of women and took a great number of 
slaves, most of whom were sold to Turks afterwards.”55  
Unceasing or prolonged blood feuds were not reserved for princes and nobility. In 
one case from 1830, an Ossetian peasant was reportedly gagged, “tied to a pole [...] taken 
to Dagestan, and sold into slavery.”56 The victim’s son, who deemed vengeance not only 
his right but also his obligation, avenged his father’s abduction and sale into slavery by 
killing the abductor’s son thirty-five years later.57 However, both the corporate character 
and the potential long durations of the feuds (particularly when thought in combination 
with the “substitutionability” of slavery for death, which Orlando Patterson talked 
about,58 and vice versa, as illustrated in the previous example) had important 
consequences, due to sharply varying blood prices between princes, nobles, commoners 
or slaves, and helped, as Manning argued, building a “princely monopoly on foreign 
trade, particularly the trafficking of harem slaves to the Ottoman empire.”59 The trade in 
these “prestige slaves,” for Manning “accounted for a major impetus for the transition to 
“market-based” feuding system amongst coastal Circassian princes.”60 Thus, the 
economy of slavery, closely knit to abduction, pillaging and blood feuds, “enabled the 
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proliferation of princely retainers, considerably augmenting the prince’s ability to 
continue pillaging,” and rendering the princes and the aristocracy in general, not as the 
“agents of order but disorder,”61 in which blood money and slaves appeared as a 
“universal measure of exchange.”62 A passage on the Abkhaz customary law, which 
appeared in the Russian state-sponsored newspaper Kavkas in 1866 and quoted by 
Kurtynova-D’Herlugnan, is illustrative of this particular point: 
The decisions of the courts of law usually involved a customary penalty 
(according to adats), which was paid by the guilty party to the plaintiff. 
For example, the penalty for the murder of a prince was 38 young boys, a 
horse with a saddle and full set of mountaineer’s armaments. Someone, 
who had killed a nobleman had to pay 16 young boys, a horse with a 
saddle and armaments; for the murder of a free commoner the penalty was 
2 young boys, a gun and a saber. The height of the above mentioned boys 
had to satisfy the requirements of the adats: they were measured by a 
certain number of palm lengths of the plaintiff. Sometimes the boys could 
be substituted for cattle.63 
 
George Charachidze similarly demonstrated the differences in blood pricing for the 
Adyghe and other Circassian societies, whose social structure and stratification was 
similar to that of the Abkhaz. In the formers, however, the distinction between the two 
ends of the hierarchical order, that is, between the prince in one end and the serf or the 
slave on the other, was more accentuated. Thus the blood price varied more sharply, 
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sometimes rendering the blood price of a prince practically incalculable.64 As 
Charachidze exemplified, in around 1860, when a Kabardian prince of Atazhukin clan (in 
the eastern part of Circassia) was killed by the Karachay (Tatar people of the North 
Caucasus), the Atazhukin clan set the blood so high that the entire Karachay clan 
combined would not be able to pay it.65 As a contemporary put it in 1826 “the horrible 
custom of blood revenge gives rise to an unstoppable series of murder and plunder which 
in the end would reduce the people to the level of African tigers and lay low the 
population of this region like the plague if the related customs of hospitality and the 
peculiar spirit of the bonds of friendship that is famous in the Caucasus under the name of 
kunachestvo did not place several limits to this torrent of destruction.”66 
 
Entangled Legalities 
Witnessing a blood feud-related murder in Abkhazia in the 1830s, Fedor 
Fedorovich Tornau stated that in the event that both parties agreed, the matter could be 
brought to a court; that of customary or Islamic law, to be decided and agreed upon by 
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each party. According to Şer’i law, Tornau noted, all Muslims were deemed equal and 
thus, the blood of a prince had the same value as the blood of a serf. According to adats 
on the other hand, as argued above, a prince’s life was more expensive than a peasant’s or 
serf’s. Thus, he concluded, the princes and nobles always opted for customary law, and 
the peasants and serfs, for the religious Şer’i courts, and since an agreement was rarely 
reached on this, very few of the blood feud cases (especially if they were not likely to 
turn into a prolonged, total tribal warfare) were actually brought to a court.67 This was the 
case even in more distinctively Muslim (hence deemed more egalitarian)68 parts of the 
Caucasus like Dagestan (in North-East Caucasus) and Chechnya, which, had a long 
history and tradition of muridism (more so than any other part of the Caucasus), which 
implied, at least in theory, that Islamic religious legal code had the upper hand, rather 
than customary law. There too, however, the relationship between the customary and 
Islamic legal codes remained in flux and was far from following a linear progress. They 
too commonly raided neighboring communities and abducted people, “as rather a 
pleasant plunder, [took] them away, and [sold] them as slaves,” to Turkish or Crimean 
slave-merchants and made considerable profits.69 Like in the rest of the Caucasus, they 
converted their “kanlys and needy debtors into slaves.”70 
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Paul B. Henze argued that Islam, like Christianity that reached the region before 
it, was merely a “veneer over traditional beliefs and customs.”71 One reason for this was 
that Islamization of the Caucasus people was relatively a recent phenomenon. As late as 
1760s, Circassians, As Klaproth stated, “proved themselves Mohammedans by little else 
than by their abstinence from swine flesh and wine.”72 Even in Dagestan and Chechnya, 
Islam became an official religion only in the second half of the eighteenth century. 
Ingush people, described as an “incredible picture of complete religious chaos,” 
converted to Islam only in 1862.73 Drawing from the nineteenth century Russian scholar 
Andria Shegren, Anna Zelkina described the degree of religious syncretism among the 
Ingush as follows: “The mullahs feel free to call upon Muslims when the bells ring, the 
Kist [Ingush] idol Gel-erda stands in peace in an old church built by Queen Tamara, 
which now lies abandoned.”74 Religious syncretism was not particular to the Ingush 
alone. Tornau wrote that there were many families among the Abkhazians that had both 
Muslim and Christian members and that this situation was never deemed unusual or 
harmed family relations.75 Abkhazians, according to Tornau, had not forgotten their 
Christian mores after they were proselytized by the Turks in the sixteenth century.76 
Muslim Abkhazians drank wine and ate pork, while the newly (re)converted Christians 
sought out ways to take a second wife. They celebrated Christmas together, and both 
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respected the “holy forests,” and feared the “spirit of the mountains.”77 Klaproth made a 
similar argument in relation to the Abazeh, that they had “strictly speaking, no religion, 
and [ate] pork,” although nobles reportedly began professing Islamism in recent years.78 
Klaproth stated that likewise the Tatars had no religion either, and that the common 
people worshipped “whom they call Tägri and not Allah, as the giver of all good, and the 
prophet Elijah (Nebi Ilia), who, according to them, frequently appears on the summits of 
the highest mountains, and to whom they offer sacrifices of lambs, milk, butter, cheese, 
and beer (ssra), accompanied with singing and dancing.”79 Klaproth further argued that 
under the influence of the Circassians, the Tatar chiefs embraced the Mohammedan faith, 
although except for the Karachay they neither had mosques, nor priests; the latter having 
been converted to Islamism in 1780s, by a Kabardian priest named Isaak Effendi, who 
was “in the pay of the Porte.”80 “Ever since the peace of Kütschük Kanardshi in 1774,” 
Klaproth wrote, “the Porte has endeavored to spread the religion of Mohammed, by 
means of ecclesiastical emissaries, in the Caucasus, and especially among the 
Circassians...”81 
Anna Zelkina argued that the degree of Islamization in Dagestan and Chechnya 
(with implications for other parts of the Caucasus) could be observed through its 
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reflection in these communities’ legal systems and “the balance between shari’a and 
‘adat legislature within it.” The common claim of the contemporaries who assumed the 
civil matters and criminal offences were neatly settled in accordance with Şer’i law and 
adat respectively, did not always hold, nor did it do justice to the complexities of the 
ways in which Islam had penetrated to the region.82 Zelkina notes that the more 
accessible lowland settlements, such as the Chechen villages, Şer’i law had a more 
discernable influence on the codes of adat, whereas in the highland areas, it existed only 
superficially and the legal system remained largely based on customary law.83 While 
family matters, such as marriage, divorce, or burial were under the jurisdiction of Islamic 
law, for instance, this did not mean that old practices were completely abandoned. 
“Thus,” Zelkina exemplified “throughout the North Caucasus the tradition of umykanie 
(kidnapping) of a bride by a groom, persisted, although even in these cases, the marriage 
was considered to be valid only after approval by a religious official.”84 More 
importantly, however, these two legal orders were at odds with each other:  
There are a number of fundamental differences between the Islamic and 
pre-Islamic tribal legal systems. The most important are, firstly, 
differentiation between personal and collective responsibility for a crime 
(one of the main characteristics of tribal society being the principle of 
shared responsibility – ‘one for all and all for one’ – while Islam 
introduced the notion of personal responsibility); secondly, differentiation 
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between deliberate and accidental crimes and the establishment of 
different degrees of punishment for them, a concept which was wholly 
alien to the pre-Islamic tribal societies; thirdly, the concept of balance 
between the damage inflicted and the punishment; and fourthly, legal 
procedure and the means of carrying out justice (i.e. judges, executive 
officers, type of oath etc.).85 
 
The differentiation between these two legal systems in terms of accidental-deliberate 
crimes and collective-personal responsibilities were particularly important for crimes 
involving blood-revenge. Although Şer’i law recognized the legitimacy of blood-revenge, 
Zelkina argued, it prohibited taking revenge on collective basis, and prefered settling the 
dispute in peaceful ways. For the Dagestanis, Chechens, and the Ingush, accepting blood 
money was a dishonor and humiliation. In other parts of the Caucasus, as discussed 
above, uneven blood pricing claimed more bodies and instigated even more violence.  
Thus, there existed a certain degree of irreconcilability between these two orders, which 
strictly kept such practices as blood revenge, bride kidnapping or abduction in general, 
and as their product, slave procurement, trade, and slavery itself, outside of the 
jurisdiction of Islamic law.86 As Zelkina further notes: “with the collective responsibility 
and no distinction being made between murder and manslaughter, long-lasting blood-
feuds involving whole clans and tribes could lead to the mutual extermination of their 
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entire male population [and female population, needless to say, by abduction/ 
enslavement].”87  
Students of Ottoman slavery have often been perplexed by the fact that Ottomans 
enslaved, in violation of the Şer’i code, their fellow Muslim peoples of the Caucasus. 
One explanation given was that the preexisting slave caste and the corresponding legal 
status made the trade in fellow Muslims permissible vis-à-vis Islamic law.88 However, 
both the question and explanation not only fail to notice that the slave procurement and 
slave trade were separate mechanisms, but also presume a uniform Islamic identity 
through all stages of the trade, as well as adherence to Islamic legal order among the 
Caucasus communities, with ample attention given to the problem of “just enslavement,” 
which did not exist.89 What has also been argued was that it was common practice that 
the slave-holding classes sold their slaves and non-slave holding commoner/peasants 
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their children.90 Quoting from a Russian survey from 1823, however, Liubov Kurtynova-
D’Herlugnan demonstrated that was rarely the case:  
Although bonded people can be sold [...] it is generally regarded as a 
dishonor to the master and, since custom here is stronger than the law, it is 
rarely done. Such a humanitarian attitude may seem contradictory because 
slave trade is an ancient and a respected occupation in the Caucasus. It 
may be explained by saying that slaves for sale are taken as spoils of war 
and later they change hands and are eventually sold [to the traders]. Such 
are the customs not only of the mountaineers, but also of the Mingrel 
princes. When they make war with each other, their first goal is to take as 
many prisoners as possible. Later the prisoners are taken to Poti, to 
Anaklia, to Anapa or other ports for sale. Therefore, everybody sells not 
his own bonded people, but somebody else’s.91 
 
Kurtynova-D’Herlugnan concluded that except “in perceived dire need or in case of 
blatant disobedience,” princes and nobles did not sell their slaves, nor did fathers sell 
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91 Kurtynova-D’Herlugnan, The Tsar’s Abolitionists, 28. 
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their children.92 Klaproth argued that “the common notion, that the Turkish seraglios are 
chiefly supplied with [Circassian women], is totally unfounded; for the Circassians very 
rarely sell people of their country to the Turks, but only captive slaves.”93 In Kalembiy’s 
story “ Kukla (Pipxe),” Naziha’s father refers to slave trade as a curse or at best a source 
of humiliation. Rather than marrying her beautiful and talented daughter to someone less 
than a prince, he exclaims, he would rather sell her to a Turkish slave trader!94 Tornau 
also mentioned that Circassians did not sell their daughters, but only those who they 
captured in raids and occasionally their own slaves. In one instance, he meets Han, one of 
the enslaved servants of a local Abezeh prince, a fifteen year old girl “with fair hair,” 
who was kept apart from other servants, dressed and trained “to be sold to the Turks.”95  
 
“To Constantinople—to be sold!” 
It is not possible to argue the wholesale inexistence of such cases of self-
enslavement or enslavement by relatives, as there is documentary evidence, particularly 
in British archives, which underlines the pervasiveness of Caucasian parents selling their 
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children into slavery. A consular report from Erzurum, for one, discussed (after stating 
that there was discernable trade in Georgian, Chechen and Circassian slaves in the 
province) the ways in which these slaves [most of whom were children aged between 
eight and fourteen] were obtained. According to the report, they were procured “from that 
part of the Russian territory touching the Turkish border between Batoom [Batumi] and 
Akhalsik [Akhaltsikhe].” It continued:  
 
The people engaged in the trade are dependents or servants of the local 
Beys of Ajerreh [Adjara]—a district of the Trebizond [Trabzon] vilaiet 
[province]—who, either by raid into the Russian territory kidnap them 
secretly, or buy them openly from their parents. [...] They are not 
generally disposed of in this vilaiet but are sent away for sale to the 
contiguous vilaiets of Diarbekr, Aleppo, and Baghdad. I may add that 
Turkish subjects as well, native of Ajerreh as also the Tchetchen and 
Circassian immigrants from Russia, sell their children into slavery—the 
females under the Nikkah [marriage contract] system and the males for 
servitude—and that, when official reclamations are made by Foreign 
Authorities for the restitution of kidnapped Georgians to their families, the 
local government authorities invariably assert and attempt to prove their 
assertion, that they belong to the latter classes—consequently Turkish 
subjects—and are not Georgians, while at the same time, the main 
question of slavery itself is invariably overlooked... 96 
 
Another report, this time written by the consular office in Istanbul, stated that white 
slavery “was not accompanied with cruelty” and that the parents were in the habit of 
breeding the “girls for sale, they themselves look to it for position and settlement in life—
                                                
96 FO 195/946 Consular Dispatch from Consul Taylor to Earl Clarendon, 20 September 1869.  
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as do girls in other countries.”97 Similarly, a draft of a pamphlet, submitted to Yıldız 
Palace in 1883, repeated the same claim, particularly in regards to Georgians, stating that 
their habit of selling their children to various countries has been in effect for a long 
time.98 Klaproth made the same argument earlier in the nineteenth century, only in 
relation to the Mingrelia, Imereti, and Guria parts of Georgia, that the inhabitants of these 
places subsisted through agriculture and the sale of their children.99 Liubov Kurtynova-
D’Herlugnan observed that such romantic ideas were common in the nineteenth century, 
among the European travelers to the region, who “visited the Caucasus were, apparently, 
also left under the impression that slavery was the most desirable fate for any Circassian 
girl.”100 August von Haxthausen’s account of the recovery and manumission of six 
Circassian enslaved women, which he claimed to have witnessed, is a good example of 
this particular reasoning: 
In announcing to the girls their liberation, the [Russian] General ordered 
them to be informed, that the choice was open to them, to be sent back to 
their homes with the Prince of their own race, or to marry Russians and 
Cossacks of their free choice, to return with me to Germany, where all 
women are free, or lastly to accompany the Turkish Captain, who would 
sell them in the slave-market at Constantinople. The reader will hardly 
credit that, unanimously and without a moment’s consideration, they 
exclaimed, “To Constantinople—to be sold!” There is scarcely any people 
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more proud and jealous of their liberty, and yet this was the voluntary 
answer of these women.”101 
 
Von Haxthausen concluded that if one looked at the views, thoughts and habits of “this 
Eastern people,” the answer given by the women would be in complete agreement with 
their notions:     
The purchase and sale of women is deeply rooted in the custom of the 
nation: every man buys his wife from the father or from the family. On the 
part of the women no feeling of shame is attached to the transaction, but 
rather a sense of honor; and indeed, before we can pronounce on the 
subject, we must be intimately acquainted with the circumstances, and 
must be able to place ourselves exactly in the position of the Circassians. 
In her own country, a Circassian girl lives in a state of slavish dependence 
on her father and brothers; her position is therefore raised when a man 
demands her in marriage, and stakes his fortune to obtain her, at the same 
time that he liberates her from the servile constraint of her family.102 
 
Ivan Golovin, on the other hand, argued that the supporters of Count Vorontsov and the 
concessions he made to the Circassians were also responsible for these perceptions. 
According to them:  
 
“The slave-trade is indispensible to the existence of the mountaineers, and 
the daughters of the Caucasus are too happy to dwell in the harems of 
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Constantinople, as in fact, the sisters and the mothers of the Sultans are 
Circassian women; being brought up in the religion of Mahomet, their fate 
would not be different if they remained in their own country; besides can 
they grieve for parents who sold them?” The supporters of the slave-trade 
are not, it must be admitted, scrupulous about principles. But what would 
they answer if we told them that life in harems is not so happy as they are 
pleased to say? [...] The slave trade was sanctioned by a treaty of 1847, 
between Russians and Circassians. During part of the year it is carried on 
openly on the Black Sea. Every year more than 1,000 young girls are 
carried from Circassia to Turkey; and the obstacles opposed to that trade 
have had no other result than to quadruple the price of slaves. Even 
Austrian steam boats are employed to for carrying Circassian girls; and 
whenever the Russians capture any of these slave boats, they either give 
the girls in marriage to the Cossacks, or they allow them to be violated by 
the soldiers of the regiments garrisoned in the neighboring forts.103 
 
Whether this was merely an attempt to reason with what seemed to be a strange custom 
on Von Haxthausen’s and other foreign travelers’ side (they understood it as the sale of 
the nation’s women by the nation)104, or it was the proliferation, as Golovin suggested, of 
an official justification of Russians’ acts, particularly failures, in the region is difficult to 
say. In either case, such presumptuous descriptions attributed a unity, as well as ethnic 
and religious uniformity to the Caucasus that it did not have, even during the Shamil 
War, and failed, according to Kurtynova-D’Herlugnan, to recognize the fact that the 
majority of the Caucasian slaves transported to the Ottoman Empire were captured in 
                                                
103 Ivan Golovin, The Caucasus (London: Trübner & Co., 1854), 22. 
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raids. Moreover, in a region, which was called by Thomas Barrett as the “land without 
labor,” whose most definitive feature was chronic labor shortages, made worse by disease 
and constant fighting, raiding, and plunder,105 voluntary release of family members, 
except in cases of necessity, does not seem plausible.106 Klaproth reported that such tribes 
as the Abezeh strengthened themselves not solely by reproduction, but also by “carrying 
off captives from among the neighboring tribes, whom they employed in the operations 
of agriculture,” pointing at the fact that the objective of raiding was not always (and only) 
obtaining captives for slave trade but also the compensation of labor shortages.107 
Moreover, that the Caucasian settlements were often founded in remote places (difficult 
to locate without the help of a guide) and the village houses were arranged to form a 
circle in the middle where the “defenseless people are held in case of attack,” or that the 
villages reportedly kept watchmen, all hinted at the pervasiveness of predatory raids in 
the region and defense strategies developed against them.108  The fact that slaves were 
almost always bartered in exchange of such scarce or controlled commodities as salt, 
arms, and ammunition makes it more likely that the impelling factor of slave procurement 
comprised larger mechanisms than the sporadic sale of children by their parents and 
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involved a highly organized system of trade, as well as raiding groups, whose numbers, 
depending on the target of the raid, could reach hundreds or even thousands.109  
Thomas Barrett argued that a successful raiding expedition typically involved 
small numbers of attackers, either mounted or on foot, depending on the purpose of the 
attack.110 If the raiders aimed at capturing only few people and a few head of cattle, the 
raid would be undertaken on foot.111 Those parties focused mainly on traveling women 
and children, particularly girls, who worked the fields or ran such errands as carrying 
foodstuff or water, “outside the village or settlement walls, with little or no armed cover,” 
which made them easy targets.112 The mounted parties attacked larger groups or 
settlements guarded by men and/or “drove off large herds of cattle and horses and flocks 
of sheep...”113 In Kalembiy’s “Abreks,” the narrator describes their raid into a village as 
follows: 
Children were playing tip-cat at the verge of the ditch. When they saw us 
they stopped playing and started staring at us. It seemed as if they were 
about to get suspicious. Yismel and I got closer, grabbed two of them, and 
clutching them tightly under our arms we got out. The others ran away 
screaming. Hearing their scream, two or three men came running near the 
ditch and emptied their bullets after us. They flew whistling, left and right. 
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A group [of men] started chasing us on their horses but our horses had 
been in the barn in the past two weeks, they were fast as an arrow. Still, 
they got nearer; we could hear their cursing. Harıçet was behind us; he 
turned around and shot at them. Smoke of the gunpowder concealed 
[Harıçet] and the followers for a while. Then we heard gun shot again, two 
or three times. We turned around to look and saw three horses with empty 
saddles heading back to the village... 
 
The raiders finally go into hiding in the forest and shortly after set out to rid themselves 
off of their spoils (for the narrator maintains that such booty should not be kept near the 
enemy), trading them with a local prince in exchange of two horses, garments, and a 
Turkish revolver.114 Klaproth wrote that the tribes that lived near Kuban River did not 
“venture to retain their prisoners, lest they should seek refuge in the Russian territory, and 
therefore sell them to the Abazeh, who again dispose of them to the yet more remote 
Kubichan inhabiting the country beyond the snowy mountains contiguous to the sea.” 
“They are thence,” Klaproth added, “transported to Anatolia and Egypt.”115  
Regardless of its size and purpose, raids were never “indiscriminate burning and 
plunder,”116 but always well planned and involved more people than those who did the 
raiding. For campaigns of military character, Barrett argued, “the raiders learned the 
troop strength, weakness along the line, and other opportunities from spies, Russian 
deserters, native villagers who lived close to the Terek, native traders, and others familiar 
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with the Russian side.”117 The raiders planned both the entry and exit of their attack very 
carefully for weeks; attacked very swiftly and more often than not, at night.118 Primary 
goal was to take as many captives as possible. Some raids had specific and decisively 
limited targets. In one instance, told by Tornau, an impoverished noble family called 
upon a meeting and decided to pursue a blood feud they previously had with an Abezeh 
family, to rid themselves off of their poverty. Consequently, a small group consisting of 
the clan’s young men raided the family, stole a “young, beautiful” girl whom they sold to 
the Turks afterwards.119 In rare occasions, the “Turks” themselves did the raiding. In one 
of these cases, three children, aged twelve to sixteen, were kidnapped by small bands of 
armed infantry, reportedly “in Ottoman outfit.” Captured in different times, while 
traveling alone in the countryside surrounding the city of Ozurgeti (in Georgia’s Guria 
district on the Ottoman border), the children were quickly disposed of: first brought to the 
house of a local man (possibly from nobility as his name, Bayraktar, indicates), 
predetermined as a safe keep, and then sold to Ottoman slave traders, destined for 
Erzincan district of Ottoman Anatolia.120 Not only were the villagers, the peasants, or the 
free folk residing in the Caucasus targets of the local raiders, but anyone passing by or 
sojourning in the vicinity were equally vulnerable to such attacks. In one famous 
example, which occurred in 1854 and according to John Ussher, “created a great 
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sensation at the time throughout Russia,” princesses Orbeliani and Nina Baratoff were 
captured in a circumstantial raid by Lesghians, in a village called Tsenondahl, where the 
former was visiting the latter in her summer residence. The Caucasus pillaging 
economies connected to the Ottoman state via slave trade and to the Russian state through 
ransom business. Thus, anyone who could be captured was a desired commodity.121 
Ultimately, slaves were obtained, through “a variety of domestic raiding systems” 
which evidently converged to the trade network that tied the Caucasus to the Ottoman 
Empire, but nevertheless was different from it. To add to what Liubov Kurtynova-
D’Herlugnan argued in relation to the fundamental difference between slavery and slave 
trade, “the trade in slaves, and the raiding that produced them” were also two different 
mechanisms.122 Raiding systems, as an “expedient to control a lucrative trade route or to 
safeguard privileged access to valuable markets,”123 were governed by the local princes 
and nobility’s desire to maintain their privileges and existing hierarchies and were 
regulated largely by customary law, modified at will. In trade, on the other hand, 
“mutually accepted” and “immutable” laws of commerce prevailed.124 The Turkish 
merchants were always present, but never as close to question the “just enslavement” of 
the slaves they bought and sold. 
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In most cases, “the Turk” was not on the ground but rather concealed in such 
items as a “Turkish revolver” and ammunition, tokens of Ottomans’ virtual colonization 
in the Caucasus,125 that were bartered, as a prerequisite, only with young girls and 
children.126 Or, they waited in shops, lined up in port cities, such as Soukhum-kale or 
Anapa, along the Black Sea coast in the Caucasus, where the sale of women was a daily 
occasion.127 There they sat comfortably and calmly, as Tornau  depicted them, and 
smoked their long tobacco pipes, pretending that they were indifferent towards 
everything around them.128 Some took up residence in villages and hamlets. İbrahim 
Köremezli noted that until the Russian annexation of Anapa, there were sixty villages 
where only merchants resided,129 some of them exceedingly rich and powerful. For one, 
James Bell mentioned a certain Hassan Bey, a wealthy man whose family was originally 
from Turkey, who “collected” young women for Constantinople, with the help of other 
“Mussulmans.”130 He was not a native chief, yet had a fortune (which included three 
vessels that he used to trade with Istanbul) comparable “with that of most of them.”131 
The Turkish traders’ immunity and the ease with which they traveled, or had access to 
their merchandize are exemplified in an incident related by Tornau. When a local prince 
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needed to travel to a port city, to accompany and guarantee a safe passage for the author, 
he devised to take an Abazin slave woman to travel with them. Thus, he assured that their 
travel did not seem “unnatural” to the onlookers, for, as Tornau stated, the mountaineers 
had to account for their movement in the region and descended to the shore either for the 
purpose of pilgrimage or emigrating/ traveling to the Ottoman lands only.132 Slave 
traders, on the other hand, could roam about freely. The Turkish/Ottoman presence in the 
Caucasus was so extensive and slave-producing mechanisms so deep-rooted that despite 
the intensifying blockade efforts by the Russians, particularly after the Treaty of 
Adrianople in 1829 and the completion of the Black Sea Coastal Military Line (which 
had the specific aim to cut off ties between the Caucasus and the Ottoman Empire), the 
trade continued.133 Reportedly, the number of Turkish vessels that ran between the 
Caucasus and the Ottoman ports diminished by the end of the 1830s, but even then, as 
Bell stated, one hundred and fifty ships found constant employment in the trade between 
the Caucasus and Ottoman lands.134  
 
Financing the Holy War 
With the onset of the Caucasian Wars during the first decades of the nineteenth 
century, Caucasian communities began systematically raiding Russian military 
settlements, as well as neighboring tribes that formed alliances with them. These raids 
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were not only larger in scale, better planned, and organized but also rendered already 
widespread raiding, ransoming, and slave capture (parts of a “formal system of local 
conflict resolution,” as Barrett called it and as already, if partially, discussed above) an 
everyday event, elevating these communities to the level of total mobilization.135 Muriel 
Atkin argued that as the war progressed, not only there were more tribes “rallied around a 
single objective than before but also more people at all levels within the tribes were 
involved.”136 “Unlike many of the Caucasian wars,” Atkin argued, “this was not simply a 
rivalry among elites” but a defense of a “whole way of life.”137 Starting with the tenure of 
General Ermolov as the commander in the region in 1817, the Russo-Circassian War 
intensified and gradually turned into a war of attrition. Ermolov’s infamously harsh 
policies and brutal measures, designed to “fight fire with fire” as Bruce Grant described 
it, included retaliation of the mountaineers’ raids with even more aggressive ones, 
sometimes “completely razing entire villages he judged to be complicit and cementing his 
reputation for merciless determination through a series of public executions.”138 Contrary 
to the Russian administrators’ estimation or expectations, these aggressive policies 
produced only more blood feuds, an “implacable enmity” towards the Russians, 
increasing the number of both the raiding and the slaves obtained from them. These blood 
feuds also determined who formed allies with whom during the war, adding to the 
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already highly fractured nature of the region.139 As early as 1807 and 1808, the messiness 
of the situation was apparent in Julius Von Klaproth’s following description: 
[The] Abasses [Abkhazes], who are at enmity with Russia, have 
nevertheless friends and kindred on the Russian side, who secretly cross 
the Ckuban to visit them [and raid every village and rob any traveler on 
the way, Tornau adds]. When a favorable opportunity offers, they likewise 
make excursion beyond the Cossack statnitzas, in order to plunder the 
adjacent villages, in company with the Nogays, and divide the booty with 
them and the Abasses who dwell within the Russian boundaries. Here the 
Kabardian banditti find an asylum; and such is the connection subsisting 
between them and these people, that they frequently bring their booty, 
consisting of captives and cattle, for sale, across the Ckuban. All these 
abuses might easily be prevented by the neighboring Nogays, who are 
subject to Russia, were they not also in alliance with the Abasses. [...] The 
leaders of the Beslen go out to plunder with the Kabardians and the 
Nogays residing in the Russian territory, and share the booty with them. 
The captive Russians they sell to the inhabitants of the more remote 
mountains, reserving children for themselves.140  
 
Quoted in Grant, Bronevskii sketched a similar picture in 1823: 
Some tribes such as Kabards and Lezgins gained the glory of conquerors, 
pursuing almost constant battle with their neighbors: Cherkess with 
Abkhaz, Kabards with Ossetians and Chechens, Ossetians with Kists, 
Chechens with almost everyone around them, and Lezgins with Georgia 
                                                
139 İbrahim Köremezli argued that Russians took advantage of the existing rivalries also.  
Köremezli, “The Place of the Ottoman Empire in the Russo-Circassian War,” 14. 
140 Klaproth, Travels in the Caucasus and Georgia, 250–251, 253. 
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and Shirvan. In a word, war is the normal state of affairs and a way of life 
for these peoples.141  
Tornau also depicted a scene that points at the commonplaceness of raiding, in which two 
raiding groups casually crossed paths on their way to their respective raids; Nogays were 
heading towards the Urup River, to raid the Kabardians on account of revenge and the 
Ubykh, with a group of several hundred men, were on the way to raid the Besleney; on 
the spot, the Nogay prince managed to trade an enslaved woman from Bashilbay tribe, in 
exchange of two horses.142 Another example from Soukhum-kale, from almost the end of 
the war points at the turmoil among those on the Russian side:  
Hasan Marghani, a powerful native chief and much protected by the 
reigning prince of Abkhasia, availing himself of his master’s absence at 
Piatigorsk [Pyatigorsk], has recently attacked and set fire to a village near 
Attara [Atara], the property of Prince Gregory Shervashidze, killing eight 
of his serfs and carrying off into slavery some forty women and children, 
besides seizing a number or cattle and horses. Shortly afterwards and 
while Hasan was returning to Soukoum Kale he was attacked by two of 
Prince Gregory’s brothers and their followers, but as Prince Alex. 
Shervashidze (brother of the reigning prince) happened to be with Hasan 
at the time, the attack had to cease, but it is expected that further uprisals 
will take place on some future day. Both Prince Gregory and Hasan hold 
Russian military rank but the local authorities do not appear to interfere in 
the matter so far, and leave to the Prince of Abkhazia to deal with the case 
as he may seem fit.”143   
                                                
141 Grant, The Captive and the Gift, 29.  
142 Tornau, Bir Rus Subayının Kafkasya Anıları, 107. 
143 FO 195/762, Confidential dispatch No.5, from C.K. Dickson to Earl Russell, 9 August 1863. 
The note underlines the pervasiveness of brigandage in the region, which renders 
“communication by land with Migrelia and Georgia dangerous.”  
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This, in essence, was what the Caucasus War was. It did not comprise “military 
operations for the purpose of destroying the enemy and conquering territory.” It meant 
the increased frequency and intensity of raiding, kidnappings and plunder, with 
“minimum confrontation and battle.”144 Despite considerable military and economic 
potential on the Russian side, fundamental discordances between each party’s fighting 
techniques or strength, as well as the difficulty of the terrain, hindered the possibility of 
quick, decisive results. Instead, Russia was dragged (or perhaps inserted itself) into a 
local system of infamously unresolvable blood feuds and Caucasus people on the other 
hand, were pushed into a costly war sustained largely by slave trade.145 The response to 
and engagement with the Russian presence in the region differed from one tribe to the 
other. In the North-West Caucasus, Anna Zelkina asserts, secular leaders led the 
resistance, in close cooperation with the Ottomans, whereas in the east, the movement 
had a more apparently Islamic character, which eventually managed to unite the 
resistance to a great extent under the leadership of Sheikh Shamil. Shamil’s “State of 
God,” Zelkina argues, brought on administrative, legal, and fiscal reform, such as the 
efforts to replace adat with Şer’i legislature, systematic or planned redistribution of 
military booty, or introducing taxation, with the aim of attaining a centralized 
government.146 Perhaps more important than the military effect was that the Russian 
expansion in the Caucasus transformed the region, where, at least initially, Bruce Grant 
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Köremezli, “The Place of the Ottoman Empire in the Russo-Circassian War,” 98. 
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asserted, “raiding was done without special prejudice toward national character;”147 it 
stimulated and hastened its Islamization, united many of the Caucasian tribes (which 
were customarily “not only disunited, but also were not stable in their choices,” as 
Köremezli put it),148 and turned the war into a holy war, jihad, and raiding into ghazawat, 
the original (and vis-à-vis Islamic jurisprudence, only) source of slave procurement, in a 
strictly Islamic context.  
 
Conclusion 
James C. Scott has described the Caucasus as a shatter zone, where “expansion of 
states, empires, slave-trading, and wars, as well as natural disasters, have driven large 
numbers of people to seek refuge in out-of-the-way places...” Shatter zones were, to 
invoke Scott’s description once again, places where “ethnicity and tribes began” and 
“sovereignty and taxes ended.” However, the Caucasus did not always fit into this clear-
cut picture. Even though there never existed a “fully articulated,” or even a discernable 
state formation, princes and nobles, to recall Bell’s description, had “considerable power 
over their own serfs even that of life and death, and of transference by sale to others,” and 
presided at public trials and “decide[d] upon the fines [and punishments] to be imposed 
upon persons who commit offences.”149 They set blood prices, judged peoples’ 
alienability, substituted their death with slavery, and above all made laws and exceptions 
to those laws; hence embodied, by definition, the sovereign power. Even in so-called 
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democratic societies, where such decisions were made by councils of elders or other 
similar assemblies, coercive means of maintaining power and authority were present.  
What happened with the Russian military expansion or the Ottoman commercial 
encroachment was not necessarily the conquest of the “ethnic and tribal” by the sovereign 
who taxed. It was rather a clash of different models of coercive power. Like Tolstoy’s 
Hadji Murat, who got caught between Nicholas I and Sheikh Shamil, enslaved bodies in 
the Caucasus were caught between local princes and nobles, self-made religious leaders, 
and Russian and Ottoman states. The civilizing mission brought to the region at gunpoint 
by the Russian army or Shamil’s murshids, omnipresent merchants or paid religious 
dignitaries deployed by the Ottoman government, even the image of the beautiful 
Circassian maiden contributed. The Caucasus War ended in 1859, with the eventual 
defeat of the Caucasian army and the capture of Shamil, although occasional clashes and 
rebellions continued for two more decades, “culminating in the extensive rebellion of 
1877 that coincided with the outbreak of another war between Turkey and Russia.”150 
Starting in 1860, the Caucasus peoples had been expelled from the region mainly on 
account of their Muslim identity, paradoxically carved out, for most part, throughout the 
Caucasus War.  
In 1861, a Nogay prince, expelled from the Caucasus and settled near Constanza, 
in today’s Romania, wrote to the Ottoman officials to complain about the “rebellious 
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behavior” of his five slaves, whom he brought with him.151 Canpolat Bey was one of 
many Caucasian chieftains who were dislocated from their native Caucasus lands during 
the war and settled in the Ottoman domains. Like many other Caucasian slave holders at 
the time, he sought ways to suppress his slaves’ pursuit of freedom, inspired particularly 
by the abolition of trade in African slaves effected a few years prior. When Canpolat Bey 
submitted his formal complaint however, to his dismay, he was asked to pay pençik tax 
on the slaves he owned.152 Utterly perplexed, he objected, claiming that pençik tax was 
not known to them in their native lands in Kuban. Nor was his ownership of the slaves a 
Şer’i matter, he contended, which could be litigated or settled at the court, for in Canpolat 
Bey’s “transplanted” perception of law, his ownership of his slaves was regulated 
primarily by adat. The following chapter will look at the ways in which the slave owners 
like Canpolat Bey and slaves themselves faced the Ottoman state, which not only had to 
take an active stance against slavery for the first time, but also delineate its categories of 
race and ethnicity more explicitly as well.  
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Chapter 2.   






He is tall, his hair is erect and eyes red. Like the beak of an eagle, his forbidding 
nose neatly descends down from among his eyebrows, halts in hesitation and 
bends to form a hook. In keeping with his frightening reputation, when his 
sparsely grown beard and moustache is added to all his ugliness, the indistinct 
figure of his pockmarked face becomes clear.   




As his train readied to leave Haydarpaşa station, thus young Krikor Zohrab pictured his 
client Krandük. A recent refugee from Dagestan and a zabtiye officer,2 Krandük was 
being accused of first-degree murder in Izmit. On his train ride there, where the trial 
                                                
1 Krikor Zohrab, “Ceyran,” in Öyküler (Istanbul: Aras Yayıncılık, 2001), 139–140. The story was 
first published in Hayrenik in 1892. 
2 Referred to as “jandarma onbaşısı” here. Many male Circassian refugees became low ranking 
gendarme officers after their settlement especially in Tuna province. See Vladimir Troyansky 
“Tuna Vilayeti’nde Çerkesler,” paper presented at “Çerkes Diasporası Konferansı” (9 May 2015, 
Bahçeşehir Üniversitesi, Istanbul) for a detailed account of “integration” strategies of refugee 
Circassians. Eugene Rogan mentions that in Jordan too the Circassian and Chechen settlers were 
active in the police, a fact that he attributed to the formal military training many of the Circassian 
settlers received in the Balkans, particularly during the 1877–78 Russo-Ottoman war. Eugene 
Rogan, Frontiers of the State in the Late Ottoman Empire: Transjordan, 1850–1921 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002), 67. Also see the brief note in Grattan Geary, The Times, 
Letters to the Editor, July 25, 1878. Issue 29316, p.4, in regards to the Ottoman government 
recruiting 500 Circassian to be employed as gendarme officers. 
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would be held,3 the young lawyer reviewed the official documentation that contained the 
details of the case (as well as his own defense) over and over again. He knew the 
difficulties involved in defending the case and once again regretted taking it on in the 
first place. Krandük’s testimony gave everything away, he wrote, and his “naivety 
beyond belief” left no room for the lawyer even to plead not guilty.4  
Upon his arrival in Izmit, Zohrab’s feelings were those of a burning desire to 
leave this messy case behind and return to Istanbul at once on the one hand and a deep 
fascination with the discordant (if not outright chaotic) air among the Circassians he 
found waiting for him (“the abukat from Istanbul”) on the other. His fascination grew 
even bigger as he got acquainted with strange sounding names (Krandük and Nüş, the 
murderer and his victim respectively, to begin with), a rich variety of languages spoken in 
the courtroom, and the person of Krandük himself, who had nothing to do with what 
Zohrab imagined him to be. A frail looking man of pale complexion, the murderer had 
“slender hands, long graceful fingers, and eyes as blue as an English girl’s.”5 Far from 
being a calculating murderer as Zohrab imagined him to be, he appeared more as 
                                                
3 Along with Sivas and Canik, Izmit was a province/district where Circassian refugees were 
settled in great numbers, especially following the 1877–78 Russo-Turkish war, when the 
Circassians tribes who settled in Tuna and other Balkan provinces once again had to be relocated 
within the Ottoman Anatolian and Arab provinces, such as Qunaitra in Syria or Amman in 
Jordan. It should be noted here that despite the two decades that separate those peak moments of 
displacement, I treat them as two stages of the same event. Needless to say, in these two decades, 
both the political and material conditions for settlement and resettlement changed. After the 
1877–78 war, for instance, the loss of territory made it more difficult to accommodate the 
immigrants with agricultural land and presumably caused more friction between the incoming 
Caucasian groups and the native peasant populations. However, viewed from the perspective of 
the legal transplantation and assimilation processes, as this chapter aims to do, the second wave 
of migration that took place after the 1877–78 war appears as the continuation of the first in the 
aftermath of the Caucasus War. 
4 Zohrab, “Ceyran,” 140. 
5 Ibid., 142. 
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someone who acted in accordance with the custom or circumstances, and was now 
confused with what it turned into. “Are they going to hang me?” he asked Zohrab, to 
which the latter answered in the negative. But he would possibly be sentenced to hard 
labor. Despite the impending danger however, what really mattered to Krandük was not 
the destiny waiting for himself but what would happen to Ceyran. “Who is Ceyran?” the 
lawyer asked. He was Nüş’s wife. “What business do you have with someone else’s 
wife?” Zohrab sternly rebuked.  
Just as he was wrong in the way he imagined Krandük’s appearance, Zohrab 
misinterpreted his “business” with Nüş’s wife and miscalculated his naivety, too. 
Krandük’s understanding of murder was essentially different than how the criminal law 
(“which could be anything but taken lightly” Zohrab noted) described it or the lawyer 
himself defined it. His act of killing was triggered by a personal incident of 
vengeance/retribution, that involved his childhood friend Nüş and his beloved Ceyran, 
implied to have been “appropriated” by the former in ways not described in the story. The 
animosity (even, feud) that started between Krandük and Nüş was consequently carried 
over to the Ottoman lands upon their expulsion from the Caucasus and subsequent 
settlement there, as was their “savage” ways. “A great many accepted the Ottoman state’s 
protection as it were the divine order,” Zohrab noted with a touch of exoticism, and 
others kept with their “nomadic and bellicose habits,” and the news of their bloody 
adventures echoed in the Ottoman lands as well.6 Nüş, as one ringleader among them, 
invoked fear all over Sapanca,7 whose criminal acts evidently gave Krikor Zohrab the 
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edge he needed for his defense. “After all, the killing of the bandit is no loss to the 
society,” he maintained at the court, demanding Krandük’s acquittal, which he 
consequently managed to obtain through his further claims that the murder was a case of 
self defense. Learning that he was acquitted, Krandük’s disoriented despair turned into a 
confused contentment and he gave his “Circassian dagger” to Zohrab as a gift, bringing 
his multi-episode life that began on the “slopes of the Caucasus mountains,” presumably 
continued along the Danube river for brief period of time, to an end in the Izmit criminal 
court.  
Starting roughly around the mid-nineteenth century, such criminal offences as 
murder or theft (raiding, pillaging, or banditry in general) and the conflicting Circassian 
and Ottoman views on them, were addressed and dealt with in accordance with the 
(trans)forming criminal law and legal institutions that adjudicated criminal cases. 
Particularly, after the wholesale adoption of the French Criminal Code by the Ottomans 
in 1879 and the emergence of the office of public prosecutor (“as facilitator of the law,” 
Avi Rubin described it), the legal procedures for these cases were left virtually with no 
room for any negotiation but called for a definitive decree of punishment.8 There were 
other legal practices, categories, and procedures still, particularly pertaining enslavement, 
slavery, and manumission, the exact definition of which the Ottoman state and Circassian 
slave owners did not necessarily agree upon but those rarely came to contradict one 
another. In fact, on the contrary, as this chapter aims to demonstrate, they often worked in 
support of each other, delineating a system of slavery which could be defined neither as a 
                                                
8 Avi Rubin, Ottoman Nizamiye Courts: Law and Modernity (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2011), 136; Kent F. Schull, Prisons in the Late Ottoman Empire: Microcosms of Modernity 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2014), 22–25.  
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Caucasian life-term type of slavery nor exactly an Islamic one, but a strange combination 
of those two, whose bind was virtually impossible to break out of for the slaves, as well 
as the reformers that aimed for general abolition.  
What did not pose a contradiction for the Ottoman state and Circassian chieftains’ 
perception of law, however, was complicated yet by another legal system that was in the 
making at about the same time. In that, the international anti-slavery law added yet 
another layer of complexity to the post-Circassian expulsion Ottoman Empire and how 
slavery, freedom, and in a less direct way citizenship were understood and handled there. 
These international developments and the emerging law provided the incoming slave-
refugees the incentive not only to question their status as slaves and claim freedom 
(which they deemed to be their right) but also to challenge the supposed sacred (thus, 
immutable) character of the Şer’i law. Building upon the previous chapter, which looked 
at different legal practices (pertaining to customary law, known as adat or xabze) of the 
Caucasian communities that produced slaves, such as blood revenge, bride kidnapping, 
and raiding/pillaging, this chapter has three objectives. First and foremost, it aims to trace 
how these legal practices were carried over with Caucasian refugees to the Ottoman 
Balkans and Anatolia and negotiated there during the elongated crisis of the Circassian 
expulsion. Secondly, navigating within a set of what they literally called “freedom 
suits,”9 (hürriyet davası), it aims to explore how slaves built their claims in relation to 
different legal terrains, problems, and concepts. All in all, it examines the ways in which 
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these processes, which took place against the backdrop of a general prohibition in African 
slaves, bent the categories of ethnicity, race, and gender in the decades that followed the 
expulsion.  
 
The Circassian Expulsion and Transplanted Legalities 
Kirkor Zohrab was not the first to provide an account of the chaotic air among the 
immigrant-refugees from the Caucasus, although he may have been the only one to depict 
it in a courtroom. Not only the hardships, such as the diseases and destitution that the 
refugees encountered during their passage and settlement, but also a good amount of 
information from the profuseness of the languages they spoke to the strangeness of their 
customs appeared in journals and newspapers worldwide. “In our age, perhaps, nothing 
has occurred so melancholy, so appalling, as this vast and gradual extirpation of the 
Circassian race,” the London Journal exclaimed in 1864, “finished by exile, fever, famine 
ague, and, far worse than all, cruelty.”10 Their interest shaped by strong anti-Russian 
sentiments, the British public read and wrote a great deal about “the brave and hardy” 
people of the Caucasus who “have at last fallen under the yoke of a people far inferior to 
them in every way.”11 A variety of others reported on the integration problems they 
encountered upon their settlement as well. Around the same time as Krikor Zohrab 
published his story on post-expulsion Izmit, the English Illustrated Magazine reported on 
the conditions of Syria, a province of the Ottoman Empire where Caucasian refugees 
                                                
10 “National Extinction of the Circassian People,” The London Journal, July 23, 1864, 61. 
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were “transplanted” in large numbers especially following the Berlin Treaty in 1878, that 
brought limitations to the Ottoman state’s deployment of then as a “demographic 
weapon” in the Balkan provinces.12 Described as a “country [...] infested with Bedouins 
and Circassian thieves who went unpunished except when the exasperated villagers in 
sheer desperation resisted,”13 Syria was seen as an opportunity by the Ottoman state, and 
a solution to the crisis in the Balkans, materialized in the program of settlement at its 
periphery.14 Both Tuna and Syrian provinces were in fact at the margins of the empire 
and populating those with the incoming Caucasian refugees was advantageous not only 
on the account of an outside threat (as was the case in Tuna province, in relation to 
Russia, for instance) but also for managing the native populations of the empire.15 The 
highly fractured nature of the refugees (and the hostilities and feuds amongst them) 
nullified any possibility of forming a unified Caucasian community.16 As the British 
                                                
12 For a comprehensive discussion on this matter, see Mark Pinson, “Demographic warfare : an 
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which began much earlier than the Circassian expulsion. See for instance BOA, A.MKT 17/14 
1260.N.25 (8 October 1844) for a note written by the Grand Vizier to the governor of Filibe 
(Plovdiv), cautioning him to keep a close eye on a Circassian chieftain named Safer, not to let 
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consul in Soukoum-Kalé, Dickson, reported to Earl Russel in February 1864, “the 
absence of all political cohesion between the northern tribes, or such remnants thereof, 
and those inhabiting other parts of the Caucasus, and, indeed, the almost utter 
impossibility of bringing about such a consummation” was one of the major misfortunes 
that fell on the people of the Caucasus. “Each and all cannot be made to forget their blood 
feuds,” Dickson noted, “still less to unite in a common cause...”17 However, formidable 
addition to the empire’s “Mahomedan population,” they proved useful in destabilizing 
existing structures of power and networks of influence.18 This situation, producing ample 
amount of tension between the refugees and local populations particularly in relation to 
the distribution of land, caused frequent clashes across the empire.19  
                                                                                                                                            
him travel outside of Edirne or communicate with other Circassians. After Safer Paşa’s death, his 
son reportedly kept on appearing in public, dressed in traditional Circassian clothing and giving 
speeches of political content, in Circassian language. BOA, A.MKT.MHM 249/57 and 250/57, 
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example, Sultan Abdülhamid ordered Gedikpaşa Theater demolished on the account that a group 
of Ottoman pashas of Caucasian origin went to see Ahmed Midhat’s play Çerkes Özdenler (The 
Circassian Nobles) in full Circassian traditional outfit. Musahipzade Celal, Eski İstanbul Yaşayışı 
(Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1992), 90. 
17 Note no.2, Consul Dickson to Earl Russell in Papers Respecting the Settlement of the 
Circassian Emigrants in Turkey: Presented to the House of Commons by Command of Her 
Majesty, in pursuance of their Address dated June 6, 1864 (London: Harrison & Sons, 
1864).”Papers Respecting the Settlement of Circassian Emigrants in Turkey,” presented to the 
House of Commons on June 6, 1864. It is important to note that both the first and second wave 
immigrants comply with the chaotic image provided by a wide array of observers throughout the 
settlement process. 
18 David Cuthell argued that particularly the initial wave of the refugees were armed, as in many 
instances they did not have to surrender their weapons to the Russians when they were forced to 
leave the Caucasus. Cuthell, “The Circassian Sürgün,” 150. Also see B. Philpot, The Times, 
Letters to the Editor, June 17, 1864, p.7. Also see a note sent to the governor of Vidin in 1861, 
cautioning him against the armed Crimean, Nogai and Circassian settlers. BOA, A.MKT.MHM 
238/12, 1278.Ca.28 (1 December 1861). 
19 See the brief note no.7 written by Sir H. Bulwer to Earl Russell on this issue in “Papers 
Respecting the Settlement of Circassian Emigrants in Turkey.” Also see “Report from Select 
Committee on East India Communication,” July 20, 1866, page 620 for a brief note on an 
insurrection at a Circassian settlement that caused interference with British communications 
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In many instances these hostilities and clashes were circumstantial, forced upon 
the refugees by the difficult conditions of refugee life or on the native peasant 
populations trying to make ends meet.20 However, in other cases, the correspondences, 
petitions, and other types of documents on these social explosions made references to the 
ancient laws (kanun-i kadim) of the Caucasian immigrant-refugees, to be understood as 
the customary law that governed (as discussed at greater length in the previous chapter) 
the entire Caucasus. As we have seen in the previous chapter, the customary law known 
as adat differed from one tribal organization to another, particularly in regards to the 
ways and degrees it was affected by the Şer’i law, producing a largely arbitrary legal 
regime that favored primarily princes, nobles, and in general, the powerful. Despite its 
arbitrariness, it constituted the primary legal system in settling both criminal offences and 
civil matters in the region, some of which had been carried to the Ottoman domains and 
made some Circassians famous “for their fierce independence and banditry,” which 
generated, according to Reşat Kasaba, a strong reaction from the Ottoman center.21 As 
one Armenian villager put it, new coming Caucasians had “hazy ideas as to the difference 
between meum and tuum.” Similar to what the English Illustrated Magazine reported on 
Syria, such incidences of robbery were common near immigrant settlements in Anatolia 
                                                                                                                                            
system. In addition, there were ongoing/chronic clashes with the existing tribes around the 
settlements. See numerous files on the hostilities between Circassian settlers near Sivas/Kayseri 
and the Afşar tribe, one of the most powerful tribes in the region. A more detailed account can 
been seen in Georgi Chochiev and Bekir Koç,”Migrants from the North Caucasus in Eastern 
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20 Reşat Kasaba, A Moveable Empire: Ottoman nomads, migrants, and refugees (Seattle: 
University of Washington Press, 2009), 117–118.  
21 Ibid., 118. 
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also. As the Armenian villager further reported to Fred Burnaby, several of their cows 
had recently disappeared and “it was strongly suspected that some Circassians were 
implicated in the robbery.”22 
Besides the hostilities and clashes that took place between the refugees and native 
populations, or among different Caucasian tribal groups with ongoing feuds, what posed 
a major concern for the Ottoman government in regards to the incoming refugees had to 
do with the disputes/conflicts within the tribes and clans themselves. As will be further 
explored below, that the refugees moved to the Ottoman Empire organized as tribes and 
clans did not mean that they saw themselves as homogenous units. As discussed in the 
previous chapter, the Circassian, or in general Caucasian, social order was peculiar in 
that, as Paul Manning describes it, they “contained ‘feudal’ distinctions of hereditary 
caste but situated within a generally egalitarian ‘acephalous’ segmentary political 
structure,” which could be interpreted as highly hierarchical (thus ripe for indirect rule, 
with the co-optation of the princes and chieftains) or “a miniature Liberal revolution,” 
depending on who looked at them.23 The Adyghe, for instance, had four castes composed 
of the princes, nobles, freemen, and serfs/slaves. One slave petition from 1872 (of 
unidentified tribal affiliation) noted that even the slave class was stratified and consisted 
of two types of slaves. The abd-ı memluk was responsible for giving half of their crop to 
the chieftain every year and could also be sold. The abd-ı hür, on the other hand also had 
                                                
22 Fred Burnaby, On horseback through Asia Minor (London: Sampson Low, Marston, Searle, & 
Rivington, 1877), 277. Burnaby also visited the Sivas prison, to see that out of 102 prisoners kept 
there, the majority were Circassians and Kurds for horse and cattle stealing, 285. Fred Burnaby 
was a British army officer who was on an expedition to inspect the Russian border prior to the 
1877–78 War, whose observations may have been strategically mediated. 
23 Paul Manning, “Just Like England: On the Liberal Institutions of the Circassians,” 
Comparative Studies in Society and History, vol.51, no.3 (2009), 591. 
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the obligation of the yearly payment but could not be sold.24 A retrospective, and 
inevitably national or ethnicity-focused view on these tribes leads us see them as 
cohesive and integral groups (in the face of Russian empire’s encroachment that they ran 
away from or Ottoman empire, which tried hard to absorb them) but from early on with 
their arrival, there were clear indications that this was not the case. In most cases, 
internal, minor disputes or offences that happened within the tribe were kept to the tribe, 
although there were occasional cases of theft that were reported, which was partially due 
to the fact that the refugees had to work against a language barrier, as in most cases they 
did not know Turkish.25 Aside from those, many of the conflicts that ended up with the 
government authorities or legal institutions such as the local Şer’i courts, had to do with 
the practice of slavery and the incoming refugees’ slave status. Caught in a state of 
uncertainty between the Ottoman state law and the “ancient customs/law” (adat-ı kadime) 
of the tribal chieftains, these disputes also offer an insight into the internal power 
dynamics of the transplanted tribal units. 
As one slave petition submitted to the office of the Grand Vezir in 1859 made it 
clear, the major cause for the slaves’ discontent was the chieftains (who, in this particular 
case, belonged to the Kabarda/Kabarta tribe) resorting to their “old customs” of selling 
                                                
24 BOA, ŞD 2872/30, 1289.Ra.7 (15 May 1872). 
25 See, for instance, BOA, MVL 620/84, 1278.B.20 (21 January 1862), for a case of murder that 
occurred between two brothers, recent immigrant-refugees from the Caucasus, for a passing note 
that their interrogation was conducted by the help of an interpreter. Also see Ömer Karakaş, “ 19. 
Yüzyılda Anadolu’da Çerkes Göçmenlerinin İskânlari Sirasinda Karşilaştiklari Sorunlar: 
Uzunyayla Örneği,” Karadeniz Araştırmaları, no. 36 (Kış 2013), 88–89. Karakaş mentions a rare 
debt dispute brought to the Şer’iyye court in Sivas in 1865. 36 numaralı Sivas Şer’iyye Sicili, can 
be accessed at BOA, MŞH.ŞSC.d 7729, page 115 
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the children of their slaves.26 This particular complaint appeared in slave petitions 
recurrently, even during the early phases of the expulsion when most of the incoming 
chieftains were relatively wealthy. In another one from 1861, for instance, two enslaved 
men named Mehmed and Mustafa filed a petition, again with the office the Grand Vizier, 
to complain about their chieftains, Batuk, Babiç, and İshak, for putting them to work day 
and night, but more importantly, that in accordance with the old customs, “they were in 
the mind of selling” the former’s daughters, saying that they were allowed to do so by the 
orders of the Sultan, even though the young girls were engaged and soon to be married.27 
Mehmed and Mustafa stated that if such an order indeed existed, they too were the 
subjects of the Sultan and moreover were, “all praise be to God,” Muslims, indicating 
that they were ready to comply with the Ottoman sovereign’s wishes. If not, however, 
they asked to be released from what they deemed illegitimate bonds of their so-called 
owners.28 Later on, as the legal suits and procedures became more widespread and the 
legal language of slavery and freedom became more established, the parties debated over 
the contested notion of dominium (kanun-i malikiye), which the slave owners rooted 
again in the “ancient law,” whereas the slaves asked for a new definition, both of slavery 
and ownership in general.29 To be added to the disputes on the descriptions and 
limitations of slave ownership are the cases of apparent “blunders” by the slaves 
themselves. Slave flights, for one, were instances in which the adat-ı kadime were 
speedily transported into the Ottoman Şer’i and public law, by pushing the slave owners 
                                                
26 BOA, A.MKT.MHM176/37, 1276.B.09 (1 February 1860).  
27 BOA, A.MKT.DV 181/59, 1277.B.19 (31 January 1861). 
28 Ibid. 
29 BOA, ŞD 2872/30, 1289.Ra.7 (15 May 1872). 
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to appeal to and demand from the legal and governmental institutions to set its coercive 
measures against such “rebellious” behavior. Such was the case with Ömer, a slave 
owner from Şibu (possibly, Şabsu or Shapsug) tribe, for instance. When two male and 
three female slaves (referred to as köle and cariye respectively) of his ran away to Rhodes 
island in 1860, he petitioned the office of the Grand Vizier, requesting the recovery of the 
runaway slaves. The Grand Vezirate, for its turn, found the case to be the matter of the 
legal practice and ordered that it be heard at the Şer’iyye court and dealt with in 
accordance with the legal decision.30 Besides the issue of in-kind payments pressed over 
the enslaved farming population by the chieftains (which put the slaves who were already 
trying very hard to dodge many hardships at once, in a desperate position), even more 
importantly than hard physical labor and torture (also frequently reported), the major 
conflict was a direct result of an ambiguous notion of ownership rights over people that 
referred to both customary and Şer’i law at once. This situation rendered, in a nutshell, 
the implementation of these laws the very source of problem itself.  
The individual sale of family members and the breaking up of families produced 
violent resistance against the slave owners and caused closer appeal to the Ottoman 
government on the slaves’ side. Cashing on his “transplanted” privileges, a certain 
chieftain named Kaspolat attempted to sell five of his slaves, Makval (or Markoval, 36 
years old), his wife (35 years old) and their children (whose age ranged between 14 and 4 
years), but met fierce resistance from the family, whose appeals stated that they would 
rather bring themselves to ruin and perish than seeing their family be broken, and 
                                                
30 BOA, A.MKT.MHM, 176/75, 1276.B.11 (3 February 1860). 
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themselves be removed from the remainder of their extended family and relatives.31 Their 
appeal found support from the district governor of Yanbolu (today’s Yambol, Bulgaria), 
who stated selling those over thirty years of age and those who had children would be 
violating the notion of the family, and suggested that the sale should be halted.32 Through 
a decision by the Supreme Council of Judicial Ordinances (Meclis- i Vâlâ- yı Ahkâm-ı 
Adliye), two legal systems and privileges came face to face to determine (or at least, 
emphasize) the age limits as well as its legal implications within the practice of slavery.33  
While the enslaved women bought and sold in urban areas (where most of the 
sale/purchase deeds, receipts, etc. in the following chapter come from) were usually very 
young (roughly between 10–14 years old, and rarely above 23–24 years old), the case 
with slaves in the Circassian settlements was different. The composition of the age (as 
well as social structure) of slaves in those settlements is best traced in what can be 
defined as settlement logbooks or registers, that contained the records kept by Muhacirin 
                                                
31 BOA, MVL 991/62, 1281.M.13 (18 June 1864). Ehud Toledano argues that the established 
Caucasian customs were strongly in favor of maintaining the unity of slave families and it was the 
“hardships of emigration [which] eroded the old and established customs.” Ehud Toledano, The 
Ottoman Slave Trade and its Suppression: 1840–1890 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1982), 160. While it is true that the difficulties encountered during the expulsion and settlement 
process shifted the ethical boundaries of both the slave owners and traders (often one and the 
same), explaining these instances with “hardships of emigration,” in the same as way as Um 
Mazed does in the introduction of this dissertation, is misguiding. Not only do the petitions 
written by the slaves themselves indicate that it was the prerogative of the chieftain to sell his 
slaves as he pleased, but also those customs rarely favored the slaves, especially the abd-ı 
memluk. 
32 The sale of the family was reportedly annulled, as an official notice sent by the Supreme 
Council to the Grand Vizier clarified. BOA, MVL 996/26, 1281.S.21 (26 July 1864). 
33 See BOA, MVL 991/39, 1280.Z.29 (5 June 1864), for a brief note on the extension of the age 
limit to all Circassian tribes. Written by the Supreme Council to the governor of Varna, the note 
stated that the condition (mesağ) of the permissibility/lawfulness of the sale of the tribe members 
relied upon the age limitations determined by the Supreme Council earlier.   
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Komisyonu, a commission that oversaw the settlement process,34 as well as other agents, 
such as local government institutions or the police. Organized according to the 
households that constituted the tribes, these registers date back, in most cases, to the 
earlier episodes of the settlement process.35 Settlement registers provide a good depiction 
as to how these groups were organized, the size of each family unit that constituted them, 
who owned slaves and who did not, and last but not the least, how these differed from 
one tribal group to another.  
The first of these registers contained information on a Circassian tribe (kabile) 
named Anaçok, which came from the Caucasus in 1859 at the outset of expulsion, and 
contained 248 individuals in total, 54 of whom were slaves.36  Broken down into families 
of different sizes, each entry began with a brief visual description (particularly of height 
and the shape and color of the beard), name and age of the head of the family followed by 
information on the remainder of the family members, starting with the wives and ending 
with the slaves that the family owned. The first entry in the book, in this case discernable 
as the chieftain’s family, was the largest of all families that made up the clan, consisting 
of 44 members. The chieftain, named Pişmak Bey, was 50 years old, had two wives and 
six children. The remainder of his family consisted of his slaves (marked as gulams in the 
list), their wives, and children, amounting to 34 individuals in total. Several of Pişmak 
                                                
34 For a comprehensive study for the scope and activities of the commission, see David Cameron 
Cuthell, “The Muhacirin Komisyonu: “An Agent in the Transformation of Ottoman Anatolia, 
1860–1866” (Ph.D. Dissertation, Columbia University, 2005). 
35 It is common knowledge that the refugees were expelled from the Caucasus in groups, and 
came to the Ottoman Empire organized in such social units as tribes or clans, however, the 
composition of these units has hardly been touched upon. 
36 BOA, A.DVN 147/43, 1276.R.4 (31 October 1859). 
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Bey’s gulams were close to his age, indicating that he may in fact have inherited them 
from his family; a fact, as will be discussed below, that constituted the backbone of all of 
Circassian slave-owners’ claims to slave-ownership, against the slaves’ and abolitionists’ 
call for emancipation.  
A similar pattern can be observed in another register from the same period. 
Kupşak tribe37 of Nogai people consisted of 64 households and 412 individuals in total, 
49 of which were slaves. In this case, the chieftain’s household was smaller in size, 
containing 24 individuals. 17 of those (that is, five gulams and their families) had slave 
status. Out of 64 households, eleven owned slaves. A register for another Nogai tribe has 
a similar composition, in that it was composed of few large slave-owning households 
(and similarly, a low percentage of slaves to the total population), whereas two other 
registers for Besni and Abzakh tribes appear different,38 as the percentage of both slave 
owning households and the total number of slaves are significantly higher than others. In 
the register for Abzakh, for instance, the households are much larger on average, with no 
apparent chieftain or prince. 18 out of 29 households owned slaves, particularly young 
female slaves, who seem unattached to a slave family, which makes the whole settlement 
seem like a slave market.  
 
  
                                                
37 The name of the tribe is noted as Kontak in the BOA catalog, although in the report itself it 
reads as Kubşak or Kupşak, possibly referring to Kıpçak people. A.DVN 147/27 1276.R.4 (31 
October 1859). 




Image 2.1 The opening page of the settlement register for the Anaçok tribe, depicting the 
chieftain’s household on the right side. BOA, A.DVN 147/43, 1276.R.4 (31 October 1859). 
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Another one of these registers, this time from after the second wave of the 
immigration , consisted of 336 individuals, excluding several deaths (possibly, en route), 
transfers to other locations, and four sales.39 Again, the leading, that is, the chieftain’s 
family was the largest, containing 15 individuals, 10 of which were slaves or members of 
slave families. There too, the larger the family (who were likely to be princes/nobles, or 
in general the slave owning classes), it was more likely to own slaves, although in the 
later register, the total number and percentage of the slaves seems much smaller than the 
earlier ones. As the register did not indicate the name of the tribe/clan, saying anything 
definitive on it is impossible, but it is likely that with the passage of time, nearly two 
decades after the expulsion, many of the enslaved members of the Circassian tribes did 
obtain some form of independence from their owners, or were sold in the slave markets 
of big cities. It is difficult to establish whether this difference is related to the tribal 
structures or changes in time. Nevertheless, these examples indicate that the main clashes 
within Caucasian tribes took place, and continued to do so in the ensuing decades, 
distinctly between the princely families and their slaves, as the remainder of the tribes 
owned only a few of them, with the exception of the Abzakh. 
In many of these cases of conflict and complaints, the slave owners clutched to 
the notion of an “adat-ı kadime” that originated from their native lands referred to as 
“vatan-ı asliye,” or simply as Kuban like the Nogai chieftain Canpolat Bey did in his 
petition that closed the previous chapter. The slaves, on the other hand, followed the legal 
developments generally more carefully, achieved some degree of knowledge and sense as 
to what their rights were, and acted, at times in an organized manner, to obtain or at least 
                                                
39 Taksim Atatürk Kütüphanesi, Belediye Yazmaları, BEL_Yz_B.000059, 1294 (1877–78). 
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claim them. Starting early on with the emigration process, the enslaved refugees were 
highly vocal in demanding change to their statuses, at times acting “rebelliously” (as per 
the descriptions by the slave owners went, such as above-mentioned Canpolat’s), and 
potentially, mutinously. In the aftermath of their expulsion from Russia, where, as they 
themselves put it, they “left all that they owned, except for their poverty,” the 
impoverished refugees were less likely to go into bloody conflicts within their 
community. Nevertheless, the instances of violent encounters did exist and both the 
possibility and fear of its frequency remained real.40 Ehud Toledano depicts a case of 
violent clashes between slave owners and slaves as follows: 
On 9 September 1866 the governor of the Vilâyet of Edirne reported to the Grand 
Vezir that violent clashes had erupted in the village of Mandira between 
Circassian slave holders and their slaves. The issue was the slaves’ status. A few 
policemen were sent to stop the fighting, but they were barred from entering the 
village. When the authorities learned about this, they immediately dispatched 
more policemen under the command of a binbaşı (equivalent rank of a major). 
This time the police managed to control the situation and put an end to the 
skirmish, but the dispute which had caused it still remained unresolved. The 
slaves demanded to be freed, and the slave holders refused to manumit them. The 
governor reported that he had sent to the village one of his staff officers to 
mediate between the factions. He was concerned, however, that with 400 
households of immigrants—all armed—fighting could be resumed at any time. 
Therefore, the Vâli  suggested that the villagers be disarmed, and he asked the 
Grand Vezir to authorize this move.41 
 
                                                
40 BOA, A.DVN 156/50, 1277.Ra.03 (19 September 1860).  
41 Toledano, The Ottoman Slave Trade and its Suppression, 162–163. 
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 The Ottoman government was not there solely to appease these tensions, nor to 
act as a judge to come to a mutual solution for the parties. It was also there to code the 
slave owners’ and slaves’ behavior, to place them in the “grid of law” that it was 
weaving. Such was the case with Listan, Yunus, and Zekeriya, three of the 
Kabarda/Kabarta chieftain Makhar Ahmed’s slaves, who took up rifles and shot at the 
latter’s house one night. In their interrogation, they said that they did so not with the 
purpose of killing him, but rather to frighten him, so that he would forgo the cruel 
treatments and torture he applied to his slaves.42 Just like slave flights, these offences 
sped up the process of legal assimilation of the slaves and often highlighted if not 
imposed a uniform meaning of their slave status. In the case of Listan, Yunus, and 
Zekeriya, for instance, their offence was brought to the local and eventually higher court 
of Supreme Council, was determined to be a criminal offence perpetrators of which were 
to be punished in accordance with the article 179 of the Ottoman Criminal Law that 
called for imprisonment for the duration of one week to six months. But since these three 
slaves (whose enslaved status was established with the very first question in the related 
interrogation) committed the offence against their masters (efendi), their bold attempt was 
found to be an aggravating factor, and their sentence was determined to be imprisonment 
for the duration of a full year. Thus, by coding the slaves’ act against their owners as 
such, the Ottoman government, or its law administering institution helped define these 
relationship as something above the ordinary and essentially unequal. 
                                                
42 BOA, MVL 698/20, 1281.L.13 (11 March 1865). BOA, A.MKT.UM 507/61. The armed 
clashes between the chieftains/slave owning classes and slaves did occur especially in the 
aftermath of the 1908 revolution, when the Circassians claimed full citizenship in the new, 
constitutional order and when the government did give both the slaves and slave owners a 
confusing message when it drafted enslaved men for the army.  
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While, judging by the age composition, many of the slaves who were recorded in 
the settlement registers were inherited and could be claimed ancestrally, the ancient law, 
“adat-ı kadime” was evoked not solely or necessarily to refer to ancestral rights to own 
slaves, whose enslavement took place during the tribes’ days long-gone in the Caucasus 
mountains. In fact, “adat-ı kadime” did not only refer to the ownership of slaves, but also 
the means of enslavement, in accordance to these customs. In many instances, we see 
examples of crude expressions of power, when a land-holding Circassian man claimed 
the rights to the labor or sexual services of destitute members of their groups. In one such 
case, a Circassian man from Hatuqwai tribe named Dingozi and his seven friends 
petitioned the office of the Grand Vizier in 1859, and complained about a man named 
Hapuzi (or, Hapuji) for employing them forcefully and without payment. The petitioners 
asked the Grand Vizier to look into the matter or at least give them the permission to 
pursue the matter in accordance with the Şer’i legal formulations.43 Another brief notice 
from 1865 reported on the enslavement of Receb and Bata Agurli by a man (possibly a 
chieftain) named Koç Çoseb.44 As it would be reported many years later, in addition to 
those who came to the Ottoman Empire as slaves, many were enslaved en route to the 
Ottoman lands due to the harsh conditions of the journey that cost the lives of 200 to 300 
people every day.45 As chapter 4 explores, in the aftermath of the constitutional 
revolution in 1908, during which slave claims to freedom virtually exploded, many 
                                                
43 BOA, A.DVN 146/11, 1276.S.14 (12 September 1859). 
44 BOA, A.MKT.MHM 332/32, 1281.Z.21 (17 May 1865). Also see MVL 529/110, 1283.Z.29 (4 
May 1867), in which 26 individuals were enslaved, reportedly with the simple promise of 
protection. 
45 Toledano, The Ottoman Slave Trade and its Suppression, 150–151.  
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stories of “unjust enslavement” during the Circassian expulsion came to the fore, 
especially to undo slaveholders’ claims to ancestral slave ownership.46 
Ehud Toledano has argued that it was the penalties not being strong enough for 
kidnapping and enslavement that allowed the traffic to go on unhindered throughout the 
remainder of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,47 an argument that too readily 
assumes an uncontested universality of the newly adopted Ottoman criminal code, and 
the justice it promised. The penal code was not there to be simply and universally 
adopted by everyone, including the incoming Circassian refugees, whose justice system 
worked differently than both the Şer’i law that sought to maintain status quo above all, or 
penal code that aimed to reach a universal justice at all costs. It was there to be 
negotiated, by those who were also negotiating their participation and inclusion to the 
Ottoman Empire. The slave owners and slaves grasped it from different ends but they did 
negotiate both their understanding of the law (and such offenses as murder, theft, 
kidnapping, and enslavement), sovereignty, subjecthood or citizenship. From the 
Ottoman government’s point of view, law had to be negotiated differently with the slave 
owners and slaves also. As Grattan Geary, the editor of Times of India put it in 1878, 
there was great benefit to the Ottoman government in recognizing “the authority of the 
Circassian chiefs over their followers,” for they could, according to Geary, “keep their 
people in some sort of order if the government would empower them to do so:” 
 
As it is, the law is too feeble a restraint, and the patriarchal rule of the chiefs 
                                                
46 For example, see DH.MKT 2891/97, 1327.B.17 (4 August 1909). 
47 Toledano, The Ottoman Slave Trade and its Suppression, 168. 
 86 
being set aside the wild Circassian does whatever he pleases. His great physical 
strength and his perfect mastery over his weapons, of which he always carries a 
varied assortment, make him the most formidable of all the robbers in these parts. 
My experience was confined to those what had been taken into the Government 
service, and I found them to be very far the best in escort duty that I had on the 
whole journey. They were obliging, hearty, good-humored fellows never afraid 
of exertion or exposure and never inventing ingenious fictions as an excuse for 
coming to a premature halt. There is fine material in these Circassian settlers who 
have so unenviable reputation. Possibly in the reorganization of Asiatic Turkey, 
which cannot now be long delayed, they will be turned to good account.48 
 
 
On the one hand, the Ottoman government had a lot at stake in empowering Circassian 
chieftains, to be able to implement/enforce the law which otherwise would be too feeble 
to have any use at all.49 On the other hand, however (and this holds particularly true for 
the practice of slavery) endorsing the “kanun-i kadim” in perpetuating slavery, 
undermined the very law the Ottoman state wanted to implement.50 Scholars of Ottoman 
                                                
48 Grattan Geary, The Times, Letters to the Editor, July 25, 1878 , 4. 
49 We know that the Ottoman government already favored Circassian chieftains in specific 
occasions. See, for instance, the petition by Şahin Giray Bey of Zodoh tribe, in which asked to be 
granted a military rank equivalent to that he had with Russian state before he departed for the 
Ottoman Empire, a request again deemed appropriate by the Ministry of War. BOA, 
A.MKT.MHM, 177/29, 1276.B.21 (13 February 1860). Similarly, Kasbolat Bey (the chieftain of 
the Altıkesek tribe) petitioned to the office of the Grand Vizier and asked for an “appropriate” 
amount of salary, and in case that it is unattainable, an administrative position at a government 
institution, a request deemed appropriate by the Muhacirin Komisyonu, BOA, MVL 434/79, 
1280.Ş.03 (13 January 1864). For an elaborate discussion on the Ottoman policies of coopting the 
Caucasian and Crimean elites, see Cuthell, “The Muhacirin Komisyonu,” 130–139. Cuthell 
argues that both the Muhacirin Komisyonu and the Ottoman government it represented 
“recognized and promoted continuity in the social structure common to both Crimean and 
Ottoman societies,” 133.  
50 The Ottoman government was not always sure on what to do either. See, for instance, BOA, 
A.MKT.MHM 237/38, 1278.R. 7 (12 October 1861) and A.MKT.MHM 335/21, 1282.M.21 (16 
June 1865) for cases where the office of the Grand Vizier is inquired about the procedure for 
slaves left behind from deceased chieftains and slave owners. 
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history have pointed out this dilemma, in which the Ottoman government was caught 
between its old habits of rule by coopting the local elites and the new political and legal 
order it aspired to implement.51 Most recently, Janet Klein’s study of the Hamidian era 
efforts to include the Kurdish region “into the Ottoman fold,” and the government’s 
extensive use and abuse of the local power networks (as much as regional conflicts) 
offers a good example of this dilemma. However, Klein’s (and others’) studies rarely go 
beyond the interactions between the Ottoman government and local power holders. 
Accordingly, law as the tracing paper of power appears to be negotiated only between 
these bodies whereas other, less privileged groups also took part in these negotiations 
whenever they could. This was especially (and transparently) so in the case of post-
Circassian expulsion slavery in the Ottoman Empire. The following section looks into 
how slaves took part in these negotiations at a time when the legitimacy of slavery was 
highly contested throughout the world, which was increasingly more connected in the 
ways subjecthood and citizenship (and the notion of justice and equality that it was 
hypothetically contingent upon) were understood.  
 
Freedom Suits 
“With his faith in justice, he comes across as naive. Perhaps I do him an injustice. 
Perhaps it is an act. Or perhaps he is the stuff of which saints are made, unalloyed 
                                                
51 See Ussama Makdisi, The Culture of Sectarianism: Community, History, and Violence in 
Nineteenth-century Ottoman Lebanon (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000). 
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innocence. But his story is classic: the man betrayed by justice.”  
 Michael Taussig, Law in a Lawless Land52 
 
“The universe of right and wrong is territorialized by a grid of laws,” Michael 
Taussig wrote, “and each law is numbered.” However, those numbers never quite fit 
reality, “neither the reality of the human condition nor the reality of the subtle 
distinctions necessary to law. “53 As we have seen in the section above, Caucasian slaves’ 
flight from their owners’ estate, incidents of assault or other criminal acts hastily brought 
them into the Ottoman “legal fold,” where the distinctions between their status as abd-ı 
hür and abd-ı memluk had collapsed and their relationship with their owners and Ottoman 
society in general were defined anew. Slaves’ legal pleas to freedom, which were literally 
called freedom suits (hürriyet davaları) and began shortly after their arrival in the 
Ottoman domains, came precisely at this juncture and embodied an effort, however naive 
it may seem, to use the very same grid to thwart control of their owners over them on the 
one hand and to claim full membership to Ottoman society on the other. When doing so, 
they not only detached themselves from adat-ı kadime and question the legitimacy of 
Şer’i law but also put the old mode of Ottoman rule, defined particularly by corporate 
privileges, in competition with the new one, characterized by the fiction of equality 
before the law.54 Thus, the disputes between the Circassian chieftains and slaves, their 
                                                
52 Michael Taussig, Law in a Lawless Land: Diary of a Limpieza in Colombia (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 2005), 30. 
53 Ibid., 16. 
54 This argument is insightfully made by Dylan Penningroth in regards lineage systems in the 
American South and Africa: “... slavery in southern Gold Coast planted roots for a patrilineal 
system of inheritance and descent that tangled and competed with the matrilineal system. It was 
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usage of the same language of justice, yet with different meanings ascribed to it, were 
more than simple issues of ownership of a patch of land, an ox, or the plough. A foreign 
or transplanted law that enforced these descriptions of ownership was not the whole of it 
either. As Suraiya Farokhi put it, “the process of [slaves’] induction to Ottoman society 
was not simply a matter between slave owners and slaves,” and the “state intervention 
went beyond simple tax collection and prevention of abuses.”55 “Acting in the name of 
religious law,” Faroqhi argues, “the state also attempted to enforce general urban [or 
provincial] order, including the hierarchy between men and women, Muslims and non-
Muslims.”56 Here we see that this involvement goes deeper than “acting in the name of 
religious law” or simply effecting the hierarchies in relation to what Madeline Zilfi called 
“the twin pillars of elite ‘othering,’“ that is of women and non-Muslims,57 but all (and 
needless to say, shifting) subordinate groups. The Ottoman state mapped its subject-
citizens primarily in accordance with the level of their subordination, and upheld (if not 
produced) the mechanisms that produced them. The Circassian slaves’ claims to freedom, 
which meant in actuality no more than full ownership of their lands, ploughs, ox and 
daughters at that point, was one of the most significant attempts against these 
                                                                                                                                            
the mirror image of slavery in British America, where legally enforced matrilineality set slaves 
apart and affirmed free men’s authority over both property and their white and black 
“dependents.” Comparing such innovations reminds us how contingent these kinship systems 
were, and how intertwined they were with slavery, not only in Africa but in the United States as 
well.” Dylan C. Penningroth, “The Claims of Slaves and Ex-Slaves to Family and Property: A 
Transatlantic Comparison,” The American Historical Review, vol. 112, no. 4 (Oct., 2007), 1051. 
55 Suraiya Faroqhi, “Quis Custodiet Custodes? Controlling Slave Identities and Slave Traders in 
Seventeenth and Eighteenth-century Istanbul,” in Stories of Ottoman Men and Women: 
Establishing Status, Establishing Control (Istanbul: Eren Yayıncılık, 2002), 252. 
56 Faroqhi, “Quis Custodiet Custodes?,” 252. This same argument constitutes the core argument 
of Madeline Zilfi’s Women and Slavery in the Late Ottoman Empire: The Design of Difference 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
57 Zilfi, Women and Slavery in the Late Ottoman Empire, 87. 
 90 
mechanisms, one that was supported by a (trans)forming legal system by a government 
that promised to safeguard, at least in theory, the rights of all of its subject-citizens to life 
and property. From the beginning of the Circassian influx at the end of the 1850s, in 
attempts that the above-mentioned Nogai chieftain Canpolat described as “unruly 
behavior,” slaves filed petitions or legal suits for their “freedom,” and their rights to 
ownership of their possessions as well as their families. These petitions put the 
contradictions between the transplanted/old and the existing/new legal systems in writing 
and elucidated what slaves made of their new “homelands,” in which they were as 
invested as their owners.  
Dylan Penningroth argues that pluralistic legal orders, such as the imperial or 
colonial ones, “served a variety of powerful groups: ruling elites, male elders, and the 
colonial state itself,” although other scholars pointed at the further complexities of this 
seemingly linear equation.58 “Those groups’ jostling assumptions and interests,” 
Penningroth further argued, “often opened up space for ordinary people, and even slaves, 
to seize on legal institutions to pursue their interest.”59 In the Ottoman Empire, well-
poised and often well-informed, slaves also framed their concerns and demands in 
reference to these assumptions and interests, beginning with the role of the Sultan and the 
Ottoman state itself. In their petitions, they put into words what sovereign power ought to 
mean and do, arguing that their position under the protection of and tax-payers to 
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Circassian chieftains not only caused their destitute state but also undermined the 
sovereignty of the Ottoman state itself.  
While the slaves’ claims to freedom began (or at least the news of it circulated) 
earlier, the first mention of its organized character was in 1863, a time when the 
expulsion was nearing its peak. In an official report written by the council of the province 
of Silistra for the office of the Grand Vizier, it was noted that an ongoing dispute among 
Circassian immigrants on the matter of slavery had been partially resolved when the slave 
owners and their slaves came to an agreement to travel to Istanbul with the purpose of 
mutually appealing to a judge or court hearing (terafu’) with the Supreme Council, but 
the latter reportedly changed their mind for no apparent reason.60 Upon this, the owner of 
the mentioned slaves, a chieftain named Kobzik Zavir together with several other 
notables and elders (a total of thirty individuals), applied to the provincial court to file an 
official complaint about the “inappropriate” behavior of his slaves. Following the slave 
owners’ official appeal, and in compliance with the local officials’ suggestion that “one 
or two of the slaves with trustable judgment” should also be heard, a slave named Abrek 
was summoned to the provincial court of Silistre and stated (on behalf of other slaves in 
his village) that they could not and would not travel to Istanbul for the trial, as they were 
not slaves but free like other freeborn people. Thus, Abrek maintained, the plaintiffs had 
no right to claim ownership over them and even less to force them to trial (possibly to set 
the terms of bondage at this point), like the use of their agricultural land and equipment, 
sale, and resale of their family members. With rhetorical mastery, Abrek further stated 
that he and his enslaved colleagues migrated from their native lands in the Caucasus to 
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Ottoman domains with the hopes and desires of ridding themselves of Russian aggression 
and becoming farmers, worthy of service to the Ottoman sovereign. “Now, since all of us 
are slaves and subjects of our Padişah,” he reportedly contended, “neither he, nor God 
would consent to [Kobzik Zavir] capture and hold us as slaves.” Unless they were 
rounded and tied up and sent to Istanbul forcefully (which was not permissible, the 
council report clarified), they would not allow any one of them to be taken to Istanbul. 
They were not to be captured forcefully, yet plain talk did not suffice either, the 
provincial council complained to the Supreme Council of Judicial Ordinances (Meclis-i 
Vâlâ-yı Ahkâm-ı Adliye), where the case file eventually ended up. Here Abrek (as one 
man of sound judgment) appeared alone in the provincial court, and yet not as a plaintiff 
either, but representing a joint effort against the adat-ı kadime, the chieftains who 
claimed their ownership pertaining to that law, as well the Ottoman government, who 
was seeking to (re)define and enforce their status as slaves for the sake of public order 
and security.  
These claims continued in the ensuing years and became more organized and 
collective in nature, producing actual petitions and lengthier arguments. In the meantime, 
however, both the slave owners and the Ottoman state developed their own (inter)related 
strategies and solutions. Convinced that manumitting slaves without the consent of their 
owners would bring on violent opposition and more clashes, the Council of Ministers 
suggested that self-purchase (mükâtebe) would be the best solution,61 not only to appease 
the ongoing or future tensions but also to resolve the matter without deviating from the 
Şer’i law that governed all public and civil matters in the empire. Mükâtebe, an 
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established Şer’i procedure, allowed the slaves and slave owners to mutually determine 
the payment terms and to set the amount (often the equivalent of the slaves’ sale price) 
for manumission. Upon the completion of the full payment, the slave would be given a 
manumission certificate and deemed free, while the owners themselves would receive a 
fair amount of compensation at the same time.62 One apparent problem with mükâtebe 
was that exceedingly impoverished refugee-slaves, who were mere share-croppers on 
their owners’ land,63 were not able to pay a slave’s price, let alone pay for an entire 
family. Moreover, legally speaking, it was a voluntary procedure and could not be 
imposed upon slave owners, which was, as Ehud Toledano observed, a setback for the 
slaves:64 
A mükâtebe could not be imposed on a slave owner who had not flagrantly 
mistreated his slave; it also gave greater leverage to the Şerî courts, before which 
such procedures were normally being conducted. Apparently, the government 
was unable to overcome the strong opposition of the Circassian slave holders, or 
simply preferred to avoid a direct, and undoubtedly bitter, confrontation with 
them. The readiness with which the Şerî courts were issuing orders supporting 
the position of slave owners against the claim of their slaves put the government 
in a different situation. [...] [t]he courts impeded the authorities’ actions which 
were meant to benefit the slaves. This may be indicative of a general mood in 
religious circles, one which upheld the legality of slavery because it was 
sanctioned by Islam. The government, it should be stressed, was consistently 
careful in emphasizing the slavery, as distinct form of the slave trade, was not to 
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be interfered with. The Persian Gulf ferman of 1847, the prohibition of the 
Circassian and Georgian slave trade in 1854, and the ferman of 1857 against the 
traffic in blacks come to mind in this context. It was only the institution of 
agricultural slavery among the Circassians that Porte was trying to dismantle, and 
that too—in the face of strong opposition—it did gradually, with great caution, 
somewhat diffidently.65 
 
That the Ottoman government appeared more sympathetic to the cause and claims of the 
slaves than the Şer’i courts was not because it was inherently good-natured or benign. As 
has been argued above, the Ottoman government too favored the slave owners over 
slaves under most circumstances, but they did it more subtly and with a different set of 
obligations and priorities, particularly at the international level, in comparison to the Şer’i 
courts, which were exceedingly and purposefully local. First of these concerns was the 
return migration of the Caucasian refugees, which began almost immediately after their 
arrival, causing alarm with the Ottoman government over the potential “domestic chaos 
and foreign embarrassment.”66 Secondly, they had to comply or at least respond to 
Britain’s intensifying efforts towards the wholesale abolition of slavery throughout the 
Ottoman domains. Having abolished the slave trade in 1808, and the institution itself as a 
whole in 1833, Britain concentrated its abolitionary efforts against the trade in the 
Atlantic and eastern Mediterranean, although often to enact or reinforce imperial 
hierarchies.67 As the above quote suggests, starting with the 1847 Persian Gulf ferman, 
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the Ottoman government issued imperial decrees that also functioned as pacts and treaties 
between the Ottoman and other (specifically British) governments, which gave the latter 
the right of search and seizure, as necessary.68 Abolition of trade in Caucasian slaves in 
1854, which was necessitated and forced upon the Ottoman government by the Crimean 
War, and Africans in 1857 (an encompassing and carefully enforced ban, more a direct 
product of Britain’s worldwide abolitionary efforts) both had binding effects that brought 
a close monitoring of the Ottoman sea and land routes by the British consular offices, 
commercial agents, as well as naval forces in the Mediterranean. Unlike the issue of trade 
in African slaves, the Ottoman government managed to dodge the British demands on 
Circassian slavery to a great extent.69 However, this did not mean that it was entirely 
immune to British control, which occasionally pushed for measures against it as well.70 
Moreover, the Ottoman government had domestic obligations, at least aspirations, in 
providing a degree of equality before the law in the aftermath of the 1856 Reform Edict, 
in compliance with the spread of the liberal ideals and liberalism as a “specific form of 
governmentality.”71 Thus, the Şer’i legal institutions and the Ottoman government had 
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different positions in relation to slavery and abolition. Mükâtebe was a solution that 
supported both positions and favored the slave owners too, by “mak[ing] the application 
of the procedure contingent upon its acceptance by immigrants’ leaders, most of whom 
were slave holders.”72 
The slave petitions and claims were presumably influenced by all these 
international developments and domestic aspirations, although they concerned 
themselves mostly with the definition of slavery, property ownership and sovereignty 
(Abrek, mentioned above, was one of the first to express it), making only rare references 
to the 1854 ban on Caucasian slave trade or the general prohibition in 1857 against trade 
in African slaves. One related note, written by the office of the Grand Vizier to the 
Muhacirin Komisyonu, pointed at the problem of the Ottoman governments’ ambivalent 
position vis-à-vis Caucasian and African slavery and the possible discontentment it 
would cause among Caucasian slaves. While both the new importation and the sale and 
purchase of existing African slaves had already been banned throughout the empire, the 
note stated, the Caucasian ones were made exceptions and their previous statuses 
(determined by the adat-ı kadime) were upheld. The importation of slaves from 
immigrant settlements, and their sale (“openly, here and there” the note underlined) 
continued without much hindrance.73 This ambivalence and discrepancy would became 
become one of the central arguments for the reformers (most notably the Ministry of 
Justice and Circassian intellectual organizations) demanding the wholesale abolition of 
slavery in the aftermath of the constitutional revolution of 1908. The semi-official 
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proclamation announced by the Ministry of Justice in late 1908 clearly stated the sale and 
purchase of Circassian slaves was prohibited, just as the trade in African slaves had been 
for a long time.74 On a related note, the slave holders who claimed that their ownership of 
their slaves had a Şer’i basis (supported by numerous ayat and hadith, as they often 
clarified) found the abolition of trade in African slaves deployed against them as a claim-
making strategy. As the chief of the Ottoman Parliament’s Committee on Petitions 
articulated in 1909, even if the ownership of Circassian slaves was a Şer’i principle or 
right, had the African slaves not already been exempted from the jurisdiction of Şer’i 
law?75 Similarly, the minister of justice Hasan Fehmi made an argument against slavery 
by pointing out that “slavery pertaining to the white race was already abolished by the 
Russian government in territories under their control” when Circassians emigrated to the 
Ottoman lands; a fact that rendered, according to the minister, the claims to slave 
ownership by Circassian notables unfounded.76  
Neither the Azizian nor Hamidian-era Ottomans openly celebrated “freedom, 
equality, justice,” as their counterparts did in the post-1908 constitutional revolution, but 
the idea that slavery was essentially incompatible with both the 1839 and 1856 edicts was 
in the making as early as the1860s, and Circassian slaves were instrumental in bringing 
that debate to the foreground. Their petitions did not mention the general ban of 1857 as 
one would expect them to do, since they would obviously benefit from it. There is no 
doubt that this was partially due to racial othering, as would be more clearly articulated, 
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often retrospectively, in the aftermath of the 1908 revolution.77 What also figured in this 
absence was the Circassian slaves’ predominantly rural character. They defined 
themselves as farmers and peasants in the service of the Ottoman sovereign and were 
removed from urban areas, where bonding with other slaves and learning about their 
experiences and sharing strategies would be easier. Most importantly, however, due to a 
variety of reasons, most significant of which was the difficulties encountered throughout 
the migration and settlement process, their protests were local ones, directed at a set of 
immediate problems and tangible items, such as the breaking up of their families and sale 
of their daughters or the ownership of their land and animals. In other words, theirs was 
not a moral or ethical quest against the “greater evil” of slavery, as was the case with 
abolitionists, reformers, or humanitarians, even though they made use of the same 
universal language of “freedom.”  
Such was the case described by a slave named Mehmed in his brief petition to the 
Council of State (Şura-yı Devlet) in July 1872.78 Mehmed and other slaves from the town 
of Silivri brought legal action against their owners five years before the petition, that is, 
not long after their settlement in the area. While their first attempt was hastily suppressed 
by local legal bodies, they managed to bring the case to court in Istanbul and had been 
collectively residing there in the past year for what Mehmed called a freedom suit 
(hürriyet davası). While Mehmed and his colleagues were following a strictly legal path 
to claim their freedom, the slave owners were far from keeping within the “prescribed 
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boundaries” of the law, refused to wait for the result of the legal procedure, and restored 
their violent means and tyrannized the remainder of the slave population in Silivri, with 
the purpose of obtaining half of the grain that was recently harvested. These specific 
instances of violence and abuse on the slave owners’ side demanded a specific set of 
responses. Moreover, at the core of the slaves’ claim to freedom was the assertion of their 
difference from the remainder of the slave population, particularly those employed in 
domestic settings in the Ottoman center. Another, lengthier, petition filed by Haydar, 
Osman, and Zoş to the Council of State in 1872 provides a more detailed depiction of this 
particular point. Acting as representatives (vekil) on behalf of all those “who [were] 
called slaves among the Circassian refugees that settled in Rumelia and Anatolia,” 
Haydar, Osman, and Zoş, themselves also slaves, had been carrying out legal action of a 
similar nature for the past several years. “It must be our poor command of the language 
and the errors we made in expressing our intention thereof,” they wrote in a sarcastic 
tone, “that hindered and delayed the receipt of the answers and just solutions we have 
been demanding in the last several years.”79 In their petition supplemented by a sixteen-
item fact list, theirs was not a discursive “double plea of humanity and international 
right,”80 but a response to a set of actual problems, concepts, and definitions, such as just 
enslavement, property or sovereignty they grappled with in their everyday lives. 
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The first of these concepts and definitions had to with the question of what it 
meant to be a citizen in relation to a sovereign power. In their native land of the 
“Circassian Mountain” (Çerkestan Dağı), the discussion went, they were not under the 
protection of any monarch, thus the stability and the order they needed (simple and 
vulnerable peasants as they were, they added) came from what they called “a few able 
swordsmen and those who had the “will to war.”81 Their present status as slaves 
originated within a specific context when their forefathers sought the protection of the 
chieftains and that their status in time was relegated from peasants to slaves. Even so, 
however, the root of the problem that afflicted them now had to do with the terminology 
rather than anything else: the word slave (köle) was understood only as those employed in 
domestic settings and sold at will (which was deemed incompatible with the adat-ı 
kadime, they clarified), but what they really ought to be called was peasants (reaya). The 
petition further clarified that this wrong usage of the word slave was devised by the 
Circassian chieftains, princes, and noblemen themselves, who were accustomed to act as 
the sovereign in their native lands but whose sovereignty was challenged by the Ottoman 
state upon their immigration to its domains.82 Only by holding on to their slaves (and 
defining them as such, before all), the petitioners argued, the chieftains could hold on to 
or assert their princely qualities that they believed they had and guarantee their gains 
through in-kind payments they extorted from their slaves or simply by selling them.83 
This situation of being at the service of both the Ottoman state and the Circassian 
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chieftains, which meant paying two separate taxes, was not only beyond the limit of their 
means but also impaired the authority of the Ottoman state itself. Moreover, their legal 
status as slaves exempted them from the military draft. While all other immigrants 
became eligible for the draft seven years after their arrival in the country, they were held 
back by their owners, which caused another harm to the Ottoman state.  
In a long official letter, the Council of State agreed upon the rightfulness of 
Haydar, Osman, and Zoş’s central claim. Like all other classes and groups of subjects, 
they wrote, they too became stakeholders in both Şer’i and civil laws upon their arrival to 
the Ottoman domains, which should have invalidated their status as slaves 
(memlukiyet).84 But their enslaved status was due to an old and widespread custom 
(itiyad) among the Circassians, and the existence of it was acknowledged even by the 
slaves themselves.85 Thus, the Council concluded, this long-established and 
acknowledged category could not retrospectively or automatically be undone by the 
simple fact that they migrated to another land. Ignoring, for the most part, the slaves’ 
elaborate arguments on the meanings of citizenship, the Ottoman government in general 
and the Council of State in particular concerned themselves with finding a practical 
solution to the problem. They proposed the promotion of mükâtebe as a safe, just, and 
only option towards a wholesale abolition of slavery in the Ottoman domains. Fearing 
that the conflicts and fights between the two parties would get more violent and spread to 
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the rest of the society and turn into a general turmoil, the Council advised against any 
coercive measures against slaves or slave owners, but not without highlighting the 
importance of bringing limitations to both sides. According to those, slave owners were 
banned from breaking up families and selling each member separately. Moreover, age 
limitations were reiterated here, although a bit differently than when it was first brought 
up a decade earlier. The letter stated that the age of 45 and 35, for male and female slaves 
respectively, marked the end of their terms of service and rendered them free.86 Yet, their 
freedom applied only to themselves and those of their children born after they obtained 
their freedom. With the consent of their owners, the remainder of their children could be 
subjected to mükâtebe also, whose fees would be determined by a special commission. In 
short, the Ottoman government opted for regulating and ameliorating the conditions of 
slavery, but eschewed an apparent intervention to achieve a wholesale abolition, even 
though it was aware of its undermining effects, which was discussed, “one by one, item 
by item” by the slaves in their claims to freedom. In fact, even the military draft was 
partially left to the slave owners’ consent and will. The Council stated that those who 
were already in the process of mükâtebe could enter into army service, as a way of paying 
the self-purchase fee, but only with permission obtained from their owners.87 In that, the 
Ottoman government undermined its power as the “holder of the sovereign decision,” by 
tying it to the consent of another authority.88 The Ottoman government failed to bring 
about an effective solution, and instead continued with half measures, that benefited in 
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most cases only the slave owners.89 In other words, its justice betrayed the slaves who 
had the most faith in it. We know that these half measures as limitations and regulations 
were hardly enforced in the following decades also, as the Circassian settlements 
continued to supply the urban and provincial elite households with domestic slaves, as the 
following chapter will explore. 
All in all, even the principal purpose of the Ottoman government’s appeasement 
strategies failed, and the clashes between the slaves and slave owners continued in the 
ensuing years. A year after the Council’s official communication, in 1873, a note written 
by the office of the Grand Vizier reported on the difficulties the slaves encountered in 
paying the self-purchase amounts that were previously decided on. Instead of the 
previous terms, the office suggested that the fee should be paid in kind, with whatever 
was left from the previous year’s and half of the current year’s crop.90 The fee could also 
be paid in cash, by auctioning the crop, if the slaves preferred to do so. In almost an 
automated-sounding response, the Ottoman government reiterated that mükâtebe would 
protect and guarantee the Şer’i rights of both parties and help in doing away with the 
ongoing strife and for that reason, should be put into practice and the results be reported 
to the office of the Grand Vizier at once. Just as the Grand Vezirate issued this decision, 
an incidence of unrest was communicated from Canik, where armed slaves and slave 
owners reportedly assembled in the town square. The report explicated that there too, a 
group of slave representatives had been to Istanbul in pursuit of legal action to undo or 
get rid of their slave status. While there, the slaves and the slave owners came to an 
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agreement on the implementation of mükâtebe for the manumission of the slaves, but the 
latter retreated from the agreement and could not be persuaded in its implementation, 
even though they were given detailed explanations on the benefits of the solution. The 
parties were eventually calmed down through the local government’s intervention, but 
given that the matter was left at a stalemate, it could be resumed any moment. Just as 
there were slave owners who refused to go into mükâtebe arrangements with their slaves, 
there were cases in which slaves rejected the idea of them paying for their manumission. 
A case from Çorlu from 1874 is told by Hakan Erdem as follows:91  
According to [the British Vice-consul in Edirne], the slaves asserted their 
freedom first, then the masters took up arms to compel them to return to their 
state of slavery unless they chose to purchase their liberty. It must immediately 
be observed that the masters were in fact willing for a mükâtebe but the slaves 
wanted to be free without paying for their manumission. [...] The local 
government assembled troops complete with field guns and ‘informed the 
Circassian Beys of the Porte’s instructions, threaten to abandon them to military.’ 
The Beys had little option but to consent to the terms of the government. This 
was a radically different situation from that envisaged by the aforementioned 
decisions of the Council. The slaves were to be freed ‘without money payments, 
the owners to receive as compensation the whole of the lands they hitherto held 
in common with the slaves.’ The slaves, on the other hand, were to be dispersed 
‘among Turkish villages’ and to have other land parcels. [The Vice-consul] 
added that there were some ninety Circassian chiefs connected with the late 
disturbances in the Edirne prisons. 
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Judging by the sizeable number of slaves petitioning with similar claims in the aftermath 
of the 1908 revolution, we know that mükâtebe, which the Ottoman government insisted 
upon, was far from bringing on a general or wholesale abolitionary solution. As already 
discussed above, it was after all a voluntary agreement, one that was at the slave owners’ 
discretion. In that, it even failed to provide the means to secure public order that the 
Ottoman government valued most.  
That the slaves were obliged to pay for their and their families’ freedom 
aggravated the poverty of those who were already suffering the harsh circumstances of 
refugee life. “Add to that,” Haydar, Osman, and Zoş stated in a rather angry tone, “the 
tools and things we owned or were given to us by the Ottoman state have been looted or 
broken by the slave owners,” which made their condition even worse. And that was not 
all of it, either. Whenever they asked for what they rightfully owned (granted to them by 
the Ottoman state or its agents, such as the Muhacirin Komisyonu), they were beaten or 
even killed. In one instance, they further noted, a group of them were tied up together and 
thrown into a well, for being disobedient towards the chieftains. They maintained their 
ways, the slaves concluded, because they expected either a monetary gain by selling their 
slaves particularly in Istanbul, or forming alliances with high dignitaries or the Ottoman 
dynasty through slavery, which became common particularly among the Abkhaz 
chieftains in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, a trait also explored in the 
following chapter. Consequently, the course of the Circassian expulsion as an elongated 
period of crisis created an overabundance of law that had to redefine its limits almost 
with each individual case, which gave Ottoman practice of slavery a highly arbitrary 
character. It continued to bent bend categorical limits until the dissolution of the empire, 
 106 
creating ample discussion on who was entitled to emancipation (and indirectly, 
citizenship) and who was not, along the way. 
 
Conclusion 
At about the same time as Haydar, Osman, and Zoş filed their petition and 
articulated why they were indeed entitled to freedom, or as many others fought their 
owners, refusing to pay for it, a brief report made its way to the Council of State. The 
report concerned itself specifically with female Circassian slaves (referred to as cariye), 
who had previously been under the ownership of a variety of people but managed to 
obtain their freedom recently.92 According to the report, these women, who were in most 
cases vulnerable towards all kinds of intruders, were approached by certain men who 
“drifted about as vagrants,” who seduced them (iğfalatına aldanarak) with the promise of 
marriage. These men, shortly after their marriage, divorced the women and caused their 
destitution, which resulted in prostitution and “other kinds of disgrace.” The report noted 
that thirty or forty of these manumitted cariyes recently appealed to the Muhacirin 
Komisyonu and obtained a daily salary of 6 piasters, but since the commission could not 
afford such extra expenses, another arrangement, in accordance with the Council of 
State’s suggestions, was in order. The Council gave its opinion as to how these women 
would be handled. Those who had tribal affiliations and whose free status was proved 
were to be taken to their settlement at once. If they were not members of a tribe, the 
women would be given the option of employment as maidservants and in case they did 
                                                
92 BOA, ŞD 2395/3, 1288.B.15 (30 September 1871). 
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not want to work as servants, they could also opt for marriage. Until a proper suitor came 
about, however, they would still have to be temporarily employed in service. These sorts 
of supportive or protective arrangements were in fact part of the manumission process, 
necessitated by law, but there were several obstacles foreseen for these women. Since 
they were divorced (and, implied here to have been engaged in prostitution), no 
household would be willing to accept them as servants. Even when they managed to find 
employment, the report asserted, the “traces of their former plight” would continue to 
cause problems and eventual aggravation of their situation. The commission was 
primarily responsible for close inspection of the women’s suitors at all times and when 
marriage could not be arranged, to place them in appropriate places, in accordance with 
their kind, cinsiyet, understood here as an ethnic or linguistic group. In that sense, even 
though their names appeared in settlement registers or were often central to the claims in 
many slave petitions, the experience of slavery and freedom for women remained 
different from that of male slaves. The latter resisted conspicuously, either by pulling out 
weapons or bringing lawsuits against their owners. Women and young girls, whose flow 
especially towards Istanbul did not cease for at least another four decades, developed 
other sorts of relationships both with their owners and slavery as a practice.  The 
following two chapters look at how slavery and freedom worked for them, in connection 
with what has been outlined in this chapter. !
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Chapter 3.   
Slaver-Mistresses, Matchmakers, and Destitute Women  
 
 
About a decade after the 1877–78 Russo-Turkish War ended, the Yıldız Palace 
secretariat in Istanbul, where the second wave of Caucasian migration was still in 
progress, received a report about a criminal case that involved three women and a number 
of young girls that had been illegally appropriated and sold as slaves.1 The perpetrators, 
three women named Sıdıka, Şirin, and Kör (blind) Nadire, targeted the destitute families 
in the Üsküdar district of Istanbul and in an ongoing scheme they went from door to door, 
using a particular division of labor and narrative strategy to convince the families to give 
or sell their daughters to them. In brief, they told the parents that they were from “inside” 
(that is, one of the imperial harems), thus, they could present their daughters to the palace 
to be sold as cariyes, a general term used for all types of enslaved harem inmates. In 
return, they said, the parents themselves would receive money or gifts from the palace 
and be rid of their poverty and misery. Besides, the girls would become çirag (literally, 
apprentice) in eight years, be given in marriage to a miralay (colonel) or a kaymakam 
(lieutenant colonel) and return home rich. 
The families involved in the case were reportedly all refugees from Silistra, 
forced to move to the Ottoman Empire in the aftermath of the 1877–78 Russo-Ottoman 
                                                
1 BOA, Y.PRK.BŞK 12/89, 1305.B.14 (27 March 1888). The file is exceptionally large and 
detailed in comparison to other files of similar content, containing three separate reports on the 
case providing different layers of information. It also contains long records of police 
interrogations, istintaknames, conducted by everyone involved in the case, except for the young 
girls Zekiye and Müzeyyen. 
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War.2 In 1878, some 180,000 people (some of whom were Circassians, who were settled 
in the Balkans a decade earlier) were in Istanbul, waiting to be (re)settled by the Ottoman 
government.3  In the 1880s, even in the early 1890s, there were still large numbers of 
refugees in Istanbul, either passing through the city to be settled in the provinces, or to 
stay, adding to the city’s poor population,4 all of whom were highly vulnerable to slave 
dealers in an environment where, as this chapter aims to demonstrate, practically anyone 
could become one at any time.  
Among those refugee families who were targeted by Sıdıka, Şirin, and Kör Nadire 
was a woman from Silistra named Penbe, who told the police that she was widowed and 
came to Istanbul five months prior, with her four children, two of whom worked as 
porters at the dockside and one who sold candles. The fourth child was a girl named 
Müzeyyen. She was 12 years old and working as a servant for the monthly payment of 20 
piasters at the time when her mother was approached by Sıdıka and Kör Nadire, with the 
promise of a post at the imperial harem and an upfront payment of 15 Ottoman liras (that 
is, 1500 piasters).5 She had brown hair and hazel eyes with a “tint of blue,” it was 
specified. Also a recent refugee from Silistra, Zehra was approached by the same group 
of women for her 8-year-old daughter Zekiye, who had “blond hair, hazel eyes.” Both 
Müzeyyen and Zekiye were categorized as “Turkish,” (here, to be understood as non-
                                                
2 Roger Deal, “War Refugees and Violence in Hamidian Istanbul,” Middle Eastern Studies, 
vol.49, no.2 (2013), 181. Overall, the war caused the dislocation of a million Muslim inhabitants 
of Serbia and Bulgaria. 
3 Deal, “War Refugees and Violence in Hamidian Istanbul,” 181.  
4 Kemal Karpat, Ottoman Population 1830–1914: Demographic and Social Characteristics 
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985), 86. 
5 BOA, Y.PRK.BŞK 12/89, 1305.B.14 (27 March 1888), 6. 
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Circassian, Muslim, and white) whose enslavement and sale were, under normal 
circumstances, strictly prohibited by law. The initial explanation that Sıdıka gave to the 
police, however, that she recently manumitted her slave and decided to adopt a young girl 
in her stead, made it seem like what she did was almost an act of benevolence. 
Among the perpetrators of the incident, which touched virtually upon almost all 
“peculiarities” of the Ottoman practices of slavery, which will be discussed below, Sıdıka 
was specified as Çerkes (Circassian). She was a resident of the Tophane district in 
Istanbul, where the city port was located and many slavers resided. She was brought to 
Istanbul from Çerkesistan (Circassia), she told to the police, when she was eight years 
old, and like Zekiye she was recently appropriated. She served as an enslaved servant to 
the chief steward of Fatma Sultan (Sultan Abdülmecid’s daughter) and was eventually 
freed and married off to a merchant from Egypt.6  
Her close accomplice Şirin Kadın was also a manumitted slave. Specified as 
Zenciye (literally, Negress) in the report, she was the only slaver proper in the gang, and 
referred to as such. She also resided in Tophane and was well connected, not only to the 
captains of the slave ships that docked in her district but also the eunuchs and other 
palace officials who were authorized to buy slaves for the imperial harem. In fact, in one 
of her transactions, she claimed to have introduced the chief eunuch of the Beşiktaş 
harem to a captain, for “how else would they even know each other?” she claimed.7 In 
short, save for Kör Nadire, Sıdıka and Şirin themselves constituted an earlier generation 
of slaves and were well entrenched in its culture and customs. For instance, they well 
                                                
6 Ibid., 3. 
7 Ibid., 14. 
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knew they had to account for the girls’ fluent Turkish, hence they explained to their 
prospective buyers that the girls came to Istanbul many years ago and forgot their native 
tongues.8 Part of the report also dealt with the recovery of the stolen girls, who were now 
the properties of such notable people as the chief eunuch of the imperial harem in 
Beşiktaş, Ferhad Ağa (who bought slaves on behalf of one of the Kadın Effendis), as well 
as Sultan Abdülaziz’s son, şehzade Mahmud Celaleddin Efendi. Since Şirin Kadın’s 
close network also included her husband, a certain Baltacı Mustafa from Egypt, also a 
slaver by profession, she had several other girls dispatched there.  
The division of labor among the three women was indicative of not only how the 
slave trade was organized, but how, as a whole, Ottoman society was hierarchized or 
compartmentalized along the lines of class, race, and ethnicity. The dellal (procurer) of 
the group, Kör Nadire, was from Gekbuze (Gebze), a town 30 miles east of Istanbul. 
During her interrogation, she claimed that she was brought to Istanbul when she was very 
young, implying that she had no ties to her native town, although later in the 
investigation, it became clear that Kör Nadire had been “recruiting” girls from her native 
town also, in addition to those she solicited in Üsküdar.9 In fact, the report pointed out 
that she recently brought a Turkish girl (again, meaning non-Circassian, Muslim, and 
white) from her village, who was subsequently sent to Egypt and sold into slavery there. 
We do not know how she approached families in her native town, but it is likely that she 
allured them with the fact (possibly a made-up one) that she was married to a lieutenant. 
This was at least what she did when she approached Müzeyyen’s mother in Üsküdar, 
                                                
8 Ibid., 4. 
9 Ibid., 3. 
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primarily to give her an impression of reliability but also to point at where she stood in 
the scale of women who had a stake in the slave trade, many of whom were ranked 
according to the profession of their husbands, as will be discussed in more detail below. 
She acted as a scout, locating the girls through her connections, making the initial 
contacts with the families and making informal appointments with them for Sıdıka to 
come in the following day. She was qualified to provide an “introduction” to the families 
and assess the girls at the same time, but it fell upon Sıdıka and her saraylı tag (used for 
all women who were or previously had been a member of the imperial harem) to 
convince the parents to hand their daughters over to her. What was started by Kör Nadire 
was continued by Sıdıka. She was the one who assured the parents that she had 
connections with the imperial harem and that she could have their daughters employed 
there as enslaved servants. Being once a slave herself, she knew exactly what the girls’ 
mothers wanted to hear also. They could even see their daughters every six months, she 
assured them, on the condition that they did not disclose the fact that they were related to 
the girls. They just had to pretend that they were their previous owners. With this 
assurance, repeated several times in the interrogation records, she took the girls to bring 
them to her own household to observe their manners, good or bad habits. In short, 
anything that would effect the price, as the usual procedure went. 
Both Kör Nadire and Sıdıka had ambiguous descriptions in terms of their 
involvement in the slave trade. The former procured not only slaves but also cooks, 
servants, or wet nurses. As it is well elaborated in Krikor Zohrab’s story Postal with the 
dellal Hacı Dürük, this profession (not reserved to the Muslim population of the empire 
either) was a sound and sometimes the only means for especially poor women to make a 
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good living. Like Kör Nadire, Hacı Dürük was depicted to have strong ties to her native 
village, where she took occasional trips to obtain young girls, in accordance with what 
was asked of her. She herself had worked as a servant, a wet nurse, a laundress, a cook, 
and as Zohrab described her, she “understood a lot from a few words.”10 The line 
between procuring servants and obtaining girls for sexual services was not clear-cut, so 
when Surpik Hanım, the wealthy Armenian woman from Kadıköy, asked Hacı Dürük to 
find her a “decent looking but shy young woman, not necessarily trained in housework,” 
the latter knew that the girl was meant to be for Surpik Hanım’s son.11 As for Sıdıka, she 
declared that she sold slaves only once in her life, when she inherited three slaves from 
her deceased husband several years back. Other than that instance, she assured the police, 
she did not trade in slaves. But she did obtain beslemes or ahretkliks, she stated.  
Şirin, on the other hand, made her living by buying and selling slaves, charging a 
4% formal brokerage fee on each transaction.12 Such details as her place of origin, when 
she came to Istanbul, or who she previously worked for are virtually nonexistent both in 
the police report and the interrogation records. She was questioned only on the details of 
the work she was doing. In line with the general versatility of slavers, Şirin was a 
resourceful businesswoman, at times lending decent sums of money to people in her 
circle. In fact, she stated in her interrogation that she had once lent Sıdıka 80 Ottoman 
liras, and she had been living in a house that belonged to her over the past five years, in 
                                                
10 Krikor Zohrab, “Postal,” Öyküler (Istanbul: Aras Yayıncılık, 2001), 31. 
11 Ibid., 32. 
12 BOA, Y.PRK.BŞK 12/89, 1305.B.14 (27 March 1888), 14. 
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exchange for its interest.13 In addition to the girls she sold in cooperation with Sıdıka and 
Kör Nadire, she also had her own resources. At the time of the interrogation, she was 
hosting in her house a 55-year-old woman named Emine, who was deported from 
Trabzon on prostitution charges.14 Emine reportedly had three daughters she brought with 
her, one of whom was given to a towel merchant in marriage, another one who was sold 
to an undisclosed place, and the third sold to one of the Kadın Effendis in the imperial 
harem, all arranged by Şirin.15 The interrogator made a point that, being a professional 
slaver, Şirin should have known better than to sell “Turkish girls” to the imperial harems 
and that imperial harems did not employ “Turkish girls.”16 But what really mattered for 
Şirin was the consent given by the young girl’s mother for the sale of the girl. In short, 
with flaxen hair, blue eyes and consent, any girl could be Circassian and would fetch a 
good price, too. Sıdıka’s interrogation touched upon a similar point as well, in which 
being Turkish or Circassian seemed like arbitrary categories, which could easily change 
significance or meaning, especially when consent was given by the parents. Being well 
familiar with the process, Sıdıka managed to obtain a bill of sale for the 8-year-old 
Zekiye, signed and stamped by her parents, thus transferring her inalienable Turkish 
identity into an alienable Circassian one with relative ease. Once she captured them on 
paper as such, Sıdıka sold the girls “for commerce, to whoever wanted them,” as she 
described it. 
Taking place almost at the end of its long course, the incident embodied the 
                                                
13 Ibid., 13. 
14 Ibid., 11. 
15 Ibid., 11. 
16 Ibid., 14. 
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distinct features of the Ottoman practice of slavery: 1) its loose racial and ethnic 
perceptions which facilitated Sıdıka, Şirin, and Nadire’s trade in freeborn children; 2) its 
traversing across different social classes which allowed manumitted slaves to own and 
trade in slaves as well as the permeability of class when slavery is taken into 
consideration; 3) its well-entrenched nature such that even at the height of abolitionist 
sentiments the Ottoman palace could still consider buying new slaves; 4) its peculiar 
relationship with the law that is made up of multiple legal systems; 5) the difficulty or 
even impossibility of detecting it, in the presence of slavery-like practices; 6) its 
linguistic dimension; 7) its demand for mobility; 8) and last but not least, that it involved, 
like the makers and victims of the above-mentioned scheme, mostly women. Taking this 
instance, which triggered a full criminal investigation as its point of departure, this 
chapter aims to explore the worlds of slave dealers, many of whom were women, who 
themselves had been slaves and exploited their “insider” position as well as their 
knowledge at great lengths. It also aims to explore how these worlds increasingly collided 
with the newly emerging international legal realm against slavery in the second half of 
the nineteenth century and the Ottoman state that pledged, at least in theory, to safeguard 
it. 
Blue Eyes, Pockmarks and the Violence of Physical Categorization 
When Kör Nadire roamed the streets of Üsküdar in search of young girls, she had 
a clear idea what she was looking for. She told in her interrogation that she saw several 
girls the day she found Zekiye, but she decided to make contacts with only two of them. 
Both the girls were reported to have clear white skin (one with a hint of freckles), blue or 
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hazel eyes with a “tint of blue.” These classifications were not due only to Nadire’s or 
later on Sıdıka’s liking but rather conventions of the slave trade network. At the other, 
higher, end of the scala, Pertevniyal Valide Sultan made similar choices. In close to a 
hundred notes of slave purchases, bills of sale, and related correspondence she wrote to 
various persons, primarily to her chief steward Hüseyin Efendi, her major concerns and 
preoccupations seem obvious and straightforward. With Circassian slaves—not only 
marked as “Çerkes” and “beyaz” (white) but often their ethnic or tribal affiliations, such 
as Abzakh, Şabigh, Hatuqwai, or Bzhedug were noted down on the bills of sale also,17 it 
was primarily beauty or the lack of it: beauty as was seen, determined, and measured by 
Pertevniyal, the mother of the reigning sultan Abdülaziz and de facto head of the imperial 
harem. As in the case with Nadire and Sıdıka, this was a prospective form of beauty. The 
slaves presented to her were ordinarily between the ages of eight and fourteen, like 
Zekiye and Müzeyyen. The Valide Sultan gauged in these children’s bodies an ideal 
womanhood, of “delicacy, gentility, and sexuality” as Walter Johnson described it for the 
slaves sold for sex in the 1850s American South.18 To match the “blue eyes and flaxen 
                                                
17 Taksim Atatürk Kitaplığı (Library), Pertevniyal Valide Sultan Evrakı (papers), 
PVS_Evr_00967, 15 S.1281 (20 July 1864); PVS_Evr_00974, 20 Za. 1281 (16 April 1865). 
Pertevniyal Valide Sultan Evrakı was acquired by Taksim Atatürk Kitaplığı through purchase and 
was made available to researchers recently, although its source and the initial purpose of the 
collection remain unclear. Containing roughly around 5600 documents, most of which were 
written by Pertevniyal herself (or, possibly her scribes), the collection provides a somewhat 
continuous account on her financial, political, and daily life. Taksim Atatürk Kitaplığı, Fatma 
Aliye Hanım Evrakı, FA_Evr_000012-016, 7 Mart 1302 (19 March 1886). Also see Ehud 
Toledano, As If Silent and Absent: Bonds of Enslavement in the Islamic Middle East (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 2007), 129–130 for similar classifications. 
18 Walter Johnson, “The Slave Trader, the White Slave, and the Politics of Racial Determination 
in the 1850s,” The Journal of American History, Vol. 87, No. 1 (Jun., 2000), 18.  
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hair” of Alexina Morrison that both Johnson and Ariela Gross talked about,19 Ottoman 
slaves were depicted having “hazel eyes and flaxen hair” (ela gözlü, lepiska saçlı). Good 
conduct, dexterity, and training, potential competence in excellent service, which 
included both labor and sexual services, were all parts of this ideal womanhood and 
accordingly emerged as major criteria in the decision-making process when purchasing 
slaves for the imperial harem.20 “Slaves had to be made,” Walter Johnson asserted, 
“sometimes violently, to enact the meaning slaveholders assigned to their bodies.”21 The 
rules of this violent act (violent in physical terms during the slaves’ capture and passage, 
and particularly in terms of their categorizations and exclusions afterwards) were 
determined, in part, by the Valide Sultan, as she stood at the top of a highly hierarchical 
network of slave traders and slaveholders in the Ottoman Empire, and were reproduced 
by practically anyone who took part in it.22 As illustrated in many of her correspondences 
pertaining to slave purchases, she provided specific details on the physical attributes of 
the slaves (as Nadire and Sıdıka did), dismissing many on the basis that they were simply 
not beautiful enough, at least not for the price asked for them. In some cases, whenever 
                                                
19 Ariela Gross, What Blood Won't Tell: A History of Race on Trial in America (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2008), 1; Johnson, “The Slave Trader.” By referring to Johnson and 
Gross’ works here, I do not mean to imply that the Ottoman practices of slavery was comparable 
to the American South. In addition to drawing from Johnson and Gross’ excellent analyses, 
bringing in Western cases of sexual slavery, in my contention, helps “de-exoticize” the overly-
Orientalized case of Ottoman (also known as Islamic or harem) slavery. 
20 Virginity was also an important category when buying slaves. For pricing and sale strategies of 
non-virgin girls, see Ehud R. Toledano, “Slave Dealers, Women, Pregnancy, and Abortion: The 
Story of a Circassian Slave-girl in Mid-Nineteenth Century Cairo,” Slavery and Abolition, vol.2, 
no.1 (May, 1981), 56. 
21 Johnson, “The Slave Trader,” 19. 
22 It is difficult to ascertain whether the Valide Sultan defined these categories anew or that she 
was merely sustaining the existing conventions. I aim to point out here that, in either case, by 
defining them anew or upholding the existing categories, the Valide Sultan was instrumental in 
the “making” of slaves. 
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the girls were properly trained and had good conduct, “rabıtalı” as she called them, she 
ordered the purchase, despite the girls’ stated lack of beauty.  
Blackness was also important for the Valide Sultan as a category, but differently 
than whiteness and its different manifestations and appropriations which, in her 
perception, were more directly connected to her and her son’s empowerment. The bills of 
sale for African slaves undersigned by her rarely provided any detail on their ethnic 
origins or physical attributes. In one of those rare cases, for instance, dated 27 Zilhicce 
1283 (2 May 1867), it was noted that the enslaved girl who was subject to sale, 
approximately 14 years of age, was of Afno (possibly Hausa) origin. However, rather 
than giving any further information, the note quickly moved on, with formulaic language, 
to the conditions of the sale.23 Other bills provided hardly any other information besides a 
generic “of black origin” (siyah-ül-asl) tag. African slaves were described in those notes 
more specifically in terms of the services they could provide for the harem as cooks, wet 
nurses, nannies, or servants. Just as the slaver Şirin was not asked by the police about her 
origins, Pertevniyal did not inquire the origins of the African slaves she bought.24 In other 
instances too, their presence and value seem to be associated with the prosperity of a 
                                                
23 Taksim Atatürk Kitaplığı, Pertevniyal Valide Sultan Evrakı (papers), PVS_Evr_04771, 27 Z. 
1283 (2 May 1867). 
24 It was not that this information could not be obtained, when necessary. An interesting case that 
took place in 1874 hints that tribal/linguistic affiliates could easily be summoned during an 
investigation. In this instance, a black woman from Alexandria was held at the customs with the 
suspicion that she was being illegally traded. After the police interrogation, it was found that she 
traveled to Istanbul as a newly employed servant at the Ecumenical Patriarchate, for she was 
Christian, a member of the Greek Orthodox Church. The interrogation then turned into 
questioning her possible conversion from Islam to Christianity. Eventually, the police brought in 
a certain Said Efendi, who recognized the markings on her nose and lips and confirmed that she 
was of Bano/Bono (?) tribe, which was of Christian origin. BOA, ZB 6/16, 1291.B.7 (20 August 
1874). 
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household, whether it was the household of an aspiring bureaucrat or a notable. The wife 
of a powerful pasha at the time, whenever Melek Hanım wanted to express her occasional 
distress or impoverished state, she did so by saying that “her establishment was limited to 
an old woman and a black slave” or that “two black slaves formed [her] entire domestic 
establishment.”25 Similarly, the protagonist of Ahmet Midhat’s story Esaret, described 
his misfortune and solitary situation by saying that his “harem was reduced to just 
himself and a black cook.”26  
While in appearance African slaves were sought and valued exclusively for their 
labor (istihdam), this did not exempt them from their owners’ legal rights and claims over 
their sexual services (istifraş). Conditions of sale comprised, in more than one instance, 
clauses on pregnancy (see Image 1 below, for an example). However, this does not mean 
that an African slave’s sexuality in the Ottoman Empire was categorically confined, to 
quote Monique Guillory, to “the mercy of her master’s sexual appetites.”27 Drawing from 
Ellen Carol Dubois and Linda Gordon, Guillory demonstrated how it was the white 
abolitionist women’s reluctance in acknowledging the possibility of willing sex between 
black slaves and white masters in antebellum America, which reduced black women’s 
sexuality only to two possibilities, that of rape and prostitution.28 While individual cases 
remain to be unearthed for the Ottoman case, it is safe to say that in practice, neither 
                                                
25 Melek Hanum, Thirty Years in the Harem: or, the Autobiography of Melek-Hanum Wife of 
H.H. Kibrizli Mehemet-Pasha (London: Chapman and Hall, 1872) 35, 54. 
26 Ahmed Midhat, “Esaret” in Letâif-i Rivâyât, volume I (Istanbul: Kırk Anbar Matbaası, 
1315/1899–1900), 46. 
27 Monique Guillory, “Some Enchanted Evening on the Auction Block: The Cultural Legacy of 
the New Orleans Quadroon Balls,” (Ph.D. Dissertation, New York University, 1999), 66. 
28 Ibid., 66–67. 
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black/white nor labor/sex divides should be understood as mutually exclusive 
categories.29 Yet, in the Valide Sultan’s perception of the world, as evinced in her 
correspondences, they had clearer boundaries. In other words, to refer to Ehud 
Toledano’s expression of silence and absence, African slaves were absent neither in their 
masters’ households nor in the ways such powerful figures as the Valide Sultan ordered 
their world. They were not so much silent, either, but silenced by the rigid racial 
categorizations, effected (or at best effectively perpetuated) by Valide Sultan and other 
slaveholders who reenacted these categories and traders who worked to match their 
expectations.  
Walter Johnson argued that in the 1850s American South, the apparent physical 
differences, particularly those in skin tones, were formalized into racial categories on a 
daily basis in the market by slave traders who, according to Johnson, “were not only 
marketing race, but also making it.”30 The American practice of concubinage, known as 
fancy trade and plaçage, broke down what Johnson called “restless hybridity” into an 
“infinite variety of skin tone [...], into imagined degrees of black and white that, once 
measured, could be priced and sold.”31 Each of these varieties were then exploited 
separately and extensively, like selling the light-skinned women for sex in exchange of 
                                                
29 Madeline Zilfi proposes the labor/sex divide as a new foundational one to define Ottoman 
slavery in place of a black/white one proposed by Ehud Toledano. “Thoughts on Women and 
Slavery in the Ottoman Era and Historical Sources,” in Beyond the Exotic: Women's Histories in 
Islamic Societies, ed. Amira El-Azhary Sonbol (Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 
2006), 133–134. However, labor/sex was already an existing categorical divide in Islamic 
jurisprudence. The black/white divide, on the other hand, seems to have taken shape in the 
market, when setting prices. 
30 Johnson, “The Slave Trader,” 16.  
31 Ibid., 17. 
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“heaps and piles of money,” as described by Solomon Northup.32 In essence, what 
Ottoman slaveholders (including the Valide Sultan herself) and traders were doing was 
no different than what the traders in the American South had been doing. They too 
meticulously categorized the enslaved bodies and put a price tag on each and every one.33 
Differently from the American case, however, they did so not always to sell them but 
instead circulated them for political purposes. In many occasions, they made gifts out of 
their slaves, as they sought favors from the palace or high-ranking bureaucrats. Whether 
they invested or traded in them “for commerce,” or presented them as gifts, however, 
these women defined race, delineated beauty, and ideal womanhood.  
  
                                                
32 Solomon Northup, Twelve Years a Slave, quoted in ibid., 17. 
33 For an elaborate discussion on the complexities of racial categorization in slavery, see Johnson, 
“The Slave Trader,” 16–20. Johnson argues that such specific categories as griffe, mulatto or 
quadroon were all products of “the alchemy by which skin tone and slavery were synthesized into 
race and profit...” 16. Also see Gross, What Blood Won't Tell, introduction, for a more extensive 




Image 1. Bill of sale for an African slave dated July 5, 1868. In addition to the usual sale 
conditions of preexisting diseases and free status (indicating unjust enslavement or illegal resale 
into slavery), the notice states that in the case of pregnancy, the seller accepted to take the slave 
back and pay the purchase amount in full. Taksim Atatürk Kitaplığı, Pertevniyal Valide Sultan 
Evrakı, PER_VAL_SUL_03396, 14 Ra. 1285 (5 July 1868).  
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Valide Sultan, Genteel Women and “Slaveholder Agency” 
Pertevniyal’s term as the Valide Sultan began in 1861 with the succession of her 
son Abdülaziz to the throne and was brought to an end by the constitutional intervention 
led by a small group of statesmen in 1876, a period that coincided with several different 
developments in regards to the course that slavery took in the Ottoman Middle East. The 
most significant of these developments was the Circassian expulsion which, as discussed 
at length in the previous chapter, created a legal chaos in the Ottoman Empire, in which 
the customary law observed by the Circassian nobility clashed with the public and Şer’i 
laws, which, in their turn intertwined with international law in complex ways. As the 
Ottoman state tried to sort out this mayhem, the chapter argued, it also found itself 
obliged to define more strictly what race and ethnicity meant for it.  
That the Ottoman state was rethinking and reorganizing these categories did not 
mean that they were uniformly accepted and adopted by everyone throughout the empire. 
Slave traders and owners misinterpreted, deliberately or otherwise, the meanings of these 
categories as well as the legal regulations that related to them. Nor was it a simple task to 
define or determine who the “authentic Circassian” (‘an asl Çerkes, as the tag went) was, 
or to explicate how African slaves could be left outside the jurisdiction of the Şer’i law, 
while the slave status of the Circassians, said to have been established by āyāt and hadith, 
were simultaneously deemed unchangeable. Such powerful and politically influential 
people as Pertevniyal could and often did act outside the law when obtaining slaves, 
whenever they deemed it crucial for the well-being of the imperial harem or an elite 
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household. In fact, their understanding of political power meant at times being capable of 
acting outside the law. For one, in her obsession with the privileged access to incoming 
slaves, or rather potential slaves, Pertevniyal Valide Sultan gave recurrent orders to her 
steward Hüseyin, to closely scan Circassian ships for all eligible young girls and women. 
She even sent messages to the governor of Trabzon from firsthand (and possibly sent a 
palace representative to assist him, as well), to catch the ships in Trabzon port with the 
purpose of sparing “the good ones” for her. All this would have been alright, if the ships 
Pertevniyal meant were not those which carried Circassian refugees in the year 1862, at 
the height of the Circassian expulsion, which by then had already turned into an 
international humanitarian crisis.34 As Eve Troutt Powell notes, foreign journalists and 
missionaries were reporting extensively at the time on the “destitution of the immigrants 
as they reached Cyprus, Samsun, or Istanbul”35 and the issue was also widely known 
throughout the Ottoman Empire, as well. Nevertheless, for Pertevniyal Valide Sultan, 
both the crisis and the laws that aimed to regulate it seemed irrelevant. Her purchase of 
the above-mentioned African slave of Hausa origin also was made in illegal terms, as the 
sale took place a decade after the prohibition of trade in African slaves, enacted in 1857 
throughout the Ottoman Empire.36 
                                                
34 As early as 1857, the Ministry of the External Affairs was obliged to take measures against the 
reported abuse and illegal trafficking of the Circassian refugees. For an example of a related note 
written by the Ministry of the External Affairs to caution the customs administration, see BOA, 
HR.MKT 180/61, 1273.B.13 (9 March 1857). 
35 Eve M. Troutt Powell, Tell This in My Memory: Stories of Enslavement from Egypt, Sudan, and 
the Ottoman Empire (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012), 127. Powell mentions Times of 
London article “The Circassian Exodus” as an example of international press coverage of the 
incident. Tell This in My Memory, 128. 
36 Taksim Atatürk Kitaplığı, Pertevniyal Valide Sultan Evrakı, PVS_Evr_04771, 27 Z. 1283 (2 
May 1867). 
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For Pertevniyal Valide Sultan, the privileged access to sources of slaves, 
sometimes at the expense of law as can be glimpsed above, was just as important and 
accordingly accentuated a concern as the “hazel eyes and flaxen hair” of the girls she 
purchased. She was, after all, considered the most powerful woman in the country, and 
one that was closely responsible for the well-being of its sovereign. Valide Sultans did 
not necessarily determine the reproductive policies of the Ottoman dynasty, but they were 
the ones who supervised and strictly enforced them. Thus, Pertevniyal decided, like many 
Valide Sultans who came before her, who her son would take as wives and concubines, 
what qualities they would have, at times even limiting the number of offspring a 
concubine would have.37 Early and privileged access to enslaved girls “just off the slave 
ship,” meant that she could pick and choose them as she wanted, to “tame” them as she 
pleased. In practice, it also meant keeping many unwanted persons and parties away from 
this speculative market and protect her gains not only from professional traders but also 
from other “genteel women”: the wives of high-ranking state or military officials and 
notables, who ordinarily sought to exploit the slave trade in ways that benefited them.  
Ehud Toledano has written about the commonplaceness of  “the hope of 
improving one’s own social and economic status through slavery,” while he 
simultaneously demonstrated, through the story of Şemsigül, how difficult that path 
actually was.38 It is not certain how willing or eager the girls and their parents (say, 
Şemsigül and her mother) had been to sell themselves or their daughters into slavery. 
                                                
37 For an elaborate account on reproductive politics of the Ottoman dynasty, see Leslie Peirce, 
The Imperial Harem: Women and Sovereignty in the Ottoman Empire (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1993). For the emergence of Valide Sultan as a political figure, see pages 109-
112. 
38 Toledano, “Slave Dealers, Women, Pregnancy, and Abortion,” 54. 
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There is an indication that slave “recruitments” were often carried out by palace officials, 
accompanied by an imperial order, at times leaving no option to the family.39 Poverty, as 
it came to be discussed at length, particularly after the 1908 constitutional revolution, was 
another known fact that perpetuated the slave trade in Ottoman Anatolia.40 On the other 
hand, we can talk about slave traders’ and owners’ hopes in improving their social and 
economic status through exploiting the slave trade network. My aim here is not to imply 
that slaves did not have “agency” in improving their lots within the practice of slavery. 
They did. However, what is crucial particularly for the purpose of this study is to point at 
the fact that, being well-equipped to implement brutal means in capturing slaves, having 
the economic means to trade in them, or present them as gifts, moreover having the 
power to decide what they should look like and how they should behave, the “slaveholder 
agency”41 had the upper hand in determining not only the rules that pertained to the 
institution, but also indirectly delineating the laws that regulated state-citizen or inter-
class relations in the Ottoman society. Moreover, I do not aim simply to reiterate what 
has already been said by the scholars of Ottoman and Middle Eastern slavery on the role 
of elite women in perpetuating the slave trade, either.42 What I want to stress is that their 
involvement in slave trade was not detached from the political sphere. Far from it. Even 
                                                
39 See, for instance, BOA, BEO 3546/265908, 1327.R.21 (12 May 1909). 
40 For an example touching upon the class aspect of Ottoman slavery, see article entitled “Esir 
Ticareti” in Sada-i Millet, 8 Mart 1326 (21 March 1910). 
41 See Walter Johnson, “On Agency,” Journal of Social History, vol.37, no.1 (Fall 2003), 113-
114, note 4; Also see Johnson, Soul by Soul: Life Inside the Antebellum Slave Market 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), the chapter entitled “Making a World Out of 
Slaves,” 78–116. 
42 Although in most cases only in passing, this issue has been mentioned in the works of Ehud 
Toledano and Madeline Zilfi. Also see Nelly Hanna, “Sources for the Study of Slave Women and 
Concubines in Ottoman Egypt,” in Beyond the Exotic, 122 on a note on how Mamluk households 
expanded and consolidated power in the eighteenth century Egypt.  
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though their influence in politics did not match those of the earlier centuries, their actions 
were nevertheless well engrained in, and in turn shaped, politics. In other words, 
Pertevniyal Valide Sultan may not have been Kösem or Turhan Sultan, who acted as 
regents on behalf of their minor sons and wielded great power and near full authority in 
politics, but she too held a significant amount of political power and the slave trade was 
one of the main outlets to sustain it. 
“If any lady possess[ed] a pretty-looking slave,” Melek Hanım wrote, “the fact 
soon would get known”43 and ranks of elite women would start chasing her. In several of 
her correspondences, Pertevniyal appears to be frantic about the rumors pertaining to 
“pretty-looking slaves.” In one of these cases, dated 23 Ramazan 1279 (14 March 1863), 
she wrote to her steward, in fact, almost begged that he arranged an occasion for her to 
take a look at a young girl—not even a slave but a besleme, and reportedly not for sale, 
either.44 Note, for instance, the slave girl she bought about two weeks later, on 10 Şevval 
1279 (31 March 1863), whom she felt obliged to buy, simply because she had good 
manners and that her eyes were beautiful.45 Leyla Hanım (Saz) also mentioned the 
importance of what had been considered good physical features by the slave traders and 
owners and how easily each “bad feature,” such as the absence of a tooth or flat feet 
could be expressed in terms of the slave’s price.46 Again, my aim here is not to state what 
is accepted to be the obvious, nor to dismantle what can be called the “hierarchies of 
                                                
43 Melek Hanum, Thirty Years in the Harem, 159–60. 
44 Taksim Kitaplığı, Pertevniyal Valide Sultan Evrakı, PER_VAL_SUL_03042, 23 N. 1279 (14 
March 1863). 
45 Taksim Kitaplığı, Pertevniyal Valide Sultan Evrakı, PER_VAL_SUL_02969, 10 Ş. 1279 (31 
January 1863). 
46 Leyla Hanum, quoted in Powell, Tell This in My Memory, 129. 
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beauty,” but to point out that in the highly stratified and hierarchical organization of the 
Ottoman state, bureaucracy and society (which the organization of slave trade merely 
mimicked), such physical features as blue eyes, flaxen hair, or “unblemished” white skin, 
once captured, were made expressions of power that could also easily be translated into a 
price tag. A purchase receipt from 1899–90 illustrates this perhaps too well. The receipt 
(unsigned, with no sender/addressee information) lists the purchase of six female slaves, 
three of whom were categorized as “büyük” (here meaning older in age) and the other 
three as “küçük” (small, young). As can be traced in Pertevniyal’s purchase orders and 
other correspondence, age was another major category in buying and pricing slaves. 
Buying a young slave meant several years of additional expenses on food, clothing, and 
most importantly, training. Thus, they were significantly cheaper than the older slaves 
with training (in housework such as sewing and embroidery, in Turkish language, and 
often in music, as well). The receipt accordingly lists the purchase prices for older slaves 
as 200 Ottoman liras (approximately 800 U.S. dollars at the time), whereas the price for 
younger ones was set as 100 Ottoman liras. However, the prices differed significantly for 
both old and young slaves, when physical attributes were taken into account. One of the 
older slaves, who was marked quite bluntly as “the ugly one,” was priced as 150 Ottoman 
liras, while one of the younger slaves, who was marked as “the blue eyed one,” sold for 





It was not only the wives of bureaucrats or military officials that sought favors 
and exploited the slave network for their benefit. The palace women occasionally did so, 
as well. To refer to Melek Hanım once again, she recounted how she was called into the 
palace by one of the Kadın Effendis,47 because the latter knew that Melek Hanım’s 
husband was favored by “the then all-powerful Grand-Vezir,” Mustafa Reşid Pasha (d. 
1858). As Melek Hanım described it, Kadın Effendi’s invitation, which was not all that 
disinterested, “wished to secure [Melek Hanım’s] services in behalf of Said-Pasha (Said 
Mehmed Pasha, Damad-ı Şehriyari, d. 1869), husband of her deceased daughter,” who 
had reportedly been exiled at the time.48 It should be noted that Melek Hanım did not 
miss the opportunity to take a Circassian slave girl and a eunuch with her, to present to 
the Kadın Effendi. All in all, whatever the immediate concerns were, holding and having 
privileged access to enslaved girls (particularly to those who had the tag “beautiful,” 
whatever that signified in actuality) meant power, so much so that it was unacceptable for 
Pertevniyal that the palace and the imperial harem, the largest buyer of slaves, lagged 
behind even ordinary slavers in reaching ships coming from Circassia. In a note she 
wrote in 1862, she commanded that his steward be ready to dispatch his men to catch the 
ships in customs port (referred to as Kavak iskelesi) before they reached the city port in 
Tophane, the final destination of all commodities that came by sea, for other slavers 
would have “already picked and chosen” until they themselves had a chance to even peek 
                                                
47 There are more than a few factual errors and ambiguities in Melek Hanım's account. Here, it is 
not clearly identified which Kadın Effendi she is referring to. Melek Hanım mentions her being 
the mother of Merimah-Sultan, which makes her an ikbal (concubine), rather than one of the 
official wives. 
48 Melek Hanum, Thirty Years in the Harem, 164. 
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at the girls.49 In another note she wrote a year later, she complained about the same 
matter, this time with a sharper tone. After reporting the arrival of a new Circassian ship 
in Trabzon, Pertevniyal complained that the moment the ship would arrive in Istanbul, 
people from all sides would be swarming to it, snatching and hiding the girls they took a 
fancy to, leaving behind barely anyone who was worthy to look at.50 Thus, she ordered 
the governor of Trabzon to capture and reserve the girls for her, before showing them to 
anyone, for all “vanish[ed] as soon as the ship arrive[d] in the Bosphorus.”51 
  
                                                
49 Taksim Atatürk Kitaplığı, Pertevniyal Valide Sultan Papers, PER_VAL_SUL_02885 
(undated). 
50 Taksim Atatür Kitaplığı, Pertevniyal Valide Sultan Evrakı, PVS_Evr_02806, Şevval 1279 
(March-April 1863) 
51 Ibid. In a brief undated note, there is an indication that the Trabzon governor did indeed comply 
with Valide Sultan's request. See PVS_Evr_05018 and PVS_Evr_05288. 
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Image 3.2 A receipt for six girls purchased for the Yıldız Palace. The receipt lists the purchase 
prices with the following explanations: “The veiled older cariye 200 lira, the other veiled older 
cariye 200 lira, the other veiled older cariye, the uglier one 150 lira, the young blue-eyed cariye 
200 lira, the other young cariye 100 lira, the other young cariye 100 lira.”  
BOA, Y.PRK.M 4/52, 1315 (1897–98). 
 
 
Image 3.3 A sheet that accompanied a bill of sale for Adviye Hanim, which contains 
physical descriptions, apparent “faults,” and prices for three Circassian slaves, 12 to 14 years old. 




Image 3.4 While it does not indicate pricing, this bill of sale for 14 Circassian girls, signed and 
stamped by their families, reveal “not having served anyone but their parents” was one of the 
criteria that determined the initial price of the slaves.  





Image 3.5 This undated inspection report, performed and signed by two doctors for Yıldız 
Palace, indicate that existing and past diseases, body or facial marks such as those caused by 
chicken pox, body weight, and whether the girls were vaccinated or not all determined the 
acceptability of the slaves as well as their prices.  BOA, Y.PRK.SGE 11/84, undated. Also see FO 
195/946 for a note that a slave purchase was “often made conditional on a good medical 
certificate being obtained.” 
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Matchmakers, Ordinary Marauders, and Versatile Businesspeople 
 
“Wherever slaves were sold,” Walter Johnson wrote in relation to the American 
South, “interstate traders were there to buy them.”52 Not unlike Johnson’s traders in 
antebellum America, who ubiquitously attended sales “whether at court house estate 
sales, private sales on a slaveholder’s land, or even in another trader’s yard,” traders of 
different varieties were everywhere, particularly in Istanbul, as already attested in 
Pertevniyal Valide Sultan’s preoccupations. Istanbul had “the largest and busiest slave 
market in the Empire” until it was shut down in 1846, or as Ehud Toledano put it  
“reverted to the back alley,” to be staged in the form of private sales at slavers’ and 
buyers’ homes or, as in one reported case, in coffeehouses located near the shut-down 
slave market.53  
Both Ehud Toledano and Madeline Zilfi argued that most of the trade was carried 
out in the Tophane district in Istanbul, where the port was located and many of the slave 
traders resided. Madeline Zilfi even described Tophane as the main locale for “the larger 
and more lasting slave-selling enterprises that still stood in the 1860s.”54 In fact, Sami 
Paşazade Sezai’s Sergüzeşt, the most famous of the abolitionist novels in the Ottoman 
Empire, opens up in Tophane. “When the Russian Company’s ship from Batumi 
approached in front of Tophane,” Sezai writes, “men waiting in their small boats out on 
                                                
52 Johnson, Soul by Soul, 48. 
53 Toledano, “Slave Dealers, Women, Pregnancy, and Abortion,” 53; BOA, MVL 131/17 
(1270/1853-54).  
54 Madeline Zilfi, Women and Slavery in the Late Ottoman Empire: The design of Difference 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 216. 
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the sea began climbing up the ship impatiently.”55 When one of these men, a slaver 
named Hacı Ömer agreed to “try” three girls for the night, he just walks them home, not 
far away from the dockside.56 In Ahmed Midhat’s Felatun Bey ve Rakım Efendi, Rakım 
Efendi found Canan, the enslaved beloved of the protagonist, as she was walking along a 
slaver to his home in the same district, in a similar manner described in Sergüzeşt. With 
her scruffy looks and inability to speak Turkish, Ahmed Midhat told his readers that 
Canan was one of the newcomers, freshly “recruited” from the “Circassian ship” that 
arrived in Tophane. In Hıfzı Topuz’s semi-biographical novel Meyyale, when Pertevniyal 
Valide Sultan (she appears in the book as a character, too) wanted to purchase slave 
children to entertain her newborn grandson, she heads to Tophane, to take a look at the 
ships that brought Circassian refugees to the city.57 
While found in great numbers in Tophane, slavers and the slaving businesses 
were not restricted there alone, but rather dispersed throughout the city. The examples are 
numerous. A slaver’s house, reportedly burned down by a number of female slaves, was 
in Gedikpaşa, in intramural Istanbul.58 The slaver woman Düriye Hanım (even though 
she was not called as such) in Ahmed Midhat’s novella Çingene lived in a small seaside 
residence in a village along the Bosphorus.59 There were others yet, who reportedly went 
on tour, most notably in the Balkan/European provinces of the Empire, bringing as many 
                                                
55 Sami Paşazade Sezai, Sergüzeşt (Istanbul: Kitaphane-i Sudi, 1340/1924). The book was 
originally printed in 1888.  
56 Ibid., 1–2. 
57 Hıfzı Topuz, Meyyale (Istanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 2012), 19. 
58 BOA, A.MKT 99/78, 1263.11.17 (27 October 1847). 
59 Ahmed Midhat, Çingene (Istanbul: Kırk Anbar Matbaası, 1304/1887), 46. 
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as twelve slaves with them, to be sold or delivered particularly in such urban centers as 
Salonica.60 What was different from the ubiquitous traders of the antebellum South was 
that professional traders constituted an indispensable yet only a small section of the slave 
trade in the Ottoman Empire. The majority of the trade was carried out by non-
professional dealers. 
Far from Toledano’s assertion that the “dealers in white slaves were a highly 
esteemed lot,” there was a certain stigma attached to all slavers, particularly drover-
slavers known as celeb, transporters, and in general, non-elite slave holders and dealers.61 
Described in Sergüzeşt, they were deemed to be cruel, merciless men and women, 
“whose hearts bore no feelings,” as the author expressed it, “and whose eyes looked like 
those of tigers.” They were known to be concerned only with their personal gains, Sezai 
further asserted, and they cared about two things alone: first, the “progressive instrument” 
of their trade, the whip, and second, that each and every one of the poor girls who entered 
his household be orphans.62 They were usually typified in plays as deceiving, unmoral 
men and women. In Recaizade Mahmut Ekrem’s play Vuslat, which is about a slave girl 
with the same name, a slaver appears in disguise, as a woman seeking a bride for her son, 
with the purpose of obtaining a girl for little or no cost.63 In one of the Karagöz plays (the 
traditional shadow theater, particularly popular at the time), Sahte Esirci (Fake slaver), 
the slaver appears as a trickster from Egypt and manages to “plant” a Circassian slave in 
                                                
60 BOA, A.MKT 187/1, 1265.5.7 (31 March 1849); A.MKT.MHM 151/194, 1275.B.3 (6 
February 1859). 
61 Toledano, “Slave Dealers, Women, Pregnancy, and Abortion,” 59. 
62 Sezai, Sergüzeşt, 1. 
63 Recaizade Mahmut Ekrem, Vuslat yahut Süreksiz Sevinç: Üç Perde Tiyatro Oyunu (Istanbul: 
Şark Matbaası, 1291/1874). 
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an affluent man’s household, to burglarize it later on.64 In fact, the stereotype was so 
well-entrenched that the notion of “Trebizon slaver” made it even to popular orientalist 
novels in mid-19th century America.65  
The professional traders aside, many who dealt in slaves were ordinary people, 
who bought and sold slaves for practical reasons. In Ahmed Midhat’s above-mentioned 
novella Çingene, Düriye Hanım took up slave dealing (or, matchmaking, as called in the 
book) out of necessity, when her husband became unable to work because of an illness 
and she was forced to provide for the household.66 The arbitrariness of slave dealing or 
the thin line between the slave dealer and the matchmaker were not evident in literature 
alone but appear frequently in archival documents as well. In one such instance from the 
mid-nineteenth century, a Georgian man petitioning for the recovery of his slaves held at 
the island of Syra, told how he recently moved to Istanbul, converted to Islam, and took 
up slaving for no other purpose than to make ends meet. He was using his connections to 
procure Georgian children to sell in Istanbul or Cairo.67 In another case, a certain Reşid 
Ağa entrusted his niece Zekiye (noted to be freeborn and of Circassian origin) to a slave-
dealing woman named Hesna in Istanbul, and for the latter to arrange a marriage for her. 
Shortly after, another slave dealer named Süleyman took the young girl with the promise 
                                                
64 Abdurrezzak ve Katib Salih, Sahte Esirci, Taksim Kitaplığı, Belediye Yazmaları, 
Bel_Yz_K.001515/01. Similar cases appeared in archival sources as well. For an example, see 
BOA, A.MKT.MVL 143/68, 1278.L.6 (6 April 1862). 
65 Lieutenant Murray, Turkish Slave: or, The Dumb Dwarf of Constantinople. A Story of the 
Eastern World (Boston: Elliott, Thomas & Talbot, 1863), 14. 
66 Ahmed Midhat, Çingene, 46. 
67 BOA, A.DVN 66/84, 1267.4.3 (5 February 1851). 
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of marrying her to his own son, but instead took her to Egypt to sell her.68 In another 
instance, a certain Hüseyin haphazardly captured a boy while the latter was roaming in 
the Sultan Mehmed district in Istanbul and sold him to a slave dealer in exchange of the 
decent sum of 7,000 piasters.69 In the case of Sıdıka, Şirin, and Nadire, discussed above, 
Nadire took up slave procurement, exploiting her ties to her native village for the purpose 
of getting medical care for her eyes that were going blind.70 In a similar case of a criminal 
nature, the wife of the governor of Bosnia took hold of two of her nieces upon the death 
of their father, and casually sold them to a slaver named Ishak, who in turn sold them in 
Istanbul.71 Leyla Açba told of an uncle of hers, Kabasakal Mehmed Paşa of Circassian 
origin, who recruited a cariye for Yıldız Palace, when he was on a business trip at the 
coal mines in the Zonguldak region. According to Açba, he took the girl to the palace 
rather as favor to the man who hosted him during his trip.72 As already mentioned, the 
wives of pashas and notables constituted a sizable chunk of the investors and traders in 
slaves, some of whom had been described as the “embodiments of tyranny,” such as the 
wife of Süleyman Paşa, who reportedly provided the entire office of the Yıldız Palace 
secretariat with enslaved women, specifically for sexual services (istifraş).73 In short, 
practically anyone could become a slave dealer at any time, if he or she had access to 
sources of slaves and many did in fact get in and out of the profession, seemingly quite 
                                                
68 BOA, A.MKT.DV 183/39 1277.Ş.9 (20 February 1861). Illegal cases of enslaving and trading 
in freeborn women and children were numerous. 
69 BOA, A.MKT.MVL 59/93, 1269.R.3 (14 January 1853). 
70 BOA, Y.PRK.BŞK 12/89, 1305.B.14 (27 March 1888). 
71 BOA, A.MKT.NZD 173/81, 1272.R.5 (15 December 1855). 
72 Leyla Açba, Bir Çerkes Prensesinin Harem Hatıraları (Istanbul: Timaş Yayınları, 2010), 103–
104.  
73 BOA, ŞD 2786/29, 1327.N.14 (29 September 1909). 
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easily and casually. Some declared (explicitly or otherwise) that they had no other choice, 
while others silently took advantage of their insider positions and knowledge.74  
The scale of the business could be rather sizable, even when not performed 
professionally. In one case, for instance, a certain Hadice Hanım, the daughter of 
Rıdvanzade (presumably a government official) reportedly bought five Circassian slaves 
on a ninety-day credit in exchange of 13,500 piasters, secured by two sets of debenture 
bonds. In addition, Hadice bought two more slaves on credit, in exchange of 14,398 
piasters and several others for an additional 4,000. Her debt amounted to the astounding 
sum of 31,898 piasters, which she has faulted by running away to Egypt, as reported by 
the guarantor in all of these transactions.75 Another case hints at the fact that slavers were 
versatile businessmen and women. A tobacco dealer entrusted the slave dealer Fatma 
with 15,000 piaster-worth of tobacco, which the latter successfully managed to sell in its 
entirety, took the money and ran away, together with her husband.76 That sort of 
versatility figures in other cases as well. In an earlier example, a certain man named 
Osman (profession not specified) gave a slave girl to a scarf merchant named Ahmed in 
exchange of 12,500 piaster worth of debenture bonds. Ahmed, for his turn, gave the girl 
to a tobacco merchant named Adem in exchange for his outstanding debt. Subsequently 
Adem sold the girl to the wife of a certain Tayyar Pasha, who eventually sent her to a 
                                                
74 A very similar pattern resurfaced recently, as already has been mentioned in the introduction, 
with the Syrian war refugees. In the case which opens this dissertation, a woman who calls herself 
a matchmaker arranged marriages for older Arab men from the Gulf and the Syrian girls they 
wanted—with white skin, blue or green eyes, and to be no older than sixteen—in exchange of 
huge sums of money. For an illustrative example, see Beth McLeod, “Syrian Refugees ‘sold for 
marriage’ in Jordan,” BBC News, 10 May 2013, accessed online May 18, 2013.  
75 BOA, A.MKT 176/100, 1265.4.1; Hadice owed money to other people as well, A.DVN 117/82. 
76 BOA, A.MKT.DV 147/94, 1276.Ca.10 (5 December 1859). 
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prospective buyer’s house, where the first owner of the slave, Osman, went and abducted 
the girl, as he never received the payment from Ahmed.77  
The higher the rank of the women (rather, their husbands’ rank within the 
organization of the Ottoman state), the bigger were the sums of money involved. In the 
seven months between March 1865 and November 1865, the total sum of money that 
Adviye Hanım, the wife of the esteemed Justice Minister and the author of Mecelle (the 
codified version of Şer’i law) Ahmed Cevdet Pasha, used in slave purchases and sales 
amounted to 50,000 piasters.78 The manner of the transaction changed also, in line with 
the political nature of slave circulation among the elite women, which can be glimpsed in 
a correspondence between Adviye Hanım and the wife of the newly-appointed district 
governor of Yemen in 1873. Adviye Hanım had put (or rather, implied) an order for a 
eunuch with the governor’s wife. After a long and persistent search, the latter managed to 
find a seven or eight-year-old boy named Selim (“nothing particularly to be proud of,” 
she described him in her letter to Adviye Hanım) and sent him to Istanbul, presumably as 
a gift.79 Judging by the number of letters that Adviye Hanım received from women 
asking for favors for their husbands, the governor’s wife acted strategically,80 possibly to 
secure a better post for her husband in his next appointment.  
 
 
                                                
77 BOA, MVL 92/3, 1266.L.13 (22 August 1850). 
78 BOA, Y..EE.. 142/292, 1327.R.06 (27 April 1909). 
79 BOA, Y..EE.. 142/173, 1287.S.29 (31 May 1870). 
80 See BOA, Y..EE.. 142, for examples of these letters.  
 141 
Ottoman Slave Trade at the Juncture of Multiple Legalities 
In all these cases, what is apparent is that the slave trade was so tenacious and 
deeply rooted in culture and society that those who took part in it do not seem to think 
capturing children by deception or by force whenever they could, selling them for a good 
profit to whomever they could, and giving them as gifts or better said, offering them as 
bribes in exchange for political favors, was in any ways problematic. People from across 
different ethnic or racial groups and classes seem to have collectively contributed to its 
perpetuation, as well. From the lowliest of haphazard traders, who literally “coveted his 
neighbor’s wife,” and eventually managed to capture and sell her into slavery, to the most 
deliberative ones, who traded in slaves for the well-being of the Ottoman dynasty and the 
empire’s sovereign, all those who traded in slaves prospered due to several common 
factors, such as the peculiar relationship of the slave trade with the law and the multiple 
legal systems that governed it. More specifically, the slave trade was situated at the 
crossroads of customary, religious, public, and international laws, which made its control 
difficult for any particular law administering body, whereas it simultaneously made 
things easier for those who continued with the trade after its prohibition in 1854 and 
1857, respectively for white and black slaves.81 Moreover, as mentioned above, the 
extended Ottoman family, the palace as well as high-ranking state officials did not 
necessarily comply with the corresponding laws, as in the case of the Pertevniyal Valide 
Sultan’s disregard of the laws pertaining to the prohibition of slavery in Circassian and 
African slaves and her persistence in obtaining slaves from the incoming Circassian ships 
                                                
81 Hakan Erdem, Slavery in the Ottoman Empire and its Demise, 1800–1909 (London: Palgrave 
Macmillan Limited, 1996), 112–113.  
 142 
at the midst of the Circassian refugee crisis in the early 1860s. Adviye Hanım and the 
governor’s wife who did “business” with her were equally indifferent to the laws that 
banned the trade in African slaves, despite the international debates and enforcement 
against it at the time. In fact, when explaining the delay in finding a eunuch for Adviye 
Hanım, the governor’s wife wrote nonchalantly that “whatever the reasons, they are very 
difficult to come by these days.”82 Ehud Toledano demonstrated that long after the 1857 
prohibition of trade in African slaves, the Ottoman imperial harem still contained 194 
eunuchs. Some of those were recent entries to the registry that Toledano reviews: 
One would expect that by the turn of the century, after almost 50 years of official 
prohibition against trading in African slaves, the number of eunuchs being entered 
into the Register should have declined, reflecting the gradual demise of the 
institution of harem-slavery. None the less, the picture is quite different: the more 
we approach the Register’s closing date, the larger the number of eunuchs entered. 
Whereas between the years 1865 and 1875, only 17 eunuchs were registered, we 
note close to 50 fresh entries for the years 1880–1890. During the last ten years of 
registration (1893–1903), no less than 100 eunuchs were put on the Imperial 
payroll. The longest-serving eunuch was registered way back in 1849, and the last 
eunuchs presented to the Ottoman Family were registered in 1901. Of course, we 
have no indication of recruits effected past the closing date of the Register. This 
pattern clearly reflects the fact that the demand for eunuchs at the Palace survived  
into the twentieth century, and that it was possible to obtain African eunuchs as late 
as 1901, if not later.83 
 
Although the 1854 trade ban in Circassian slaves, effected mostly as a response to the 
increased volume of slave traffic during the Crimean War was short-lived at the time, the 
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83 Ehud Toledano, “The Imperial Eunuchs of Istanbul: From Africa to the Heart of Islam,” Middle 
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issue came up several times in the 1860s, most notably in 1864, with the prohibition of 
trade in freeborn Circassians.84 As Hakan Erdem asserted, the point here is not that the 
Ottoman state banned what was already illegal according to Şer’i law, but it recognized 
that slavery could easily percolate the world of the freeborn, if they were poor and 
desperate enough.85 Şirin, Sıdıka, and Nadire’s disregard for legal categories as the 
presence of consent and destitution, which was mentioned earlier, illustrates this well. At 
the discursive level, there was an effort by the Ottoman state to banish Circassian slave 
trade, as it was incompatibility with both the 1839 and 1856 edicts (that aimed to provide 
a degree of equality before the law, for all of its citizens) was somewhat manifest. In 
practice, on the other hand, the palace as well as the high-ranking state officials continued 
with the trade, paving the way for others to follow.86 Mind, for instance, the brief 
ciphered note written in March 1900 that reported about a eunuch from the Yıldız Palace 
named Abdülhamid Ağa, who recently “obtained six slave girls” in Adapazarı and was on 
his way to Istanbul.87 As can be observed in the above-mentioned bill of sale for fourteen 
Circassian girls (Image 4), the recruitment carried out by a palace official named Çerkes 
(Circassian) Osman on behalf of the Yıldız Palace took place rather late, in March 
1908.88 
                                                
84 Erdem, Slavery in the Ottoman Empire, 106–107, 114–117. 
85 Ibid., 115. 
86 See Nelly Hanna, “Sources for the Study of Slave Women and Concubines in Ottoman Egypt,” 
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Such was the case with the elite households outside the palace as well. Adviye 
Hanım’s daughter, the famous novelist Fatma Aliye Hanım, who is considered to be the 
first woman of letters and intellectual in the Ottoman Empire and hailed, for that 
particular reason, as the pioneer of feminist thought and action in the country, was also a 
known advocate of Ottoman slavery, particularly against the British and Western pressure 
to abolish it. She traded in slaves and maintained that being an enslaved servant or 
concubine were merely one among many different phases of womanhood.89 The fact that 
she was fighting for women’s rights or that she was involved in politics and conversant in 
law, did not make slavery problematic for Fatma Aliye and she kept on buying slaves 
well into the turn of the century. Moreover, one bill of sale that belonged to her showed 
that she bought a young enslaved woman named Perver, from the Hatuqwai-Bzhedug 
tribe, approximately 18 or 19 years of age, together with her newborn son Hasan.90 As 
has been frequently argued, the sale of a slave who gave birth to a male child was strictly 
prohibited according to Şer’i law. The story of the slave herself is not in the file, nor 
mentioned in the bill of sale. Thus it is not clear who impregnated the woman, whether it 
was her master or not. It is not known who sold her to the slaver either but it is a known 
fact, as insightfully elaborated by Ehud Toledano, pregnant slave women caused alarm 
                                                                                                                                            
Circassian settlements across the country to obtain slaves. For other examples, see BOA, 
Y.PRK.UM 17/6, 1307.L.5 (25 May 1890); BOA, Y.PRK.UM 17/11, 1307.L.11 (31 May 1890). 
89 Ehud Toledano, Slavery and Abolition in the Ottoman Middle East (Seattle: University of 
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90 Taksim Kitaplığı, Fatma Aliye Hanım Evrakı (papers), FA_Evr_000012-016, 7 Mart 1302 (19 
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for the wives of the masters, since the children born to concubines were legitimate 
heirs.91 Intimate relations between concubines and the men of the household were kept 
under strict surveillance by the mistresses. Numerous examples can be found particularly 
in literary texts. Note that, for instance, the mistress in Recaizade Mahmud Ekrem’s 
above-mentioned play Vuslat, who gave the slave girl Vuslat to a slaver in disguise, to 
keep her away from her son. In Sami Paşazade Sezai’s Sergüzeşt, the ill-fated protagonist 
Dilber was sent away for similar reasons. In Nabizade Nazım’s Zehra, it was the 
relationship that Suphi, Zehra’s husband, had with the enslaved girl Sırrıcemal that 
pushed Zehra into a fit of jealousy with catastrophic consequences, particularly for the 
enslaved girl. In Halide Edib’s Sinekli Bakkal, the newly purchased slave girl named 
Kanarya caused a fierce battle between the mistress of the household Sabiha and her 
slave-turned-daughter-in-law Dürnev. As a result, Kanarya was sent away as a gift. While 
it was highly likely that Perver was also sent away for similar reasons, by a cautious 
mother or a jealous wife, Fatma Aliye readily accepted the legality of the transaction 
without much questioning.  
 
                                                




Image 6a. This indenture contract dated May 1903 states that Hanife bint Mehmed, 6 years old, 
is given to Faik Pasha’s (Fatma Aliye’s husband) household for a twenty year service term, in 
exchange of 25 mecidiye (500 piasters) paid up front. In addition, monthly amount of 5 piasters 
would be retained on behalf Hanife, to be given to her at the end of her term. Taksim Atatürk 




Image 6b. Addition to the previous one, this contract, written and signed by Hanife bint Mehmed 
in January 1915, roughly twelve years after the commencement of her services with Fatma Aliye, 
confirms both the ending of her term and that she received her earnings in full. Taksim Atatürk 




In all these cases, there is an implication that one could easily continue trading in 
slaves, despite the existence of laws and a significant amount of the international 
community against it, and for the most part, get away with it. Starting with the year of 
1896/97, Fatma Aliye’s slave purchases seemingly came to an end, or rather were 
replaced with indenture contracts, hinting at another aspect of Ottoman society which 
allowed slavery to flourish or at best go unnoticed; that is the prevalence of slavery-like 
practices, such as evlatlık, beslemelik, and ahretlik, all of which implicitly meant 
adoption for the purpose of servitude. Two or three indenture contracts among Fatma 
Aliye’s papers do not constitute a sound documentary base to tell how they differed from 
the bills of slave sales, except for the obvious fact that they specified limitations for the 
durations of service. In addition, they seem to be concerned only with the labor of the 
indentured child as well as the initial and yearly payments made to or retained for the 
family (see Images 6a and 6b above, for an example). Despite their differences, as hinted 
in the indenture documents, evlatlık, beslemelik, and ahretlik practices all functioned at 
times as a safe harbor to those who traded in slaves “improperly.” As might be recalled 
from chapter 1, a police investigation on an illegal sale of three Georgian girls by the 
aide-de-camp Çürüksulu Ali Pasha was thwarted when the girls’ parents claimed that 
they gave away the girls as evlatlık.92  
 
Conclusion 
Sıdıka, Şirin and Kör Nadire merely reenacted what the women of the palace or 
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the elite households had been doing: they exploited a slavery system that was governed 
by multiple (and at times, conflicting) legal systems, took advantage of the destitution 
and poverty caused by such socio-political upheavals as the Circassian expulsion or the 
1877–78 Russo-Ottoman War, and hid their activities, when necessary, behind other 
slavery-like practices such as evlatlık, etc. They used their own tools of power, such as 
being a previous member of the imperial harem or being married to an army officer, 
when accessing sources of slaves. They carved out a space for themselves in the large and 
somewhat diffuse slave trade network, that effectively connected the provincial town of 
Gekbuze to the imperial harem in Istanbul. This vast network brought together a diverse 
groups of people, and it was so tightly-knit together that such people as Emine and her 
three daughters, deportees from Trabzon, could end up in Şirin’s house in Istanbul, 
through a thick network of acquaintances or associates. With the discovery of the 8-year-
old girl Zekiye as well, it was one of Sıdıka’s acquaintances, a black woman named 
Fatma, who first alerted Sıdıka about the possibility of obtaining the girl for sale. Just as 
Pertevniyal, Adviye, or Fatma Aliye were protecting their positions and gains through the 
slave network, so did Fatma, Sıdıka, Şirin, or Kör Nadire, by forming alliances with 
whomever they thought necessary and amassing money for themselves as a form of a 
retirement plan for their approaching old age. The palace officials at the Beşiktaş and 
other imperial harems who readily purchased the girls from Şirin and Sıdıka, without 
much investigation, constituted the other half of the system that delineated the ethnic 
category of Circassianness as a somewhat arbitrary one, which was often tied strictly to 
class. As long as the girls or their families did not claim their free status, they could 
remain enslaved in and employed by the imperial harems.  
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Consequently, it was Müzeyyen’s mother (who was relatively better off compared 
to Zehra or Emine) who notified the police and had Sıdıka, Şirin, and Nadire arrested. At 
the end of a long police investigation, which produced pages of interrogation records, 
they were found guilty for unlawfully capturing destitute Turkish refugee girls and 
deceitfully selling them into slavery “here and there, as if they were Circassians.” For 
Sıdıka, Şirin, and Nadire, slavery could be extended to anyone who consented to be 
enslaved, even though that consent was induced by poverty, despair, and an overall 
destitution. For the Ottoman government, on the other hand, enslavement was tied, at 
least at the discursive level, to more strictly determined ethnic and racial categories and 
would not (and in fact, from its perspective, better not) extend to everyone who was 
sufficiently vulnerable. Not that the elites that constituted the Ottoman state personally 
did not breach these categories. As will be explored more fully in the following chapter, 
they in fact did, extensively. But the discourses of the state always developed with a 
degree of autonomy, independent from the people who took part in it. It was not that 
Sıdıka, Şirin, and Nadire were not aware that what they did was illegal, either. Their 
efforts to cover up their scheme with a series of lies hint at the fact that they were aware 
of the incompatibility of their actions with the law. But their customers at the palace 
made the matter more confusing for the three women, for if the palace could overlook the 
illegality of the matter and bought Turkish girls to be employed at the imperial harem, 
even possibly to be a concubine to one of the princes there, then what they have done was 
permissible, at least to a certain degree. What they did not understand was that the palace, 
despite the efforts of Sultan Abdülhamid to make it “the unquestioned center of power in 
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the Ottoman Empire,”93 did not carry the same significance as the state any longer, and 
that the latter was now under the obligation of not only transforming its internal legal 
order to effect a more encompassing criminal or civil law, but it also had to comply with 
the equally pressing international law, which ultimately rendered the imperial harems as 
utterly contradictive and thus contested institutions in the Ottoman Empire, as will also 
be explored in the following chapter. At the moment of the incident, the Ottoman Empire 
was already a signatory to several international agreements against the slave trade and 
was headed towards the more encompassing Brussels Conference Act, which would be 
signed a mere two years later. Thus, it could not turn a blind eye on such an offence.  
In the end, with the stated purpose of making an exemplary case out of these 
women, the police, in cooperation with the municipal government and Yıldız Palace, 
deported Sıdıka, Şirin, and Nadire to Tripoli, where they stayed for at least half a 
decade.94 Yet, as it was stated in the police report, the case was never brought to a court, 
and no official legal action was taken, since the “reputation of the palace and the imperial 
harem was at stake,” the report explained. What can be discerned in the report is that the 
police held the imperial harem also responsible for the offence. Yet, the palace and the 
imperial harem were there to be respected and protected not to bring legal charges 
against. Hence, all was handled and resolved quietly. The three women were deported to 
Tripoli and the imperial harem continued with its customary practices for another two 
decades. It continued to buy slaves and receive them as gifts well until the constitutional 
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revolution of 1908, which marked, among other things, the beginning of the dissolution 
of imperial harems in the Ottoman Empire. As will be discussed in more detail in chapter 
5 below, the dissolution of the Yıldız harem and the mass manumission of several 
hundred enslaved servants triggered a host of debates on the slave trade and slavery, in 
conjunction with equality, justice, and citizenship. The four decades that preceded it, 
however, witnessed for the most part chaos, in which anyone who held some degree of 




Chapter 4.   





In September 1908, two months after the Young Turk Revolution and the 
inauguration of the Second Constitutional Era in the Ottoman Empire, a female slave of 
Circassian origin named Fatma Leman fled her mistress’s house, taking refuge in the 
Ministry of Justice in Istanbul. Her reasoning was straightforward: if this revolution, 
under the slogans of “freedom, equality and justice,” granted freedom to each and every 
Ottoman individual, then she too was free like the rest of her compatriots.1 Whether the 
promulgation of the constitution guaranteed her freedom is another question, but her 
conviction that she was now free and her decision to seek her rights at the Ministry of 
Justice (which, in her view, was more closely associated with the new regime) instead of 
the religious Şer’i courts (where manumission deeds were normally issued) led to an 
institutional paralysis over the ensuing months. The Ministry of Justice, not knowing 
what to do with the runaway slave and uncertain of its authority on the matter, responded 
to the slave’s appeal by not doing much more than writing an official communication and 
sending her off to the Ministry of Police. The police did not know what to do with Fatma 
Leman either. Finding themselves in a difficult position, in which they could not let the 
enslaved girl go (as the issue of property rights was at stake) nor return her to her owner 
(indicating that Fatma Leman’s claim was at least partially valid) the police chose to 
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evade making any decision altogether and summoned the owner instead. For her part, the 
owner, whose faith in the old judicial order was intact and who had the means to employ 
an attorney, insisted that Fatma Leman be taken to the Şer’i court to “prove” her free 
status. The girl herself decided to wait for the reinstatement of the Parliament instead and 
make her appeal there. In the meanwhile, she was allegedly kidnapped from where she 
was waiting in hiding for the Parliament to convene, sold as a concubine to a high 
ranking provincial government officer, and eventually, when the Parliament urged the 
police to follow up on the case, was located in her native village living with her mother, 
unmarried but having given birth to a female child.2  
What lay “beyond” slavery for Fatma Leman was analogous to her life as a slave, 
taking the usual course of slavery in the Ottoman Empire, as it would elsewhere such as 
in the Atlantic system. It comprised different forms of coercion such as kidnapping, rape 
or resale, touched by varying degrees of despair and vulnerability reflecting the lack of 
kin support, poverty, and conditions such as pregnancy and child bearing. What also lay 
in this “beyond,” however, was what Frederick Cooper, Thomas Holt and Rebecca Scott 
called the “uncertainties of freedom,” in which slavery simply dissolved into other forms 
of power and exploitation. As the legal and administrative institutions transformed or 
realigned themselves, or failed to do so for that matter, this uncertainty manifested itself 
in terms of ambiguities or contradictions in various social structures or arrangements, 
most notably the realm of citizenship.3  
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The previous chapters traced not only the ways in which the Ottoman state 
positioned itself vis-à-vis slavery, but also how it defined itself and the limits of the new 
social and political order it aimed to establish, through slavery. The 1908 constitutional 
revolution was in many ways a culmination of these previous five decades, as the result 
of which a constitutional government claimed the ownership of the state power. Focusing 
on the immediate aftermath of the revolution, this chapter explores the ways in which the 
new regime’s emancipatory efforts and failures determined the limits of citizenship in the 
Ottoman Empire. It probes the claims made by the slaves, who the very language of 
freedom, equality, and justice that the slave owners and the Ottoman state used, although 
they attributed different meanings to the words that this language comprised. These 
differences were not necessarily or solely due to slaves’ needs, interests, or priorities, but 
were also shaped by their perceptions of what they thought was happening at the time: 
what sense they made out of the pillars of the revolution and the new regime; what they 
thought Ottoman citizenship meant; what they understood from emancipation (be it the 
emancipation from slavery or gaining equal rights as citizens); and last but not least, how 
they saw and ordered ethnic, religious, racial, and gender conflicts. Examining the (anti-) 
slavery idiom used by the Ottoman state, slave owners and slaves in distinct and often 
conflicting ways on the one hand and the perpetuated bifurcated nature of the Ottoman 
legal system on the other, I aim to offer a glimpse of the social and political conditions 
that determined who was entitled to claim freedom and who was not.4 
 
                                                




The “Spirit of the Constitution” 
The revolution of 1908, often referred to by its contemporaries only as 
“freedom,”5 was the culmination of a long battle between the absolutist rule of 
Abdülhamid II and a constitutionalist opposition that comprised statesmen, officers, 
members of clergy and intellectuals “who shared a common enemy, but not a common 
agenda.”6 Such efforts to introduce a constitutional regime were not unprecedented in the 
Ottoman Empire. Several decades prior to the 1908 revolution, a small cadre of 
bureaucrats led by Midhat Paşa and supported by a group of intellectuals who called 
themselves Young Ottomans, succeeded in deposing sultan Abdülaziz and bringing 
Abdülhamid II to power in his stead. The latter’s accession to the throne was due to his 
declared allegiance to a prospective constitutional rule and his promise to promulgate a 
constitution. He did so only to suspend it merely a year later, which marked the 
beginning of a bitter struggle between his 33-year-long absolutist rule represented by 
Yıldız Palace, and the constitutionalist opposition, which intensified in the last decade of 
the nineteenth century and culminated in an army-led uprising and consequently the 
reinstatement of the suspended constitution in 1908. Viewed by some scholars as a 
complete rupture that subsequently transformed the Ottoman political culture “from a 
bureaucratically-run monarchist regime to a liberal democratic political system” and by 
others a mere (still, triumphant) restoration of an earlier interrupted revolution, it 
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nevertheless marked the beginning of an era that represented “a new experience in the 
way Ottoman subjects viewed their relations with the authorities.”7 
The series of events that sparked the 1908 revolution and eventually forced 
Abdülhamid II to restore the constitution was largely the making of ordinary soldiers and 
junior officers, all of whom were members of the Committee of Progress and Union, 
which at the time still a secret organization. Merely a sequence of local uprisings at the 
beginning, the news of the revolution reached the Istanbul public only after the 
constitution was reinstated, on July 24, 1908.8 Once it was known however, “freedom” 
was embraced and celebrated with enthusiasm everywhere, regardless of the character of 
the revolution that brought it about, whether seen as a “well-planned army insurrection” 
or a “totally popular movement,”9 which at times was emphasized by its contemporaries. 
For one, an almanac named “Almanac of Freedom,” published in 1909, stressed that the 
“holy revolution” was not carried out by the Ottoman government but the very people 
themselves.10 Aykut Kansu argued that the popular character of the revolution was 
already evident in the years leading up to it, in tax revolts throughout the empire, which 
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were largely popular uprisings, which broke out largely due to the “unequal levying of 
the tax.”11 
Not everyone, however, understood “freedom” the same way.12 Like similar 
efforts at emancipation that accompanied sudden social and political change, the 
revolutionaries in the Ottoman Empire were unclear in their understanding and vision as 
to how “freedom, equality, and justice,” were to be achieved.13 It is not that the 
revolutionaries did not envision or desire a constitutional regime, representative 
democracy, freedom of press, or individual liberties. The representatives both in the Ayan 
and Mebusan assemblies continued debating these notions, plans, or visions in the 
subsequent years. Yet, like in all revolutions, the outcomes, as Şükrü Hanioğlu has put it, 
“differed markedly from the expectations of its true believers.14 In that sense, they not 
only did not know how slavery would be abolished but were also unclear about the direct 
political consequences of the revolution itself; an ambiguity which had been attributed by 
some scholars to the suddenness of Abdülhamid II’s capitulation that threw the country 
and its administrative institutions into utter confusion. The rapidity of change hindered 
the formation or transformation of legal and administrative institutions that would have 
facilitated the desired or envisioned change.15 It may be that the revolution had a well-
determined aim of creating “the modern secular Ottoman citizen whose loyalty was going 
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to be to the state,” as Bedross Der Matossian has argued, but the level of confusion 
attached to these concepts was astonishing.16 For other historians, this difficulty stemmed 
not simply from confusion but the contradiction between being a constitutionalist and a 
revolutionary at the same time, as the former derived its “legitimacy from respect for the 
law, community consensus, stability, and continuity, while the other owed its legitimacy 
to itself—the act of revolution and its spirit, without which there would not have been a 
constitution.”17 In fact, the lack of a corresponding law or a law-enforcing institution 
often served as the basis for limiting the revolutionaries’ claims to such rights as the right 
to assembly, freedom of the press, or individual liberties, such as freedom of 
movement.18 
Moreover, the people were no less perplexed or contradicting than the 
revolutionaries either. The Sultan, after all, was the same monarch that kept them under 
virtual slavery for the preceding three decades, during which he revived the tradition of 
what Hakan Erdem called “rhetorical slavery” and once again made “the concept of 
loyalty to the person of the Sultan the cornerstone of the Ottoman sociopolitical 
system.”19 Drawing from Carter Findley, Hakan Erdem argued that this system, known to 
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the students of Ottoman history as the “system of loyalty,” flourished particularly among 
officialdom. As indicated by the “oft-used appellation ‘loyalty and slavery’ (sadakat ve 
ubudiyet),” it was a “two-pronged system” in which “the quality of loyalty was supposed 
to stem from servility/slavery of the officials and they were expected to ‘prove’ it on 
suitable occasions.”20 Abdülhamid’s choice of his sons in law, for instance, was also 
indicative of this tendency. “The deposed khan selected his sons in law himself,” as 
Ahmet Mahir Efendi, a deputy from Kastamonu, reported “from among the orphaned, 
those without wealth or a cent, those who he deemed close to himself in thought and 
action.”21 Yet, except for the bendegan, which included the enslaved or indentured palace 
servants and eunuchs, only few of these officials were actually slaves or of slave origin. 
In addition, the suppression of the 1876 constitution, the subsequent dissolution of the 
Parliament and the failure to restore the constitutional regime throughout Abdülhamid 
II’s long rule, backed up by the dissident voices of such intellectual and political groups 
as the Young Ottomans and Young Turks, brought to many subjects’ minds a picture of 
the Ottoman subjects as slaves of Abdülhamid II; “the deposed khan,” as one enslaved 
man called him in his petition in 1909, “who made the entire Ottoman nation moan under 
slavery for thirty three years.”22  
The historian Ehud Toledano has pointed out how the Young Ottomans (setting 
an example for later generations) “made more than occasional use of the idiom of slavery 
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as a metaphor in their writings about political and social freedom.”23 “Even the name of 
[Namık] Kemal and Ziya [Pasha]’s  journal, Hürriyet (freedom),” Toledano has argued, 
“is the Islamic legal opposite of the term for slavery (rıkkiyet and esaret).”24 Thus, a 
common binary of “freedom” and “slavery,” as well as the violent nature of the latter, 
were already well established by the time the revolution took place. In fact, in the 
proceedings following the Parliament’s reinstatement, deputies made frequent references 
to Hamidian rule and its strong-arm, violent traditions and procedures. In one instance, 
when the representatives were debating on the abolition of corporal punishment, the 
reasoning behind the change was directly connected to the slavery-freedom duality. “The 
spirit and the philosophy of the Constitution,” Rifat Bey, a deputy from Aleppo, wrote in 
the proposal he submitted, “is based on mutual love, connection, compliance and 
understanding among persons,” whereas the spirit and the philosophy of Abdülhamid’s 
oppressive rule thrived upon fear, terror and hate. But with the inauguration of the 
Constitution, Rifat Bey contended, the people were released from their bonds of slavery 
and until their actions and manners in this new order are observed and considered, all old 
methods of physical punishment should be abolished altogether. For Rifat Bey, the stick, 
the whip or the bastinado (foot whipping) had no place in the courthouses of the era of 
freedom.25 
Despite the frequent and common use of the slavery metaphor, particularly in 
reference to the Hamidian rule against which the revolutionaries explicitly positioned 
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themselves, the actual institution of slavery took almost an independent course from the 
current debates. In some references, it was even considered to have ceased altogether a 
long time ago. For example, when the Parliament was debating revisions to the 
Constitution, Yorgo Boşo Efendi, a deputy from Serfice (today’s Sarvia, Greece) 
proposed an additional article to the constitution that would ban the sale and purchase of 
persons. Seyyit Bey, a deputy from Izmir, refused it altogether based on his conviction 
that in the Ottoman lands there was no one who was not free. When Yorgi Honeus 
Efendi, a deputy from Salonica, reminded him of “all those slave girls in Yıldız Palace,” 
Seyyit Bey rebuffed it by saying that they were all manumitted and delivered back to 
their families, even though these manumissions were still in progress at that time and 
encompassed only the enslaved servants of deposed Abdülhamid II, not those of other 
members of the dynasty, nor notable households of Istanbul or the provinces.26 In another 
debate on business enterprises and labor regulations about a year later, when the Finance 
Minister Mehmet Cavit Bey suggested an arrangement for workers which Kirkor Zohrap 
Efendi criticized for being “akin to slavery,” the former refused it by saying that 
“humanity long left behind the age of slavery.”27  
As have been discussed in the previous chapters, operating within a global 
community regulated by international law, conventions, and agreements, as well as 
putative humanitarian concerns and efforts towards a wholesale emancipation, the 
Ottoman government found itself forced to push a policy against the practice of slavery. 
“Notwithstanding [the] revival of slavery rhetoric and regardless of the nature of 
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Abdülhamid’s rule,” Hakan Erdem has argued, “the Ottoman government’s policy 
against the actual institution of slavery persisted.”28 The Sultan did not always agree with 
the Porte on the anti-slavery measures and often caused long delays in securing his 
assent, rendering the issue of slavery a contested ground between the Palace and the 
Porte. In fact, the signs of this contention were already in place, according to Ali Haydar 
Midhat, the son of Midhat Paşa, the author of the 1876 constitution. Comparing the 
earlier drafts with the final text of the constitution, Ali Haydar Midhat observed 
omissions, even corruptions to Midhat Paşa’s draft, one of which was related to slavery 
and Midhat Paşa’s “idea of a manifesto,” as Erdem called it, about anti-slavery measures 
to be taken in the Ottoman Empire with the onset of the first constitutional era:29 
 
The buying and selling of slaves being contrary to the prescriptions of 
the Sacred Law (Cheri), We hereby enfranchise the slaves and eunuchs of Our 
Palace, and declare that henceforth all trade in slaves, whether purchase or sale, 
is hereby formally forbidden in Our Empire, and a date will be fixed for the 
gradual emancipation of all existing slaves, and special measures will be adopted 
to prevent any return to slavery.30 
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It is arguable whether Midhat Paşa expressed his provisions about slavery in these 
specific terms, especially in regards to the point that slave trade was against prescriptions 
of the Şer’i law (or, if he did, he really meant it) for a few years later, as reported by the 
British Consul of Jidda, he saw no fault in giving two female slaves as gifts to a religious 
official.31 Nevertheless, furthering the process that started with the 1857 prohibition of 
trade in African slaves (to be renewed in 1877), Midhat Paşa not only revived earlier 
debates on abolition, highlighted the importance of such means as mükatebe (self-
purchase) in order to achieve it, but also proposed, in an unprecedented way, to abolish 
palace slavery, convinced that it would set the example for the remainder of the Ottoman 
society. Following the dissolution of the constitution and subsequent arrest and extra-
judicial killing of Midhat Paşa, the abolition of palace slavery was not be to debated 
again until after the 1908 revolution, but slavery and particularly its trade were subjected 
to a series of international arrangements in the subsequent years. The Anglo-Ottoman 
Convention for the Suppression of the Black Slave Trade in 1880 and the Brussels Act in 
1890 rendered trade in African slaves illegal and made trade in Circassian slaves frowned 
upon to a certain extent, at least in theory, in the decades that followed. 
Last but, not the least, the issue of slavery also had to be addressed at the local 
level, as it touched the essence of the definition of Ottoman citizenship, which was 
“inextricably linked” to the definition of constitutionalism, whose legitimacy was based 
unambiguously, at least in theory, in equality before law.32 Thus, when Fatma Leman fled 
her mistress’s house and claimed her freedom in September 1908, she was not only 
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capable of making a distinction between two legal systems (and judging what she 
believed to be their potential merits and dangers) but she was also aware of (or at least 
had been exposed to) the actual, rhetorical, local, perhaps even international usage of the 
words slavery and freedom. What she was less mindful of, perhaps, was that the ending 
of slavery for women and the freedom that came after it, worked differently for women 
than it did for men. 
 
The Gendered Politics of Emancipation 
The 1908 revolution, which also sparked the process of slave emancipation was 
largely militaristic in nature, particularly following the counter-revolution in April 1909, 
which was harshly suppressed by the army troops that marched from Salonica to 
Istanbul.33 This had direct implications both on the gendered nature of the political 
environment that was shaped after the revolution and how emancipation affected men and 
women in the newly emerging social order, at times determining the hierarchies in which 
slavery was to be placed. For example, in the aftermath of the counter-revolution in May 
1909, the Grand Vizier attempted to consult with Mahmud Şevket Paşa, the chief 
commander of the marching troops, on the dissolution of the deposed sultan’s harem and 
the manumission of the cariyes. However, the latter responded in a stern manner that it 
was not appropriate, nor was it a time to busy the army with such trivial matters and that 
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these women should be transferred to Topkapı Palace and the matter be discussed and 
decided thereafter by the Ottoman state.34 
Scholars of slavery and emancipation in the Atlantic world have stressed the 
explicit linkages between masculinity and citizenship, arguing that slave emancipation 
that resulted from armed struggle helped constructing a highly gendered political 
community in its aftermath.35 The Ottoman constitution did not pronounce the limits of 
citizenship as clearly as its Haitian counterpart did roughly a century earlier, but implicit 
in its definition of state membership was the notion that no one was worthy of being an 
Ottoman “if he [was] not a good father, a good son, a good husband, and above all a good 
soldier.”36 Thus, emancipation meant, for enslaved women, the end of one hierarchical 
order and the beginning of another, in which existing gender relations were confirmed or 
disrupted, yet coercion, sexual vulnerability, and the gendered politics of public space 
remained.37 “Despite the diversity of processes and outcomes in the Atlantic world,” 
Pamela Scully and Diana Paton show, “slave emancipation everywhere took gendered 
forms, restructuring relationships between men and women, and making men’s 
entitlement to leadership of a family a central feature of post- emancipation societies.”38 
Women were to be released from slavery, but into a new kind of subordination and 
dependence. One of the older enslaved servants of the imperial harem, Sırrıcemal, who 
had been expelled from Yıldız Palace following Abdülhamid II’s deposal, illustrated this 
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in a written petition.39 After sixty years of service, Sırrıcemal found herself on the street, 
penniless and with no family or friends, until a woman took pity on her and brought her 
home. “I think about my life in the past,” she said in her petition asking for a pension 
“and of my future, I dread and get scared.”40 Sırrıcemal’s personal connections as a 
former member of the palace, and the skills and training she acquired there, could not 
secure a professional means to earn a living. In fact, that option was not even addressed 
in any of the correspondences, but her efforts did gain her a pension. In another case, a 
young woman named Nazmiye, reportedly the slave of the former war minister Mehmed 
Rıza Pasha, also found herself and her 8-month-old child on the street, unmarried, with 
no friends or relatives and poverty-stricken.41 Having no access to such organizational 
information as to whom to petition, or having skills and means to write a petition in the 
first place, Nazmiye and her child were found unsuitable even for the almshouse and 
were recommended to be admitted to a woman’s hospital instead.42 
Not the least important result of the new Turkish Constitution,” the New York 
Times wrote shortly after the revolution, “will be the effect upon the inmates of the 
harem, who, it is admitted, measurably aided the Young Turks in their conspiracy against 
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the former order of things.” The paper noted that while “freedom, absolute freedom” was 
what Turkish women wanted, there were “convincing reasons” as to why they “may not 
at once enter into the full joys of it, since they were simply unable “to conduct 
themselves with decorum in the presence of the curious and fascinating glances of the 
opposite sex.”43 Yet for the women noted about—Fatma  Leman, who was at the child-
bearing age of 22 and recently subjected to resale, Nazmiye who was left alone with a 
newborn child out on the street, and Sırrıcemal, who was nearing age eighty and had no 
means, money, or personal belongings, and moreover, was all alone in Istanbul—what 
stood on the way to “freedom, absolute freedom” was more than being simply incapable 
of conducting  themselves “with decorum in the presence of the curious and fascinating 
glances of the opposite sex.” These obstacles included kidnapping, being recaptured and 
sold into slavery, being abandoned (or forced to relocate to their native villages, provided 
that they had one), and, in the case of Nazmiye, possibly rape. It was not that these 
women did not try to devise means to pursue their new lives. One enslaved woman 
named İspantiyar, who was expelled from Abdülhamid II’s harem following its 
dissolution, allegedly found employment as the headmistress of an orphanage in Adana 
province. Nonetheless, it is doubtful that she performed this duty in an official capacity, 
for when the Ministry of Finance investigated the matter with the Ministry of Education 
concerning a pension-related issue, the latter found no record of İspantiyar’s 
employment.44 Fatma Leman, for her part, managed to produce an address of an old 
acquaintance, where she would reside while waiting for the parliament to convene, 
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worked at a mansion as a servant, and even took a room at a hotel when hiding became 
necessary. None of these actions could prevent her falling prey to slavery and eventually 
finding herself at her natal home “married to none and lamenting,” as the report described 
it.45  
It is true that male slaves too resorted to flight or demanded their freedom, but 
having been less marginalized than women, they had relatively easier access to work or 
to such institutions as the army. In two separate instances in Sivas province, bands of 
young enslaved men, driving off a few heads of horse and sheep, escaped from their 
masters’ premises to Kayseri province nearby (the district governor of which had the 
reputation of being a guardian of fugitive slaves), where they eventually volunteered to 
be enlisted in the army as a means to claim their citizenship.46 In the case of the enslaved 
male servants of the palace, the thirty nine eunuchs who were expelled from Yıldız 
Palace and subsequently exiled to Ta’if (in today’s Saudi Arabia) were kept under virtual 
arrest there but were eventually provided with travel documents to seek employment 
elsewhere.47 What made the women’s case different than that of the men was the 
former’s unchanged status as dependents of male benefactors, whether the Ottoman state, 
their male relatives or their husbands. The aim here, however, is not simply to reiterate 
how marginalized women were in the era of “freedom” but to point out their perpetually 
dependent state in which the discursive, ambiguous, or even contradictory nature of 
emancipation in the Ottoman Empire crystalized. After all, the Ottoman constitutional 
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revolution too based itself on modern liberalism, which in turn hinged on, as Pamela 
Haag points out, “the ideal of the masterless man.” In the Ottoman case, not only were 
the “masterless” women not assigned “the propriety, self-interested traits associated with 
the market rendition of the individual,” but the very notion of these women as 
individuals, detached from an ethnic or religious claim to liberty and equality, was 
questionable.48 In that sense, Fatma Leman’s and other enslaved women’s stories were 
both unique and exemplary at the same time, but not solely due to the degree of despair 
or the sad endings they met in their respective experiences. Rather, they were indicative 
of the limits of emancipation in the post-revolution Ottoman Empire; limits, as will be 
discussed in the sections below, that can be traced through such underlying themes in 
these stories as the singular faith placed on such overtly secular institutions as the 
Ministry of Justice or the Parliament, as opposed to religious ones. 
 
The Problem of the Bifurcated Legal System 
Whether because of instinct or more informed decisions, Fatma Leman and other 
slaves’ faith in such secular institutions as the Ministry of Justice was not entirely 
unfounded.  Starting early on after the revolution, the ministry made a well-articulated 
debate against slavery, highlighting particularly its corruptive effects and possible 
dangers in undermining the constitutional order as a whole. In a note written to the 
Ministry of Interior Affairs in November 1908, Justice Minister Hasan Fehmi reiterated 
that the constitutional government assured, by definition and without exception, freedom 
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for each and every individual. Turning a blind eye now to the continuing sale and 
purchase of Circassian girls across the country and particularly in Istanbul not only 
harmed the reputation and legitimacy of the constitutional government but also gave way 
to the sale and purchase of free-born individuals, labeled Circassian under false pretenses, 
hence rendering everyone, at least in theory, susceptible to such offenses.49 Both for the 
minister and the public prosecutor of Beyoğlu (who produced a similar note 
approximately ten days later, in response to the case of two fugitive slaves, one 
Circassian and the other African), the matter of the African slaves appeared clear and 
unambiguous, as the rules and regulations were already determined by international law. 
By contrast, the case of Circassians was complicated. When the “Circassians emigrated to 
the Ottoman lands” the minister noted, “slavery pertaining to the white race was already 
abolished by the Russian government in territories under their control,” from where they 
had mostly emigrated; a fact that rendered, according to the minister, the claims to 
ancestral slave ownership by Circassian notables unfounded. Moreover, in Şer’i law, just 
enslavement was restricted to wartime only and bore no validity any longer. But even if it 
were valid, as the chief of the Ottoman parliament’s Committee on Petitions articulated 
later on, wasn’t it true that the African slaves were already exempted from the 
jurisdiction of Şer’i law?50 Thus, for the Ministry of Justice, the continuing sale and 
purchase of Circassian girls was not only incompatible with the constitutional regime, 
which based itself first and foremost on the principle of political and legal equality, but 
no longer had a Şer’i basis either. Shortly after this official correspondence, the Ministry 
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of Justice published a brief note in the newspapers announcing a ban on the sale and 
purchase of Circassian slaves, making its position against slavery public and open for the 
slaves who rightly favored it.51 What was less apparent for the slaves was the position of 
the constitutional government, which was neither clear on the matter, nor immune from 
the notion of an obligation to maintain the existing hierarchies and privileges it inherited. 
What is more, the revolutionaries endorsed the old regime’s corporate notion of modern 
citizenship, which was based on a particular form of representation rooted in the idea of 
ethnic-religious equality,52 often at the expense of individual claims to freedom, equality, 
and justice. 
The constitutional government, moreover, was not as comfortable disregarding 
Şer’i law as the Ministry of Justice was, at times overtly eschewing any modification of 
Şer’i law’s area of influence. This position was indicative of the ambiguous relation of 
the Ottoman state to its two separate justice administering institutions. Bifurcation of the 
Ottoman legal system had its roots in the reform movements that began earlier in the 
nineteenth century, most notably with the Gülhane edict (that marked the beginning of 
the Tanzimat era), which had the declared aim of “guaranteeing personal rights and 
confirming equality between different religious and ethnic communities in the empire” as 
was described retrospectively in the inauguration speech of the 1908 Parliament.53 As has 
already been discussed earlier, the first instances of the legal reforms consisted of mere 
codifications of the Şer’i provisions, which regulated almost all civil, commercial, and 
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penal processes within the legal realm. With the adoption of the Imperial Ottoman Penal 
Code in 1858, however, there emerged the first cases of intervention into Şer’i law by the 
Ottoman state; interventions which sometimes by their nature resulted in the abrogation 
of Şer’i law, particularly vis-à-vis the penal law.54 Unlike penal law however, certain 
segments of the civil law, particularly family law, marriage, inheritance, and laws that 
regulated the domestic realm, of which slaves and slavery were part, remained under the 
jurisdiction of Şer’i law until much later, although not without a constant threat of being 
taken over by the Ministry of Justice. This was especially true after the1908 revolution 
and its promises of freedom, equality and justice for all citizens, a present danger, from 
the viewpoint of the Şer’i law, that slavery too would fall outside of its jurisdiction.55  
The first wholesale manumission of slaves in the Ottoman Empire took place in 
1909, about three decades after Midhat Pasha’s original suggestion. Overall, in the 
months that followed the counter-revolution and the deposition of Abdülhamid, over two 
hundred enslaved women were reportedly manumitted, 44 of whom were found to have 
no families or relatives. The manumission process applied only to the enslaved servants 
in Yıldız Palace, and was more a product of the unusual circumstances in which 
Abdülhamid II was deposed and his harem dissolved than a specifically aimed or planned 
emancipatory effort.56 Throughout the disturbances during the counter-revolution, which 
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took place between April 13th–24th, 1909, the inmates of Abdülhamid II’s harem, 
according to the witnesses, were left to their own devices, with minimum access even to 
food and water and virtually no connection to the outside world.57 Once the clashes 
between the groups supporting Abdülhamid II and the army ceased and the deposition of 
the Sultan was resolved in Parliament, the inmates of the palace had to face the police, 
the soldiers, the officials of the municipal government, and even a group of deputies from 
the Parliament, who collectively oversaw the dissolution process.58 Associated with the 
old order, the enslaved women were handled less than gently, and the process of the 
dissolution of the palace property was, according to a firsthand witness to the events, 
nothing short of an act of looting.59 Following days of thorough inspection to ensure that 
no valuable items (whether personal belongings or not) left the premises, the enslaved 
women were transferred to Tokapı Palace to be eventually manumitted. The office of 
Şeyhülislam (the chief religious official in the Ottoman Empire who also oversaw the 
religious courts) was asked to start the Şer’i procedure on the matter at once and thereby 
was named the highest authority on the matter. The slaves were to be delivered to their 
families (some of whom had been waiting outside Yıldız Palace for several weeks) but 
only after a proper decision, in accordance with Şer’i provisions, was made.60 A brief 
note sent by the Ministry of Interior to the office of the Grand Vizier shortly after also 
emphasized the necessity of setting up a commission in order to handle the manumission 
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process for the enslaved women. This commission, which was to be composed of 
representatives from the municipal government, the Ministry of Police and the Privy 
Purse was expected to accelerate the process and deliver the women back to their families 
as quickly as possible, but again, not before ensuring the Şer’i aspects of the procedure 
were properly carried out and completed.61 In that sense, the revolutionaries who carried 
out both the constitutional revolution of 1908 and the suppression of the counter-
revolution in 1909 and headed the government were not untouched by what the historian 
William Gervase Clarence-Smith calls “Ottoman conservatism.”62 They achieved their 
aim, “in a breach of the tradition” as Hakan Erdem puts it, not to keep the palace slaves 
enslaved any longer, but only in as much as it was allowed by the Şer’i interpretation on 
the matter, a condition that they would amend, only partially, in October 1909.63 As 
Erdem points out, the revolutionary government also had to conform to the boundaries of 
the Şer’i law and insure that the “recognition of the legal status of slavery meant that 
there could be no wholesale abolition,” but only cases to be individually decided by the 
Şer’i courts.64 
Nourished by this ambiguous environment, claims to freedom and justice, which 
had already begun earlier, abounded. A Circassian man named Musa, who had been 
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forced by an imperial decree to hand over his daughter and niece to a palace officer four 
years prior, demanded the release of the two young women immediately, with the 
conviction that it was now the “age of freedom,” although his relentless efforts for an 
entire month produced no results.65  Among the same group was Kerim, who came to 
Istanbul and had been waiting outside the Yıldız Palace for fifteen days, to “rescue” his 
niece (who, save for him, had no other male relatives) and asked that she be set free 
promptly, “in the name of justice.”66 In a telegram message sent directly to the new 
sultan, three Circassian men demanded, on behalf of all “Circassians present in front of 
Yıldız Palace” that their daughters be freed immediately, a demand they made in the 
name of God and his prophet this time, indicating perhaps that they recognized the 
process of manumission still to be essentially a religious one.67  
The mass manumission also set the example for other slaves from outside the 
place, one of whom demanded his freedom with the conviction that if the Ottoman state 
could manumit six hundred female slaves of the palace, it could easily undo his unlawful 
enslavement, as well.68 In a petition sent to the Ministry of Interior dated January, 1909, a 
group of five Circassian slaves demanded their release from bondage, basing their claim 
on the “sun of freedom which bestowed emancipation on every individual who has ever 
settled in the imperial domains.”69 In another instance, Razdil Kalfa, a manumitted 
Circassian slave (whose name and title indicated her previous position as an enslaved 
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servant of the imperial harem) petitioned the Ministry of Interior Affairs in July, 1909 on 
behalf of her enslaved family, with a clearly stated belief that “under the aegis of the 
blessed constitution” any occurrence of slavery was simply not possible any longer.70 In a 
telegram message sent to the office of Şeyhülislam, also in July 1909, a male Circassian 
slave named Ibrahim (on behalf of himself and other slaves in his district) demanded that, 
at a time when everyone was celebrating together with zeal and joyfulness, “without 
distinguishing one from another by race or religion,” it was people’s representatives’ duty 
in the Parliament, to put an end to trade in people.71 
For the slave owners on the other hand, the “sun of freedom” looked different. 
Objecting to the Ministry of Justice’s announcement of a general ban several months 
earlier, some articulated that such a move on the ministry’s side not only meant the 
approval of a wrongful interpretation of the meaning of freedom, but also violated public 
law provisioned by the constitution, infringed on their personal rights and abrogated the 
religious Şer’i law that sanctioned those rights. After all, their rights to their slaves’ sale, 
purchase, labor (istihdam), and sexual services (istifraş) were legitimate, in accordance 
with Şer’i law. The constitution, which guaranteed both the right to life and property, had 
to protect these rights as well for it to be legitimate. Moreover, there was no definitive 
clause in the constitution that would banish slavery. So, if disobedient behavior did occur 
among the slaves against their owners, it was not because of the constitution itself but 
rather due to misinterpretations (consciously or otherwise) of the law. In a word-for-word 
opposite of the Ministry of Justice’s anti-slavery argument, they claimed that these rights 
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had been passed down from their ancestors and were firmly established by numerous āyāt 
(verses of the Quran) and hadith (deeds and sayings of the prophet Muhammad). If such 
lawful property cannot even be litigated or claimed at the court, they asked, what is the 
use of legal justice or the Şer’i provisions?72 Fatma Leman’s mistress, Hatice Berriye, 
expressed her ownership rights over her fugitive slave in similar terms. For Hatice 
Berriye, her ownership of the slave was a Şer’i principle that could not be abrogated. It 
was the police officers’ (who, Hatice Berriye asserted, “acted in the name of freedom”) 
incompetence, not the mutability of Şer’i law, which caused her to lose a slave and go 
back home empty-handed.73 Moreover, as a group of Circassian chiefs articulated it, the 
slaves’ unruly behavior, supported and often times outright provoked by such 
government officials as the Kayseri district governor, or groups like the Armenian 
Revolutionary Federation (referred to as Taşnaksutyun) was a direct intervention to the 
internal policies of the empire.74 Hence, it was a duty of grave importance for the 
government to punish disobedient slaves and stop those whose motive was to harm the 
Islamic community (ehl-i Islam).75 In sum, slaves, slave owners, and the Ottoman state 
used in their claims the very same language of freedom, equality, and justice, but they 
attributed different meanings to the words that this language embraced. These different 
interpretations helped sharpen both the definition of Circassianness and the content of 
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Circassians’ claims to freedom, equality and justice, now strategically woven together 
with ethnic-national ones, as my last sections shows. 
 
“The Pitiable Daughters of the Pitiable Caucasus Lands” 
The few years that followed the 1908 revolution in the Ottoman Empire brought 
about a social upheaval in which discourses of citizenship were not only used by those 
who claimed rights and liberties in the new political order but mobilized “to enact 
hierarchies, to institute registers of difference along lines of gender and race, ethnicity, or 
marital status.”76 “The promise of emancipation was,” Pamela Scully et al. have argued, 
“to some extent, a gendered one: that is, men were promised the entitlement of 
masculinity, of being head of household,” and women, on the other hand, “were liberated 
into dependence,” most notably through marriage.77 Marriage has always been a common 
promise to emancipation for female slaves in the Ottoman Empire also, particularly for 
palace slaves. A police interrogation with a slave dealer indicates that the term of service 
of an enslaved young girl, which ideally ended with marrying her off (a process known as 
çırağ/çırak çıkmak) by the owner, was part of the bargain that took place in the slave 
procurement or recruitment process. When the above-mentioned dealer tried to convince 
a young girl’s parents to hand their daughter over to her, she described the whole process 
as an 8-year-long contract term, after which their daughter would be married off to “a 
kaymakam or a miralay” (colonel or a lieutenant) and the parents themselves in the 
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meanwhile would get rid of their poverty and misery.78 Marrying off slaves, çırağ 
çıkarmak, was one of the few details, along with death and salary arrangements, deemed 
important to be marked on the harem registers.79 The importance attached to 
çırağlık/çıraklık (that is, the status of being married off, apprenticeship) was primarily 
due, as explored previously in chapter three, to the fact that it almost bore the same 
significance of the marriage of a relative, especially in forming ties between persons or 
households. For one, in her memoirs, Halide Edip Adıvar used the term çıraklı more than 
once, to refer to former slaves that came out of specific households.80 Çırağ/çırak 
çıkarmak did not necessarily involve marriage, as veteran cariyes also could be sent to 
live outside the palace, either in someone else’s household or in a new one set up by the 
owners, but the term and the practice itself applied, more often than not, to younger 
slaves completing their term of service and being emancipated, cementing bonds among 
households, or extending the influence of a household through a larger network, along the 
way. With the reinstitution of the constitutional regime and the coming of “freedom” 
however, the ties between slavery, marriage, çırağlık/çıraklık, freedom, and emancipation 
began assuming a different character and a new level of significance. 
The period that spanned roughly from 1908 until the onset, in 1912, of a series of 
wars that resulted in the collapse of the empire, constituted a moment when the “dynastic 
legitimacy and state sovereignty within clearly defined borders” was abruptly shifting 
towards what Eric D. Weitz called the Paris system, a move from traditional diplomacy 
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“to the handling of entire population groups categorized by ethnicity, nationality, or race, 
or some combination thereof.”81 Despite the ongoing debates on the “ominous trade in 
Circassian girls” and its dangers of undermining the constitutional order, or 
contemporaries’ assertions that the elite households in Istanbul were filled with slaves, 
slavery did not become central to the debates on freedom, equality, constitution or 
citizenship.82 The more immediate and pressing concerns were related, at least at the 
discursive level, almost always to “the awakening of national sentiments” of  “the 
Circassian, the Arab, the Kurd, the Greek, the Armenian.”83 In all slaves’ claims to 
freedom and justice there was an effort to delineate Ottoman citizenship as civic 
citizenship in terms of rights and liberties, which worked against a simultaneous fear that 
such claims would eventually lead to religious or ethnic-based ones. It was on this 
fractured ground also that the defenders of slavery, mainly slave-holding Muslim elites, 
strategically conflated slaves’ claims to freedom and equality with an attack on Islamic 
order itself. For their turn, opponents of slavery did not shun strategic usage of ethnic-
national designations either, occasionally turning slaves’ claims to freedom, justice and 
equality into a corporate claim to Circassian emancipation. This is not to say that it was 
the abolitionists, Circassian intellectuals, or slaves themselves who invented this 
particular ethnic designation. On the contrary, as the earlier chapters tried to demonstrate, 
Circassianness as a term that denoted a variety of Caucasian ethno-linguistic groups was 
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a mere construction, at times even used to legitimize destitute people’s entry to slavery. 
Nevertheless, despite its fictive character, it was a category used to determine 
enslavability. In fact, a report issued by the Council of State (Şura-yı Devlet) in 1912 
stated that in the parlance of Şer’i law, there was no such thing as a non-Circassian slave, 
since all other ethnic groups were considered inalienable, hence indicating that, in view 
of slavery, Circassianness was not only an existing category but also an exclusive one.84 
What happened in the aftermath of the revolution, through the abolitionists’ or Circassian 
intellectuals’ claims was that the existing and exclusive category of Circassianness 
became attached to an ethnic-national identity and pride, which described itself, among 
other things, through the chastity of its women. 
“A great number of young girls,” an article that appeared in the women’s 
magazine Kadın (Woman) in early 1909 stated, “who are the hearts of the motherland, 
hope of the society, and sisters of free and thinking humanity: they are enslaved and 
helpless.”85  
These are so neglected and thought unworthy of attention and investigation 
... Ah my poor sisters, who have neither a mother nor a family, who have no 
one! What a deep animosity, resentment and anger I feel towards those of 
your fellow sisters, who do not bother to consider, even for a fraction of a 
moment, to defend, take back and grant you your civil/personal freedom. 
Here I am, having been waiting and aching, becoming more and more grief 
stricken every day in the past six months  [...] Recently, when the Ministry 
of Justice [whose name and the vastness of its meaning, as well as the 
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expansiveness of the area of its activities, admittedly caused perplexity for 
the author] announced through a circular, the abolition of trade in slaves, I 
gave much thought about those who remained as slaves, whether or not they 
too deserved a decision in favor of freedom, whether undoing their fetters 
would suit the time and place we are living in [...] How could I not think 
about it, how could I not make a legal comparison? We, thirty million 
Ottomans acting as one, have been thinking, trying to procure and recover 
one and only one thing: with all its meanings, inclusiveness and 
comprehension: Freedom!86 
 
It was a grave contradiction, for the author of the article too, to talk about freedom, when 
the number of enslaved women (made into “cold and lifeless decorations of the palaces” 
as the article described them) exceeded thousands. That these enslaved women were 
exploited as mere ornaments was unacceptable to the consciousness of the free Ottomans, 
for they were chaste and virtuous Circassian orphans, who deserved, as much as anyone 
else in the empire, to become free and happy mothers whose sons “would shine like the 
sun in the Ottoman cities, and like clusters of stars in its periphery.”87  
Not thousands but even hundred sons... Do you not know that Ottomans 
unleashed utmost fear and terror in Rumelia by no more than forty men? 
Perhaps your elders would remember, in grief-stricken Caucasus lands, 
when our forefathers raided over the peaks and hills like thunder unto the 
enemy their numbers did not count that many either. [...]  
Leave slavery aside; in those pompous rooms you are confined and dragged 
along, what do they teach you on humanity? Instead of womanly honor and 
personal dignity, [they teach you] slavery and servility [...]  In a great nation 
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[like ours], who is free and esteems freedom above life, how can we allow 
thousands of individuals, especially women to be enslaved and confined? 
 
The “pitiable daughters of the pitiable Caucasus lands” had the right to claim their 
freedom too, and the ongoing formulations would have to take shape everywhere: the 
Ottoman parliament, the public, as well as the recently founded Çerkes İttihad ve Teavün 
Cemiyeti (Circassian Unity and Mutual Aid Society),88 the latter already having been a 
claimant in numerous petitions and other correspondences made with the Ottoman 
government on behalf of Circassian slaves.  
Hakan Erdem has argued that, besides the old motive of the wholesale 
manumission of the palace slaves and setting an example for the remainder of the society, 
the constitutional regime also had the aim of winning the “goodwill of the Circassians at 
least some of whom had come to loathe the employment of their kin as slaves in the 
increasingly Western-oriented atmosphere of the early twentieth century.”89 Even when 
Deli Fuat Pasha, a prominent Circassian statesman (and president of the above mentioned 
Circassian Mutual Aid Society) had reservations on the issue of abolition “on the ground 
that the Circassian girls would be worse off,” Erdem has argued, other Circassian men of 
influence mostly asserted that “this was a matter of national pride and, as such, should be 
pushed ahead.”90 Mehmed Fetgeri Şuenu, a Circassian intellectual and the co-founder of 
the Circassian Mutual Aid Society asserted that Circassians were a people with a glorious 
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past, weakened over time by a twist of fate and since then they have come to be known as 
the “wretched people, dealers in young girls, who go as far as bringing up their own 
daughters to quench the lustful desires of lascivious masters”91:  
Africa’s negroes, America’s ‘peaux-rouges’ [‘redskins’], Caucasus’s 
miserable girls; they were all subjected, from time to time, to this greedy 
madness of humanity... By means of the civil law promulgated by the 
West[ern states] ‘peaux-rouges’ obtained—even though partial—their 
freedom; those negro lalas [high-ranking manservants of the palace] and 
eunuchs from the Sudan and Abyssinia who were deprived of their manhood 
for this contemptible grandeur... Even they rid themselves off of slavery. 
But the misfortunate children of the Caucasus still carry the burden of this 
shameful trade [...] The same way the lazy majesty of the East had objected 
to abolition of black slaves when it became obvious that he would lose the 
means to his grandeur, he is now resisting the loss of his white slaves from 
the Caucasus... Because they are his means to satisfy his despicable lust.92  
 
Circassian intellectuals made slavery, particularly women’s slavery, their focus, as they 
tried to formulate ways of doing away with what they called the “blemish” on the 
Circassian “nation,” prevent the “gates of hate and hostility” ever to open and cause strife 
between the Turks and the Circassians, and along the way, rethink, reformulate, and 
reconcile ways of being Ottoman and Circassian at once.93 For some, this issue also had a 
personal dimension. Mehmet Fetgeri Şuenu, for example, noted the memory of  his 
mother’s pain and misery when his sister was taken away to become an enslaved palace 
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servant. In Şuenu’s highly romantic depiction, his mother exclaimed: “there, your sister, 
in that dungeon called the palace, weeping and moaning, in front of a stranger’s hearth,” 
and supposedly urged Şuenu to work hard to put an end to this matter in which “the 
[Circassian] ‘nation’s life and womanhood was subjected to satisfy the desires of lustful 
and immoral people.” 
At the time Mehmed Fetgeri Şuenu wrote his book on Circassian women, the trade in 
Circassian slaves (“theft and sale of the Circassian girls and presenting them [as gifts] to 
others” as Şuenu described it) still continued in an unofficial, semi-secretive way. 
Mingled with these claims to national honor, however, there was again the pronounced 
complexity of the ongoing slave trade with the “July 10 Constitution” (as Şuenu called 
the 1908 revolution) and the European Civil Law that went into effect before it.94 At a 
time when even animal rights were protected, Şuenu argued, the current status of 
Circassian slaves, by law, was compliant neither with “sublimely distinctive religion of 
Islam” nor the spirit of the Constitution.95 This pronounced contradiction, backed up by 
claims to national honor and occasionally by more encompassing debates on class,96 
shaped and determined the ways in which the Circassian intellectuals and the Circassian 
Society they founded constructed their claims to freedom, justice, equality and 
citizenship on behalf of Circassian slaves.  
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One among many similar organizations that emerged in the immediate aftermath 
of the revolution, the Circassian Mutual Aid Society was founded in early November 
1908 and served as a hub, providing support and information to both slaves and slave 
families on legal procedures, composing and following up on petitions and other official 
correspondence as well as discussing the matter publicly, especially after the Society’s 
journal Gûâze, began publishing in April 1911.97 With a clear aim to navigate the 
bifurcated legal system and efforts to reconcile slaves’ and slave owners’ demands, who 
at times inextricably referred to the same article in the constitution for their respective 
rights and claims,98 they repeatedly stressed the indispensability of government action on 
the matter and demanded, through a number of petitions and other official 
correspondence that slavery be abolished and prohibited by law once and for all.99  
While the Circassian Society’s involvement and efforts in resolving the issue of 
slavery started early on, a clear formulation of their claims and demands began taking 
shape only later. In a tangible manner, the Society formulated its demands in a petition 
that it sent to the Ayan Meclisi in February 1910. These demands were elucidated in a list 
of six items, the first of which, in an inclusive way, demanded from the Ottoman 
administration that it announce once and for all, the practice of slavery was abolished and 
prohibited by law. Reviving an earlier debate, the society also suggested the 
implementation and encouragement of mükatebe (self-purchase) as a means to abolition. 
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Yet, since the great majority of these enslaved men and women were devoid of any 
personal wealth, it insisted that the state should determine a set amount and consider 
lending money to the slaves, to facilitate their emancipation, cutting their ties to their 
owners at once.100 
In the following months, the society made several similar attempts, some of which 
were discussed in the journal Ğûâze. In fact, the article “Against Slavery” in the first 
issue of the journal was rather a summary of the society’s efforts in the preceding 
months. Providing an overview of the events in the aftermath of the revolution, the article 
stated that, following the reinstatement of the constitution and the rights and liberties of 
the Ottoman public were restored, there emerged two separate points of view among 
Circassian intellectuals. First of these was a belief that these right and liberties would 
extend to Circassian slaves, abolishing slavery among their ranks unconditionally. The 
second view argued that the constitution could be no more than a motive to abolish 
Circassian slavery, which was sustained by the slave classes within Circassian 
community and the Şer’i law that sanctioned it. As the current situation confirmed, the 
Society argued, without resolving this complex system of slavery, which exploited two 
distinct systems at once, slavery could not be abolished in the Ottoman domains. 
The society submitted its first petition both to the government and the Parliament, 
requesting the method of self-purchase to be promoted by the Ottoman state and that the 
self-purchase amount be paid by the state treasury, demanding a corresponding bill that 
would also banish the sale and purchase of individuals, to prevent unlawful enslavement 
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of, often too vulnerable, manumitted slaves.101 These demands were reiterated by the 
society numerous times in the years that followed the revolution, only to be disregarded 
by the government. Occasional responses from the office of the Şeyhülislam, which, with 
opaque language, repeated that the basic principle in the lands of Islam was not slavery 
but freedom, yet maintained that the approval of enslavement by Şer’i law could still 
apply, if special [religious, yet undisclosed] conditions were met by the owners.102 Not 
content with what they called the “dubious results” of their attempts, the Society 
“regrettably confessed” that they were not sure if their voice was even heard by the 
Ottoman government. “Not only are we not able to have our voice heard” the article 
further asserted “but we are not even able to tell from our correspondences, nor from the 
reports drawn up by different state institutions, nor the imperial decree or the bill, in what 
mind the government is, in regards to abolishing slavery, hence we are forced to halt in 
utter astonishment in our expectations of action against it.”103 
That slavery was “prohibited by law and the prohibition was confirmed by the 
constitution,” as the bill stated, was already known to everyone, the article maintained, 
asking “who would argue that the sanction of enslavement is not subject to special 
conditions and regulations? For the society, the Ottoman state agreed to abolish 
Circassian slavery, but this was so only in appearance. Had this been not the case, why 
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would they weaken the very law they promulgated, by adding a Şeri clause confirming 
the owners	 right to bring legal charges against suspected slaves.104 
While in a free country, bringing legal charges against the members of a free 
people, whose freedom has been proven, could be assumed to imply and result in 
freedom, the society expected the Ottoman state to have more lucidity and 
precision on such crucial matters as personal rights and liberties. 
What we demanded [from the Ottoman state] was a clarification of the 
procedures, of what comes after a so and so court decision. Let’s say the court 
came to a decision in favor of freedom... Then, what comes next, what should be 
done, we wonder. The government did not provide the method or points [of 
clarification] that we demanded. Let’s assume that in Aziziye the şeri’ court 
upheld the sanction on someone’s slave status, would that person maintain his or 
her status as slave? That is, would he or she remain as a slave or not? We have 
been trying to secure [the conditions] that they would not remain as such.105 
 
Baffled but unyielding, the society took up the issue of slavery once again in the 
second issue of Ğûâze, this time pointing at a different aspect of it. A letter received from 
above mentioned Aziziye district (one of the largest Circassian settlements in the 
country) of Sivas province, written by a certain Dumanişzade Mahmud, informed the 
society about the crisis escalating in the region and warned about the danger of a possible 
mutiny among the slaves against their masters.106 In fact such news of an anticipated 
mutiny was already in circulation much earlier. In a note sent from the Ottoman 
parliament to the Ministry of Interior on 25 Kanunusani 1324 (7 February 1909), several 
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Circassian slave owners, certain Bekir and Mehmed Arif and their six colleagues, were 
said to have sent a telegram to the Parliament to warn about an unrest, which might be 
caused by the slaves. The telegram (a copy of which was attached to the correspondence) 
stated that even though their ownership of their slaves and cariyes were legitimated 
firmly and indisputably by various verses from the Koran, prophet’s deeds, as well as a 
fetva given by the office of the Şeyhülislam and an imperial decree, the slaves, who were 
reportedly encouraged by a recent declaration by the Ministry of Justice in regards to a 
ban on slave trade, began claiming their freedom. The telegram requested that it be 
known by the Ottoman parliament, that these slaves were “capable of villainy” and in 
complete disobedience, they already began obtaining arms. Hence, the article concluded, 
it was them who should be held responsible for any bloodshed that might occur.107 
Written almost about two years later, the article in Ğûâze talked about the same danger, 
yet it held the Ottoman government responsible for it, for not taking necessary 
precautions on the matter, not acting in both party	s interest and thus causing them (slaves 
and their owners) to form two opposing groups, and not to make a legal arrangement to 
mitigate the increasing tension, which the article maintained, could be done only by the 
government.108 
The Society continued with its claims and abolitionary efforts throughout the 
subsequent year, most of which continued to be discussed in Ğûâze. An article that 
appeared several issues later, it was noted that the society submitted another petition, yet 
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failed to obtain any tangible results.109 The Parliament had reportedly decided that the 
slaves in the Aziziye and Canik districts were to be settled outside their masters’ estates, 
with the financial support from the Ottoman state,110 a development the society found 
insufficient, as they believed the core of the problem laid elsewhere. Several weeks later, 
the journal published an article dispatched from Aziziye, which highlighted the general 
negligence of the press (with the exception of Ğûâze) about the issue of slavery, despite 
the fact that the crisis was going through a critical phase at the moment, in which new 
occurrences of violence were taking place. In the preceding weeks, as a consequence of a 
rather perplexing measure taken by the Ottoman state (namely conscription from among 
the enslaved), reportedly a fight broke out between a group of slaves and their owners, 
leaving one slave dead and six others injured.111 Under these circumstances, the article 
argued, the slackness of the press, which ought to be the “interpreter of the thoughts and 
opinions of the peoples, defender of the rights, facts, and truths” was inexplicable, in the 
face of slavery, which was a threat to personal freedom and even a danger for the 
Constitution.112 
Contrary to what the Society has been pushing for until then, however, the article 
argued that among Circassians, there were no legitimate (meşru’) slaves, ‘abd, that 
complied with the status of slavery as delineated by Şer’i law. After all, the practice of 
slavery and methods of enslavement among Circassians were historical developments 
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different than what Şer’i law recognized, and largely endemic to the Caucasus.113 Thus, 
setting the Şer’i law as the barrier to abolition and causing this tension between the slaves 
and their owners, the Ottoman state was responsible for the escalation of crisis. 
Moreover, the “illustrious” Şer’i law was discredited by such actions as well. “What 
precautions the government is considering to take against these saddening events, we do 
not know,” the article concluded, “what is certain is that the Ottoman government is not 
taking the matter seriously, giving the due importance that it deserves [...] if a solution is 
delayed any further, regrettable events are likely to reoccur.” From the viewpoint of the 
society, the Ottoman government acted only on paper, as if it was merely expressing a 
wish.114 A year later in 1912, the government finally consented to pass a bill in regards to 
self-purchase, yet declined to pay the purchase amount from the state treasury.115 
Consequently, the following year, an official communiqué written by the Ministry of 
Interior proposed that the Bank of Agriculture provide the credit for slaves for their self-
purchase (the amount to be determined by the Ottoman government), on 10–15 year 
terms, which turned abolition’s on-paper existence, after almost a four-year struggle on 
the slaves’ side, to a practical reality, although freedom, equality, and justice presumably 
came to the slaves in the form of a bank loan and debt.116 
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That the issue of abolition met such setbacks in the Ottoman Empire was due to 
several different factors that comprised, as discussed above, contradictory meanings 
attributed to the words freedom, equality, and justice, the complexities of the bifurcated 
legal system, as well as the new regime’s corporate notion of citizenship. However, 
neither the new government’s particular interpretation of freedom and equality, nor its 
unwilling, or at best deliberative stance against abrogating Şer’i law, help to explain the 
general negligence of the deputies in the Parliament when debating the issues of slavery 
and freedom. To go back to the above-mentioned debate that took place in the Ottoman 
parliament in June 1909, when Yorgo Boşo Efendi suggested with a formal proposal that 
the Ottoman constitution, like its European equivalents, should include an item that 
would ban the sale and purchase of individuals, Seyyit Bey found it improper and 
unnecessary on the basis that Mecelle already prohibited the sale of persons, making it 
illicit and unlawful.117 Likewise, Mehmet Tevfik Efendi from Kengırı, Salim Efendi from 
Konya, also in support of Seyyit Bey, argued that all Ottomans were already in full 
possession of their freedom, and any violation to that effect was punishable by law, as 
indicated in Mecelle.118 For Manastır, Ankara, and Istanbul deputies Trayan Nali, Mahir 
Sait, and Kozmidi Efendis, however, this was an issue of grave importance, to be 
regulated directly by the constitution itself, rather than by penal or ordinary law, for even 
though such clauses had existed in Mecelle for a long time, the sale and purchase of 
slaves, “such as Circassian girls,” Trayan Nali Efendi specified, continued in the 
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mansions of the ministers as well as the palace, all this time. Thus, Kozmidi Efendi 
argued, it was necessary to tie this to a more encompassing law, which would apply even 
to the Sultan himself. In the end, Yorgo Boşo Efendi’s proposal met more objection than 
support and was eventually rejected by the majority of the parliamentarians, most of 
whom believed that slavery no longer existed in the Ottoman Empire, and if did, it was 
merely due to a violation of the penal and Şer’i law. Even when Kigem, Muradyan 
Hamparsum and Vartkes Efendis tried to demonstrate that there were occurrences of sale 
and purchase of Armenian peasants in the Eastern Provinces, they were rebuked on the 
basis that such practices remained in the old regime, and did not exist in the age of 
freedom and constitution.119 
Scholars of constitutionalism have argued in the case of the United States that 
those who said they were acting in the name of all Americans “formally consulted 
propertyless white men only rarely and consulted neither black men nor any women, 
whatever their race or class.”120 In the Ottoman Empire too, the emancipation of the 
“subordinate elements of [Ottoman] society,” was deemed “unnatural,” and to be 
“upsetting the moral order” of the society.121 Hence, the emancipation efforts after the 
revolution produced two different layers of results: in the first layer were the truly 
vulnerable women, who lacked financial means, or family and kin support like Fatma 
Leman. She did not claim her Circassianness or seek help from the Circassian Society, 
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and could still be sold as a concubine after the revolution. In the second layer were those 
who received recognition and support, and who had partial rights as “free and happy 
mothers” but in a loophole, insofar as they were Circassian women. 
When Mehmet Fetgeri Şuenu reported about the persistence of sale and purchase 
of Circassian slaves in 1914, he attributed it to the rich men’s, the elites’ fancy of slave 
women, and their belief that they could not live without them.122 “Just like the slavers of 
the old days” Şuenu asserted, “many a butcher and monster, who took up slaving as their 
profession, are still making profit out of it.”123 Merely a year later after Şuenu’s assertion, 
following the Armenian genocide, there emerged a new source of poor, orphaned, 
alienable girls who were appropriated as slaves with ease. The movement for their rescue, 
according to Keith Watenpaugh, sheds light “on the degree to which Ottoman reform 
efforts of the previous century, which incorporated the extension of rights of equality and 
emancipation as part of a larger modernization schema, had taken root within Ottoman 
society and could withstand the multiple and existential crises and widespread social and 
economic dislocation of the war years.”124 What humanitarian efforts found in the post-
1915 Ottoman Empire was not only the decades-long ethnic strife between the Turks, 
Kurds, Circassians, and Armenians that chronically surfaced with catastrophic 
consequences in 1895, later in 1909 and finally in 1915, nor the war. They also found a 
long-standing practice of slavery, perpetuated, in ways discussed above, by the duality of 
the legal system that regulated it; the laxness, negligence, or sometimes outright denial by 
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the constitutional regime in taking measures against it; and by the “magic but elusive” 
nature of the word freedom.125  
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Chapter 5.   
The Relics of an Unwanted Ottoman Past 
 
 
 The March 1924 issue of the journal Resimli Ay1 came with what would have 
been a scandalous headline a decade earlier. Hinting at a shift in the significance of the 
imperial harem as a political institution, the article stated, quite bluntly, that the “imperial 
harem had been a source of prostitution and disgrace, which hid thousands of enslaved 
young women in its bosom.” Corresponding with the abolition of the caliphate and the 
exile of the Ottoman dynasty, the article drew parallels between the extravagant life led 
by the Ottoman sultans, their families, and no less, their concubines on the one hand and 
the poverty and misery of the Turkish peasants who had to pay for all of that 
extravagance with their taxes on the other. “Until the people came to this final decision 
[of exiling the Ottoman dynasty]” the article stated, “the palace housed 1500 cariyes and 
150 eunuchs,” all of whom were employed to sustain the decadent lifestyle of the royal 
family. “Today’s distresses and disasters” it further exclaimed, “are the fruits of 
yesterday’s excesses.”2 Described in the style of a fairy tale, these excesses included 
items of clothing, jewelry, or food served on golden plates, as well as lavish orgies that 
took place in lush palace gardens, “ornamented with jasmines, honeysuckles, and flowers 
of every color.” Appearing ambiguously both as subjects and objects of this 
                                                
1 Resimli Ay Mecmuası, Sayı:2, Cilt:1, Mart 1340 (March 1924). Edited by two of the most 
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2 Ibid., 20. 
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extravagance, enslaved concubines figured prominently in all these depictions. “In 
avenues that lay between flowerbeds,” one description went, “the cariyes lined up, all 
naked, resembling white lilies” and continued, in a highly Orientalized tone as follows: 
Both [the princes and the cariyes] would then begin bustling and rushing about 
under the sweet and dreamy light emanating from the lanterns that hanged down 
from the green branches [...] Reared up with lust, the princes would race after the 
girls they sought after, with a burning desire to reach them, to clutch their arms 
around their slender waists, to push their lips against their burning lips. Finally, 
once they seized their prey, they would vanish into the dark corners of the garden, 
trampling the flowerbeds, knocking down silver trays left over from the feast 
[earlier in the evening].3  
 
In addition to these lavish orgiastic ceremonies, there were what Resimli Ay called “pool 
orgies” in which the senior stewardesses of the palace would take a number of these 
young women to the pool and prepare them for the sultan, by stripping them naked, 
clothing them only with a piece of silk wrap. Then the sultan would come, place himself 
on his throne in the garden and entertain himself watching the girls bathe, who giggled 
with occasional coquettish screams.4 This tradition too, the article noted, continued until 
the very last of the Ottoman sultans, who customarily gathered beautiful girls in their 
harems to “quench their lustful appetite, keeping over a thousand of them to this day”5  
 
Neither the court nor its disgraces have been fully erased yet. The dynasty is no 
more. The sultans, who blotted and stained our history with blood have now 
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become history themselves. However, they left behind a burdensome inheritance 
for the people: the palace and the palace inmates. The sultanate had been toppled 
over, but the palace remains. The sultans all passed on and away but the palace 
inmates stayed. [...] A palace in the republican order, how could such a 
contradiction be allowed?6  
 
About a decade and a half earlier, following the constitutional revolution of 1908, 
the imperial harem began to be referred to as merely an outdated institution and its 
inmates as victims, but it was still dealt with as a legitimate institution. When the 
constitutional government tried to redefine its administrative and legal institutions in the 
aftermath of the revolution, especially following the dethronement of Abdülhamid II in 
1909, it employed brutal means when handling the palace property and its harem inmates, 
particularly those in Yıldız Palace, but it did so strictly on the basis of politics, as it 
viewed both the institution and its inmates as political actors, associated with the old 
regime.7 What was new with this new conception, which the Resimli Ay article 
exemplified, was not only that it implied those particular sorts of brutal means; violent 
storming of the palace premises by the republican army or the police, appropriation and 
confiscation of royal property “by the people and for the use of the people.” It also 
pointed at an effort to disengage the palace in general and the imperial harems in 
particular, from the political milieu they had so long been a part of. An institution that 
had traditionally been a hub where long-lasting patronage relationships (with great 
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political implications) were cemented8 was now depicted as a setting for a One Thousand 
and One Nights-style fairy tale, in which women appeared only as highly sexualized 
objects; as “white lilies,” “pleasure fairies,” or “white winged angels” who flew here and 
there in the “heavenly garden” of the imperial harem, whose delicate and fragile bodies 
were no more than vulnerable targets to the sultans’ lecherous advances, or the princes’ 
sexual assaults.9  
Irvin Cemil Schick argues that the use of sexual imagery, particularly of sexual 
violence, as a political metaphor, “performed double duty” and helped in reproducing 
gender roles.10 This held for the Turkish Republic as well, where one of its leading 
intellectual journals highlighted sexuality and sexual excesses as the essence of the 
imperial order and its relics, such as palace slavery, to channel the public opinion of its 
readers in favor of the republican measures taken against the Ottoman dynasty. At the 
same time, this depiction also helped “objectifying women and portraying them as natural 
objects of appropriation and targets of violation,” and for the case at hand, exploitation.11 
Bringing forth the sexual content effectively helped demonize an enemy, namely “an 
unwanted past,” that was marked with, as Lerna Ekmekcioglu argued, “heterogeneity, 
outside intervention, and European chastisement of Ottoman Turks for Islamic 
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backwardness, even barbarity.”12 Resimli Ay was surely aware that only a small number 
of enslaved palace servants served, in their expression, to the “lecheries of the sultan and 
his sons.” The great many that constituted this “burdensome inheritance” were low-
ranking enslaved servants who were, as was partially explored in the previous chapter, 
left to their own devices after the exile of the Ottoman family.13 They were stripped of 
what they deemed to be their personal property and faced poverty, survival marriages, 
forced relocations that ended, in some cases, with suicide. Moreover, there were other 
slaves in this inheritance too, manumitted before the inauguration of the republic, who 
had been on the imperial payroll since then.14 By the same token, there was the legal 
status of slavery, as well as other legal “laxities,” such as polygamy, that went with it. 
The republican order had to come to terms with its own “twin relics,” retrospectively 
condemned as backwardness if not barbarism that came directly from its immediate 
past.15   
                                                
12 Lerna Ekmekcioglu, “Republic of Paradox: The League of Nations Minority Protection Regime 
and the New Turkey’s Step-Citizens,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, vol. 46, no.4, 
Special Issue: World War I (November 2014), 660. Ekmekcioglu here draws parallels between 
the republican regime’s policies towards the non-Muslim minorities and their measures against 
the Ottoman dynasty, arguing that the latter was easier to execute by simply exiling all members 
of the Ottoman family. As this chapter aims to demonstrate, getting rid of the “burdensome 
inheritance” of the Ancien Régime was not an easy process either and necessitated the deployment 
of similar narrative strategies that Ekmekcioglu mentions. 
13 See for instance Başbakanlık Republican Archives (BCA) 30.18.1.1 14.39.7, 132–23 (1925) for 
a note on 30 enslaved men and women expelled from the palace, now employed as servants in 
various institutions. Other contemporaries noted that many of the enslaved women both from the 
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Ottoman state almshouse, Darülaceze. In a later example, two eunuchs named Zülkefil and Said, 
expelled from the Yıldız Palace in 1909, had been reportedly living in a shanty house since then. 
“Yıldız Sarayından Kısıklıda gecekonduya,” Cumhuriyet, January 28, 1952. 
14 For an example, see parliamentary minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey (Türkiye 
Büyük Millet Meclisi Zabıt Ceridesi, TBMMZC henceforth), 25.2.1340 (1924), 345. 
15 See “Medeni Kanun: Tarihi 17 seneyi bulan büyük içtimai inkılabın kıymeti,” in Cumhuriyet, 
February 17, 1940 for a note on these “twin relics” of backwardness. 



































































Last but not least, there was the long line of women as political actors, who did 
not have an easy place in the republican political order that was now claimed by a group 
of men who called themselves, above all, “comrades in arms.” Just as everything else in 
relation with the Ottoman polity changed, the significance of these women’s political 
participation also had to change. This chapter explores, first and foremost, the 
“republicanization” of the imperial harems, and what the successive constitutional and 
republican orders and its takeover meant particularly to the palace inmates and their 
material world in the Ottoman Empire. As has already been discussed in the previous 
chapters, the palace slaves constituted only a small portion of the slaves in the empire. 
However, not only was there a sizeable industry attached to this small group of people 
but also the enslaved women themselves were closely and intimately tied to the larger 
political realm, as explored particularly in the third chapter. Moreover, their emancipation 
was deemed to have set the example for the rest of the enslaved population of the 
Ottoman Empire. Especially in the aftermath of the 1908 revolution, agricultural slaves in 
the provinces made specific references to the mass manumission of Abdülhamid II’s 
cariyes, when they made their own claims to “freedom, equality, and justice.”16 In that 
sense, the palace slaves and the imperial harem embodied the “twin relics” of the 
unwanted Ottoman past. In this specific context, this chapter follows how the republican 
“project of regulated amnesia,”17 dealt with the physical disposal of items found in the 
palaces and imperial harems, along with ideas and discourses attached to them. In that, it 
aims to trace the ways in which the mode of women’s political participation changed in 
                                                
16 See Chapter 4, for a discussion on this matter. 
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the republican order, which now belonged almost entirely to the veterans of the National 
Resistance.18 
The past three chapters explored, from different perspectives, the ways in which 
slavery confronted the new governmental order that was taking shape in the Ottoman 
domains from the mid-nineteenth century on. In these chapters, I argued that the Ottoman 
government, which pledged to safeguard equality for all of its citizen-subjects before the 
law, especially after the 1856 Reform Edict, found itself increasingly more entangled 
with the problem of slavery and freedom in both domestic and international contexts. To 
invoke Dylan Penningroth’s observation once again, the “jostling assumptions and 
interests” of such intellectual groups as the Young Ottomans (or statesmen like Midhat 
Pasha)19 “often opened up space for ordinary people, and even slaves, to seize on legal 
institutions to pursue their interest.”20 In that the above-mentioned entanglement took 
place in a widespread manner within the (trans)forming legal realm, rendering the debate 
on slavery and freedom an indispensable part of the eventual, however delayed, reform in 
civil law (particularly, family law). The amendment process began in 1917 but then was 
interrupted by World War I and the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, followed by the 
                                                
18 Ekmekcioglu, “Republic of Paradox,” 662. 
19 For a comprehensive discussion on how slavery and freedom were understood by the Ottoman 
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National Resistance. Nevertheless, when the matter was eventually taken up again in 
1926 with the enactment of a new, comprehensive civil law, slavery as an institution or 
practice in and of itself was virtually nonexistent in the parliamentary debates. Rather, it 
appeared as an unidentified segment of a larger problem of law, expressed both in terms 
of the inadequacies of codification efforts pertaining to the Şer’i law and the conflicts that 
were concomitant with the bifurcated nature of the Ottoman legal order. Slavery did not 
appear in parliamentary debates until June 5, 1933. When it was brought up, it was 
treated as an international problem, rather than an intrinsic issue that resulted from the 
social, cultural, and legal peculiarities of the Ottoman practice. This chapter also aims to 
provide an overview of this legal (trans)formation that took place between the years of  
1917 and 1933, and explore the ways in which the state-citizen relations changed within 
this process, offering a glimpse of how the Ottoman “relics” were dealt with within the 
legal realm.  
 
The Problem of Slaves as Imperial Property 
The debates on the ownership of imperial property and its public and private 
character first emerged in 1909, with the dissolution of Yıldız Palace in general, and 
Abdülhamid II’s personal wealth and his harem, in particular. Both the removal of the 
harem inmates and the assessment of the harem’s content were overseen by a 
commission, which was drawn up by the newly established parliament and comprised of 
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representatives from different government institutions.21 Starting from May 1st, 1909, the 
handling of palace property was discussed at the parliament over a number of long 
sessions during which a small group of deputies suggested the formation of the above-
mentioned committee to supervise inspections that had been implemented by the local 
government.22 The debates following this suggestion partly dealt with, not unlike the 
parallel debates on the manumission of the enslaved harem servants at the time, 
determining the institutions responsible for or legally entitled to carry out the process. For 
instance, Sinop deputy Hasan Fehmi Efendi suggested that the matter could not be left to 
Municipal Government (Şehremaneti), as the primary responsible institution in the 
process had to be the Treasury or the Ministry of Finance.23 Nafi Pasha from Aleppo 
suggested that since palace property was considered beyt-ül mal,24 its inspection was also 
a Şer’i matter, to be supervised by the office of the Şeyhülislam (chief religious official in 
the Ottoman Empire, one that overlooked the Islamic Şer’i courts, as well). Hiristo Dalçef 
Efendi from Siroz (Sérres in today’s Greece) pointed out that this inspection and 
confiscation could not be left to the municipal government alone, as the wealth of Yıldız 
Palace did not belong only to Istanbul, but to the entire country. Zohrab Efendi, from 
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documents reportedly comprised the mayor of Istanbul, two members from the Municipal 
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22 MMZC, 18 Nisan 1325 (1 May 1909), 139–141. 
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Istanbul, stated that what was subject to inspection and takeover was not solely the 
wealth in Yıldız Palace, but also documents, particularly informant records known as 
jurnals, collected there in the previous three decades, that concerned specifically such 
political actors as themselves. For Antalya deputy Ebüzziya Tevfik Bey, the Ottoman law 
commended that all this wealth and documents were to be transferred to the new sultan, 
and no government institution was entitled to inspect or confiscate them.25 Similar to (and 
in fact, indicative of) the debates on the manumission of the harem inmates, neither the 
legislature nor the executive branch of the government had a clear idea on the procedure 
as to how the palace property would be handled, and more than one legal and 
administrative body were deemed entitled to supervise this process. In the meantime, 
however, the Third Army Corps had reportedly removed all the cash and some of the 
valuable items from Yıldız Palace and secured them in the vaults at their headquarters.26 
The critical questions came when the sorting out began. What exactly was subject 
to proposed (and subsequently carried out) inspection and confiscation? Was it only 
Sultan Abdülhamid’s personal wealth and if so, where did his person end? Did his wealth 
include his extended family’s also?27 Were palace slaves to be considered part of the 
                                                
25 MMZC, 18 Nisan 1325 (1 May 1909), 139–141; Also see MMZC, 3 Mayıs 1325 (16 May 
1909), 415–417, for Menteşe deputy Halil Bey’s proposal for close guarding of the informant 
reports (jurnal) found in Yıldız Palace, accumulated over 33 years. During the course of long 
debates, there were other deputies who stated that every object within the palace premises had a 
monumental value and suggested that Yıldız Palace be turned into a museum to be entitled 
Museum of Ottoman History (Târîhi Osmânî müzehanesi). See, for example, Sivas deputy 
Nazaret Dagavaryan’s proposal in MMZC, 23 Mayıs 1325 (5 June 1909), 144 and Arif İsmet 
Bey’s related concerns in MMZC, 16 Haziran 1325 (29 June 1909), 76. For a debate on the 
extraordinary case of Hareket Ordusu, see MMZC, 24 Haziran 1325 (7 July 1909), 215–216. 
26 MMZC, 19 Nisan 1325 (2 May 1909), 148–149; MMZC, 28 Mayıs 1325 (10 June 1909), 293. 
27 MMZC, 21 Nisan 1325 (4 May 1909), 206–210. The parliament debated the necessity of a 
restrictive order, particularly in relation to bank accounts of all members of the Ottoman dynasty. 
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Ottoman dynasty by association or were they considered property? When it came to the 
physical removal of the harem inmates from Yıldız Palace, questions pertaining to the 
property rights of the enslaved inmates also came to the fore. Consequently, the palace 
inmates themselves were determined to be persons rather than property, and their 
manumission, which began soon after their removal from Yıldız Palace, was finalized 
after a long and, for the most part, ambiguous process, as explored in the previous 
chapter.28 Nevertheless, because of their association with the old regime, their belongings 
could not be sorted out that easily. As the archival sources, parliamentary records, and 
particularly memoirs indicate, strict inspection was in order during the assessment 
process, which Leyla Açba described as follows:  
On Wednesday, 28th of April [1909], the ravenous rebels, who decided to remove 
all inmates and officials from the palace, were letting the women out only after a 
strict inspection. They did not let the palace women to take even a small purse with 
them. They gathered all of us in the Küçük Mabeyn [one of the offices used by the 
palace secretariat] [...] In the meanwhile, the wives of police officers were brought 
in [to assist with further inspection]. They took groups of five women into a room, 
where they checked them to their underwear, to make sure that they were not 
hiding jewelry or other valuable items under their clothes.29 
                                                                                                                                            
The same session also hosted a debate on legal means to effect any confiscation, deciding 
consequently looking into the international law and practices on the matter, 209. Also see 
MMZC, 25 Nisan 1325 (8 May 1909), 272 and MMZC, 3 Mayıs 1325 (16 May 1909), 417–418. 
28 MMZC, 19 Nisan 1325 (2 May 1909), 160–161. “...aslı nesli malum olmayarak, abd ve cariye 
halinde bilcümle saraylarda istihdam edilmekte bulunan kesandan rıkkiyetleri sabit olanların 
i’takı ve olmayanların ıtlak ve tahliyesi...” Also see BOA, DH.MUI 37-2/23, 1328.Ş.23 (30 
August 1910), for a later note written by the Grand Vizier that explicated the handling of the 
objects and documents by imperial treasury, among other institutions. This ambiguous process 
constitutes the core of the fourth chapter of this dissertation. 
29 Açba, Bir Çerkes Prensesinin Harem Hatıraları, 208. Born in 1898 in Istanbul, Leyla Açba 
was  from a noble Abkhaz family, whose female members had prominent positions in 
Abdülhamid II’s harem. Her maternal aunt Peyveste Hanım and her paternal cousin Fatma Pesend 
Hanım were two of Abdülhamid’s wives. Leyla Açba spent her childhood in the Yıldız Palace, 
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When Leyla Açba was in the inspection room, an officer forcefully pulled down her 
aunt’s headgear (hotoz), while another one told them to take all of their clothes off, which 
Açba recounted in astonishment. Following the inspection, Açba wrote, they left the 
palace and conjoined together with the other cariyes who were let out earlier and had 
been waiting outside. As they were walking through the crowd that gathered in front of 
the palace, they were surrounded by a group of young (and, as Açba specified, evil-
looking) men. Açba’s mother and aunt asked the men to let them pass, which the latter 
complied only after the women handed their earrings to them.30 After the inmates were 
removed from the palace, Leyla Açba further reported, the main gate to the harem was 
broken open and a group of soldiers entered and looted the place with the slogans of 
“freedom!”31 As reported later on by Sazkar Hanımefendi to Leyla Açba, not only their 
savings and jewelry were taken away, but the soldiers even looted the furniture. “Even 
the curtains, the stoves!” were taken away Sazkar Hanımefendi exclaimed, not sparing a 
                                                                                                                                            
and officially became the cariye of Sultan Vahideddin’s first wife Nazikeda Kadınefendi quite 
late, in 1919. 
30 Açba, Bir Çerkes Prensesinin Harem Hatıraları, 208. 
31 Açba, Bir Çerkes Prensesinin Harem Hatıraları, 217. Açba notes that the authority to loot the 
harem premises was given to the Army by the Parliament, although the latter did not hold such  
power during the incident, and took part in the process only to produce reports of it, as evinced in 
the debates. The parliamentary minutes indicate, however, that the Third Army Corps did go into 
the palace and as noted above, took away the valuables to secure them at the military 
headquarters, although it is safe to assume that some items were appropriated for personal 
purposes. Açba also mentions that the Parliament strictly ordered the Army not to touch the 
palace women, and hence any incidence of rape could be avoided, although no such order was 
issued by the Parliament. 
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large mirror that belonged to Abdülhamid, which the soldiers broke into pieces, as they 
tried to remove it from his bedroom.32  
As the Parliament, Army, and other state institutions tried to determine the limits 
of private and public property,33 the primary question the harem inmates faced was a 
more personal and urgent one. Those who were removed from Yıldız Palace knew that 
their lives as sarayis have been brought to an end.34 When she was brought to Topkapı 
Palace, İşvezad Hanım knew that she would never be able to return to Yıldız Palace again 
but she was less certain as to what she would do to sustain her living or where she would 
go or reside. It took several weeks until she was sought after by her father Özbek Maan, 
who took İşvezad Hanım to her native village.35 Among the women who were transferred 
to Topkapı Palace and had no relatives was Layık Seza, who ran a tenacious campaign to 
recover her “mahogany colored” piano after her expulsion from Yıldız Palace in 1909. 
Roughly about six months after her removal from Yıldız Palace, she petitioned the office 
                                                
32 Açba, Bir Çerkes Prensesinin Harem Hatıraları, 219. 
33 The parliament also tried to determine their own work description as the members of the 
national legislature. See MMZC, 24 Haziran 1325 (7 July 1909), 214 for an interesting 
discussion, in which the parrots found at the imperial gardens are defined to be the responsibility 
of the executive branch, not the legislature. 
34 Literally meaning palace dweller, the word sarayi signifies all enslaved women who received 
palace education and served at the harem, even after they were manumitted and left the palace. 
For an elaborate account on the sarayis as components of the extended Ottoman court, see İpşirli 
Argıt, “Manumitted Female Slaves.” 
35 Açba, Bir Çerkes Prensesinin Harem Hatıraları, 219. Özbek Maan’s related petition can be 
found at BOA, DH.MKT 2816/32, 1327.R.27 (18 May 1909). Leyla Açba’s memoire here reads 
almost exactly the same as the Ottoman archival files which describe the procedure. It states that 
following the girls’ transfer to Topkapı Palace, the municipal government set up a commission, 
headed by the chief police commissioner Şevki Efendi who oversaw the manumission and 
placement of the girls with their families, except for the forty four, who did not have families. It 
may be that this was common and widely known news at the time, especially among those who 
had stake in it, like Leyla Açba herself. It may also mean, however, that this information was 
added to the memoire later on by its subsequent editors.  
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of the Grand Vezir, urging them to search and locate the piano as quickly as possible. 
Layık Seza, who was described by Mislimelek Hanım as a “tall, graceful young woman,” 
was known to be close to Abdülhamid.36 Although it is not specified in the related 
accounts, it is likely that the piano was given to her as a present by the sultan himself and 
for that reason deemed valuable by Layık Seza in a specific way during her time in the 
palace. Following her removal however and after she subsequently became a servant to 
one of the concubines (ikbal) of a navy lieutenant named Tahir Efendi, the meaning and 
value of the piano changed.37 Like many other harem inmates, especially those who 
lacked kin support, she relied mostly on her own resources to sort out her life outside the 
palace. Until a small amount of a pension was granted to her about a year later,38 the 
recovery of her piano (either for sale or for other reasons) might have been Layık Seza’s 
only way to make a living.39 Apart from the items accumulated in the palace, in rare 
instances women possessed items that they brought with them to the harem. Such was the 
case with Mislimelek Hanım (who came to the harem as an enslaved young girl), who 
had in her possession an ornamented wooden box given to her by her (then deceased) 
grandfather. Like all other furniture in her room, the box was lost during the chaos of the 
1909 events. Mislimelek later on pursued the matter with the new sultan, Reşad, but 
                                                
36 Mislimelek Abdülkadir, Haremden Sürgüne Bir Osmanlı Prensesi: II Abdülhamit’in gelini 
Mislimelek Hanım, istibdat döneminin bilinmeyenlerini (Istanbul: İnkılap Kitabevi, 2011),105. 
37 BOA, BEO 3636/272633, 1327.Ş.29 (15 September 1909); DH.MUI 40-1/49, 1327.Z.5 (18 
December 1909).  
38 MMZC, 13 Kanunuevvel 1326 (26 December 1910), 629. 
39 Note, for instance, how two of Naciye Neyyal’s enslaved servants sold some of their valuable 
items given to them as gifts by their owner, to buy a house after their manumission. Ressam 
Naciye Neyyal, Mutlakiyet, Meşrutiyet ve Cumhuriyet Anılarım (Istanbul: Pınar Yayınları, 2000), 
55. 
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failed to recover the box, despite her efforts.40 Layık Seza and Mislimelek were not alone 
in pursuing their belongings with the officials who oversaw the dissolution of 
Abdülhamid II’s harem or the successor sultan. One of the chief eunuchs of the Yıldız 
Palace, Nadir Ağa among others, also petitioned to recover his binoculars and 
complained about not achieving any results in his pursuit almost a year after the 
dissolution of the Yıldız harem.41 
 
While harem inmates and members of the Ottoman dynasty were in pursuit of 
recovering their belongings, the government debated how the cash, bonds, stock, 
valuables, and antiques were to be put in use for the “people.” In one such debate in 
parliament, which followed the proposal given by the head of the Hijaz Railroad 
Commission, the deputies discussed whether or not the government had the authority to 
transfer a sum confiscated at Yıldız Palace to the construction and maintenance of the 
railroad.42 Apart from these large-scale projects, however, the immediate concern was 
largely about the (re)usable items, particularly in the harem section. One such example 
                                                
40 Mislimelek Abdülkadir, Haremden Sürgüne Bir Osmanlı Prensesi, 137.  
41 BOA, DH.MUI 79-1/28, 1328.Ra.18 (30 March 1910). These efforts were not particular to the 
manumitted slaves, either. Ayşe Sultan, one of Abdülhamid’s daughters, for one, was worried 
about her parrots and petitioned for their recovery. Şehzade Burhaneddin, one his sons, pursued 
his photography development equipment, in addition to an electric chandelier. On a different 
note, in an official inquiry, the office of the Grand Vezir asked the Ministry of the Interior on how 
the foreign medals/decorations that belonged to the deceased sultans, particularly of Abdülmecid 
and Abdülaziz, would be handled. Involving several different institutions, including the two 
above-mentioned offices and the palace secretariat, it was decided that these medals were to be 
sent to the imperial treasury, in compliance with the ancient customs (teamül-ü kadime). None of 
these cases, however, carried the tone of urgency that Layık Seza’s petition had, which hinted at, 
among other things, an ample degree of despair. 
42 MMZC, 4 Mayıs 1325 (17 May 1909), 480–482. The proposal was strongly objected by some 
deputies, on the basis of its illegitimacy, as the mentioned money belonged to the people and 
could not be utilized arbitrarily, 482. 
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concerned the transfer of bedframes and copperware in Yıldız Palace to the newly 
established Cerrahpaşa Hospital.43 Having been informed about these items, stacked up 
and idly waiting at the palace, the Directorate General for Health and Public Assistance 
(Müessesât-ı Hayriye-i Sıhhiye Riyaseti) requested their donation from the municipal 
government who for its turn, asked the Ministry of the Interior for their transfer, but not 
without a number of justifications for its request. These requested items included no more 
than a few iron bedframes, copper pots and pans, and straw matrasses and did not hold 
any value, the deputy mayor Tevfik specified. Moreover, they were left there unused, to 
rust and decay whereas they could be of the utmost use, serving the sick people of the 
city instead. The Municipal Government had no money, the letter stated, yet the hospital 
had urgency, thus these items would ease the financial burden on the former.44 In another 
instance, during the debates on budgetary planning, the deputies voted in favor of 
donating various tools and instruments in Yıldız Palace’s observatory to a newly 
established meteorological station.45 Consequently, all valuable items, particularly 
jewelry, were priced in accordance with expert assessments and reports and sold, 
bringing a decent sum of 3 million francs to the Treasury. In the following months, the 
furniture and other items were partially restored to what was deemed to be their original 
locations in other palaces, and others were given away particularly to the Ministry of 
Education, to be utilized in schools.46 Despite these examples, the handling of Yıldız 
                                                
43 BOA, DH.MUI 65/55, 1328.Ra.5 (17 March 1910). 
44 BOA, DH.MUI 65/55, 1328.Ra.5 (17 March 1910). Even with such reasoning, however, the 
Ministry of Interior found this request unacceptable, until the Grand Vezir Hakkı Pasha’s 
involvement and the new sultan’s approval of their transfer. 
45 MMZC, 28 Temmuz 1325 (10 August 1909), 307.  
46 MMZC, 12 Nisan 1326 (25 April 1910), 370. 
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Palace and its harem was largely untouched by the ideological effect of the regime 
change, as evinced in the parliamentary debates, in which the primary effort seems to be 
about figuring out what it meant for the “people” to own property, as well as determining 
the institutional and legal basis of the process of the take-over. The wealth of the sultan (a 
specific one, Abdülhamid II, rather than all sultans), who was deemed to have 
accumulated it by “enslaving” the people, was now defined as his “debt to the people,” 
legally, literally and metaphorically. All in all, because the constitutional regime 
concerned itself only with toppling Abdülhamid’s reign, and not the absolutist rule itself, 
the pressing question of what it meant for “the people” to possess Yıldız Palace (or any 
other imperial property, including all movable items found at the palace premises) was 
also shaped by a particular sense of retribution, from which the enslaved palace women 
and their material world were not spared.47  
                                                
47 That Yıldız Palace was chosen by the constitutional regime as the place where the first year 
anniversary of the revolution would be celebrated is indicative of this. MMZC, 8 Temmuz 1325 
(21 July 1909), 473. 
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Images 5.2 - “Le Palais de Yıldız garde par les Soldats de l’armee Liberatrice,” Taksim Atatürk Kitaplığı, 
Postcards Collection, Krt_000706. 
 
Images 5.3 “L’Armee Liberatrice gardant le lac de Yıldız,” Taksim Atatürk Kitaplığı,  




As the past two chapters elaborated, the imperial harems consisted, with the 
exception of the Ottoman dynasty members, almost entirely of enslaved women, many of 
whom were coerced into and sequestered in the harems as enslaved children many years 
prior. Those who occupied the low-ranking positions were ordinarily kidnapped (by 
abduction, persuasion, or an imperial decree) and sold to the palace, examples of which 
can be seen in chapter three above.48 The high-ranking positions (that is, the path to 
become a legal wife or a concubine to the sultan or one of his sons) on the other hand 
have become no more than an on-paper legal status and could even be deemed symbolic. 
By the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, the high-ranking posts were reserved 
mostly for Abkhazian girls of noble birth, who were sent to the palace as gifts, with the 
purpose of cementing bonds between the Ottoman dynasty and the Abkhaz nobility that 
settled in the Ottoman domains earlier in the nineteenth century. However, once admitted 
to the palace, they still had limited interaction with the outside world. Instead, they built 
their world around the things they earned or were given for their labor, sexual services, or 
simply put, “good deeds” they had done for the benefit of the Ottoman state. In some 
instances, these items were given to the women on important occasions such as the birth 
                                                
48 As late as March 1908 (only a few months before the constitutional revolution), the Ottoman 
officials were still visiting Circassian settlements across the country to recruit/levy young girls. 
For an example, see BOA, Y.PRK.ASK 255/2, 1326.S.11 (15 March 1908). For a case of 
abduction that took place after the revolution, see DH.EUM.THR 32/34, 1328.R.26 (7 May 
1910), although in this case the abducted young woman was not sold to the imperial harem, but to 
a provincial government officer. See the article titled “Esir Ticareti” in Sada-i Millet, 8 Mart 1326 
(21 March 1910), for a discussion on the connections between poverty and the perpetuation of 




Image 5.4 Leyla Açba Hanım, 1919. Image courtesy of Bir Çerkes Prensesinin Harem Hatıraları 




of a new dynasty member, death (mostly in the form of an inheritance from the slave-
owning dynasty members to the enslaved), as well as weddings and circumcision 
ceremonies, religious festivals, and other similar occasions. Imperial birth (veladet-i 
hümayun) registers list items provided not solely to the woman who gave birth and her 
personal attendants but to a larger group of enslaved women in the harem.49 The death 
registers (muhallefat) also contain itemized lists of “things” that dynasty members (as 
well as some of the enslaved women themselves) owned and used in their everyday lives. 
Following the death of a harem inmate (in fact, anyone who was a member of the askeri 
class of imperial administrators), her personal belongings and estate were customarily 
distributed among her inheritors, with a decent portion held by the Ottoman state. In this, 
it was common practice among female members of the dynasty to allocate parts of their 
assets to the slaves they owned. In one such example, the muhallefat register of Behice 
Sultan, one of Abdülmecid’s daughters, provides a long list of items to be given to her 
enslaved servants following her death. Among common items such as garments, 
dishware, bathroom utensils etc., the list also includes less-expected items such as a 
sewing machine and two kemançes (a type of bowed string instrument).50 Apart from 
those that belonged to dynasty members, muhallefat registers of high and low-ranking 
enslaved servants also exist and help decipher their ownership patterns. For instance, the 
                                                
49 See BOA, TSMA.d (Topkapı Palace Museum Archives) no. 971 and 974 for two examples of 
birth registers. Most of the items listed on the registers are birth related, such as cradles, 
washbasins, linens, etc., but there is a mention of jewelry, garments and gold coins also. 
50 BOA, TSMA.d no. 997. The register does not specifically note which item was given to whom, 
thus making it not that useful to understand the hierarchies attached to this process, but it 
nevertheless gives an idea about types of items that changed hands after the deceased slave 
holders. This particular list does not contain any jewelry or other valuables, hinting at the fact that 
those were distributed through other means, or at times were not distributed at all.  
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register for one of Esma Sultan’s chief attendants, Nesim Saba Kalfa, demonstrates that 
these women owned not only precious items but also things for plain everyday use, such 
as copperware or mattresses, perhaps like those that were to be sent to Cerrahpaşa 
Hospital a couple of decades later.51 In that sense, their ownership of things were not 
limited to things that had monetary value, that they were given on special occasions, or 
received as salary, although precious items such as jewelry and money (together with 
distinctly expensive fabrics and ornamented garments) functioned as markers of the 
harem inmates’ rank within the highly hierarchical harem organization. When describing 
the hazinedars in the harems,52 Şadiye Sultan, one of Abdülhamid’s daughters noted how 
distinct types of staffs, made of ivory and ornamented by different sorts of precious 
stones set the chief hazinedar apart from both other members of the harem and lower 
ranking hazinedars.53 In other instances, these items also pointed at unspoken or informal 
hierarchies. Such was the case with Pervin Kalfa, both an attendant and a concubine to 
Abdülhamid II’s son Abdülkadir. Even though she was not one of his official wives, 
Pervin had been Abdülkadir’s servant and concubine since adolescence, and according to 
one of the prince’s wives, Mislimelek Hanım, also the most favored. Reportedly, she 
                                                
51 BOA, TSMA.d no. 7829. Also see TSMA.d no.7768, for a list of all expenses made for an 
enslaved woman named Tavrıfelek. Similarly, the list includes various items of every day use, 
such as coffee cups, dishware, etc.  
52 Literally meaning treasurer, the word denotes the highest rank of service (except sexual 
services) for enslaved inmates within the harem organization. 
53 Şadiye Sultan binti Abdülhamid Had, Hayatımın Acı ve Tatlı Günleri (Istanbul: Bedir 
Yayınevi, 2000), 16. Şadiye Sultan states lower rank hazinedars also carried staffs, though less 
ornamented ones compared to that of the chief hazinedar. All cariyes in elite households were 
elegantly dressed, and decorated with jewelry. In his elaborate biographical study of Refia Sultan, 
Ali Akyıldız mentions weddings and other similar festive events during which the palace servants 
were given gifts, most notably precious fabrics. Ali Akyıldız, Mümin ve Müsrif bir Padişah Kızı 
(Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1998), 29. 
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received more gifts and owned significantly more jewelry than the official wives and was 
granted freer access to tailoring and embroidery services provided by the palace tailors.54 
Thus, the questions related to the dissolution process and whether these women should be 
allowed to keep their personal belongings or not also referred to their rank and political 
power within the harem in particular and the Ottoman court in general. In other words, 
what they were forced to leave behind not only comprised their jewelry, garments, or 
musical instruments (with practical, measurable value) but also any rank, position, and 
influence attached to those items. The wives, concubines, and servants of the sultan and 
his sons saw themselves not merely as wives and servants, even less as “pleasure fairies” 
that served a lecherous sovereign, as the Resimli Ay journal suggested, but as agents who 
took an active role in the perpetuation of the Ottoman dynasty and the well-being of the 
sovereign, which meant, for them, the Ottoman state.  
It was not that the ownership of “things” was ever given to the cariyes 
indefinitely. In his account of Abdülaziz’s dethronement in 1876, Ziya Şakir provided a 
detailed description of what dethronement meant in physical space, particularly for the 
female members of the palace. As soon as Murad V’s accession to the throne was 
announced, Ziya Şakir wrote, the imperial harem was claimed by Murad V’s mother 
Şevkefza Sultan, who effected the removal of Abdülaziz’s mother, wives, concubines, 
and servants within the same day.55 The latter were expelled from the palace forcefully 
and all of their property was confiscated by the new valide sultan Şevkefza, on behalf of 
                                                
54 Mislimelek Abdülkadir, Haremden Sürgüne Bir Osmanlı Prensesi, 94–96. 
55 Ziya Şakir, Çırağan Sarayı’nda 28 Yıl: Beşinci Murad [28 Years at the Çırağan Palace] 
(Istanbul: Kaknüs Yayınları, 2007), 108–109. 
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her son Murad V. According to Ziya Şakir’s account, the expelled women were not 
allowed to take anything with them, except for the dresses they were wearing and had to 
worry about where they would sleep and what they would eat from then on.56  
What started with the constitutional revolution in 1908 and Abdülhamid II’s 
dethronement in 1909 was not new to the harem inmates in essence. What is important 
here is that the dissolution process carried out by the constitutional and republican 
regimes went against the harem inmates’ understanding of what the Ottoman state was 
and the hierarchical order it was based on, both within the harem organization and in the 
ways it related to the world outside, in the form of a rigid divide between sarayis and 
şehirlis.57 Safiye Ünüvar, a tutor hired for the education of the young princes and 
princesses (along with their enslaved playmates and servants) noted how these two 
groups were even referred to as two “distinct races” from time to time.58 When praised by 
a sarayi for being “just like them,” Ünüvar rebuked her as follows: 
My dear kalfa, who are the şehirlis and who are you, the sarayis? Are you not one 
among the people also? You should know that had the people [of the city] not exist, 
the palace would not exist either. We should do away with this sense of 
discrimination [...] A people without a state [understood here as the Ottoman dynasty 
and the court] would endure, while a state without a people would cease to exist.59  
 
 
                                                
56 Ziya Şakir, Çırağan Sarayı’nda 28 Yıl, 109. 
57 Literally, city dwellers, şehirlis constituted everyone who lived outside the palace and who has 
never been part of the court. 
58 Safiye Ünüvar, Saray Hatırlarım (Istanbul: L&M Yayınları, 2007), 62–63. 







































































Writing in the early republican era, Ünüvar’s account [and this particular statement] here 
is not untouched by the republican portrayal of the Ottoman dynasty. Nevertheless, not 
only the dynasty members but all sarayis considered themselves to be essential part of the 
Ottoman state, by virtue of being part of the extended Ottoman court and for having been 
given the authority in safeguarding its well-being. The material world they built for 
themselves was considered proof of this authority. It was in this context that for Nazikeda 
Kadınefendi and Leyla Açba, who told the story, being forced to leave the country by the 
republican regime, “as if [they] were traitors” as the former put it, was utterly 
inconceivable.60  
The emergent perception of the palace and the harem as public space and their 
contents as public goods became sharper in the decades that followed the constitutional 
revolution and reached its peak in two steps; in 1922 and 1924, when the nascent 
republican government abolished the sultanate and caliphate respectively, consequently 
exiling all members of the Ottoman dynasty, removing all enslaved servants from the 
palace and confiscating imperial property in its entirety. What the constitutionalists 
hesitantly started in 1908–1909, was brought to a culmination by the republican regime 
that consisted of a new group of administrators who drew their legitimacy from a 
sequence of wars, most notably as mentioned above, the National Resistance. As the 
charter and the bylaws of the ruling Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk 
Fırkası) put it, this new group would do away (at least in theory) with the privileges 
granted to “any family, class, congregation, or individual,” a point that was brought up 
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during the debates about the incompatibility of the allowances paid to the royal family by 
the republican order.61 The discussions on the palaces and the remainder of the Ottoman 
dynasty intensified in the early months of 1924 and continued to center on the allowances 
granted to the dynasty members. In an effort to make sense of or justify the payment, 
Istanbul deputy Yusuf Akçura suggested to provide an itemized version of the budget 
allotted to the royal family. This suggestion, however, yielded an even more unjustifiable 
result, as the itemized budget contained a sizable list of cariyes also, with their 
“incomprehensible, difficult to read names constructed from Persian, such as Mihridil, 
Dilşadan, Bedrifelek,” Akçura noted with an annoyed tone.62 The discussions that 
followed the budget-related debates increasingly emphasized the incongruity of paying 
large sums of money to those who could not even be called citizens, let alone civil 
servants.63 In a tone similar to the Resimli Ay article that opens this chapter, which 
condemned imperial harems as “sources of prostitution and disgrace,” the deputies stated 
that the caliphate64 had no place in a national budget, drawn up and approved by the 
National Assembly, and sustained by the people.65 “You say dynasty,” the Denizli deputy 
Mazhar Müfid exclaimed, “but dynasty is no citizen, it is dynasty,” and the burden was 
                                                
61 Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası Nizamnamesi (Ankara: 1923), accessed through TBMM Library 
Open Access Collection. TBMMZC, 27.9.1339 (1923), 292, 310; TBMMZC, 27.9.1339 (1923), 
327–328. After the abolition of the sultanate, the Ottoman sultans were considered to be caliphs 
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62 TBMMZC, 25.2.1340 (1924), 345. Akçura here refers to the palace/harem practice of renaming 
all enslaved servants with exceedingly ornamented Persian phrases.  
63 TBMMZC, 25.2.1340 (1924), 346. 
64 Understood not so much as religious title here but a disguise for sultanate and the 
luxurious/extravagant life still maintained at the palaces and imperial harems. 
65 TBMMZC, 27.2.1340 (1924), 415. 
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related not only to the amount paid in allowances, but this very definition of who had the 
right to be a citizen and what constituted the Turkish republican state.66 Consequently, 
when the law regarding the abolition of the caliphate and exile came on March 3, 1924, 
its basis (or, at least its primary concern) was precisely this inconsistency.67 Yet, this was 
not the whole of it. Besides determining the lines of exclusion for the Ottoman dynasty, 
the Ottoman government simultaneously rearranged its legal institutions, reducing, as 
Judith Tucker described it, “what had previously been a vast body of somewhat disparate 
interpretation and opinion on family matters to a standardized code that aimed to 
establish clear and universally applicable rules for family life and gender relations.”68 
The following section will explore how the republican government dealt with what came 
to be know as the legal “remnants of the caliphate and sultanate.”69 
 
The Legal Remnants of the Ottoman Past 
As the republican state emerged as “a particular type of rationality in 
governmental practice,” in which it is “at once that which exists, but which does not yet 
exist enough,”70 it strived to set the boundaries of citizenship and determine who was 
entitled to be a republican citizen and who was not. Throughout the process, the palace 
                                                
66 TBMMZC, 27.2.1340 (1924), 429. 
67 For a lengthy debate on the dangers of keeping and the necessity of abolishing caliphate, see 
TBMMZC, 3.3.1340 (1924), 27–69. 
68 Judith E. Tucker, “Revisiting Reform: Women and the Ottoman Law of Family Rights, 1917,” 
The Arab Studies Journal, Vol. 4, No. 2 (Fall 1996), 5. 
69 TBMMZC, 17.2.1926, 232. 
70 Michel Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1978–79 (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan,2008), 3–4. 
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and the Ottoman dynasty, as well as their “human extensions” such as the enslaved 
servants of the imperial harem, again became a matter of contestation in which many of 
the republican views about the newly emerging mode of governance crystalized. The de 
facto dual nature of the republican political order and the present danger of people’s 
increasing support of the caliphate over the republican government made the abolition of 
the caliphate a necessity, even though it was deemed to be a “1300-year-old institution 
[...] inherited through a long line of “glorious predecessors” of the Rashidun Caliphate, 
the Umayyids, the Abbasids, and the Fatimids...”71 After all, the Minister of Justice Seyid 
Bey argued, there were no Şer’i or religious obstacles but only political ones that 
impeded its abolition, as Islam neither attached spirituality (ruhaniyet) to its 
administrative institutions nor attributed holiness to its religious dignitaries. In essence, 
Islam did not necessarily have religious governance (teşkilat-ı diniye) either and left its 
administration to the Islamic community itself.72 In a highly intricate and technical 
discussion, Seyid Bey informed his audience in the parliament that the Islamic jurists in 
the past defined caliphate (hilafet and imamet used interchangeably) as the authority of a 
“deserving” (istihkak) person over public matters.73 In language reminiscent of religious 
debates on the Islamic institution of slavery (partially explored in the previous chapter), 
yet completely oblivious of it, the minister defined caliphate as a type of guardianship 
[velayet, Ar. walayat], which is voluntarily granted by the people to an individual: 
                                                
71 TBMMZC, 3.3.1340 (1924), 35, 65. 
72 Ibid., 50.  
73 Ibid., 51. 
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The ulema defined guardianship as “tenfiz-ül kavle alel gayri şae ev eba,”74 which 
meant to have others obey one’s words, whether they agreed or not. [...] This 
means to have others obey by force and this means nothing but domination. Is 
domination lawful, from the viewpoint of the Şer’i law? If one attempts to subdue 
others by force through illegitimate means, then it should be called domination 
[tahakküm], or tyranny [tagallüb] and by definition [absolutist] reign. If that 
attempt is legitimate, on the other hand, it is called guardianship...75 
 
For Seyid Bey, no one individual has been automatically granted such an authority in 
Islam, and no one had the right to subdue others by force either. 
No person has the right to tell the others what and what not to say or where and 
where not to go. Everyone is free to live anywhere he likes, move in any ways he 
pleases. Each individual himself is honorable and immune from assault and 
aggression. So is the case with the right to property ownership. Every man is free 
to put his property to use in any ways he desires and that property is also immune 
from assault. Every one is equal before the law, that there are no such things as 
class privilege or aristocracy. Islam, in the true sense of the word, is a democratic 
religion that refuses to endorse any one person’s prerogatives.76 
  
The institution of slavery, sanctioned by the Islamic jurisprudence up until that time 
(possibly still so, at the time of the minister’s address), was completely erased from the 
discussions and was not brought up by any other deputy either. The Justice Minister 
further argued that the only person that held a right to forceful guardianship as an 
                                                
74 This Arabic statement was the classic definition of velayet, literally meaning the enforcement 
of a statement in relation to others, whether they agreed or refused. 
75 TBMMZC, 3.3.1340 (1924), 52. 
76 Ibid., 52. 
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acceptable/legitimate practice was the father over his children. The justice minister’s 
argument did not go far from the father-child analogy and was instead hastily tied to a 
general discussion that aimed to fit Islam into the republican view of governance. That 
“fitting,” however, could be achieved only by erasing contradictory or problematic 
aspects of Islamic law, the most important of which was about slavery.77 In many 
respects, the minister’s speech was reminiscent of the Ottoman slaves’ claims to freedom 
in the preceding decades, who indefatigably emphasized the incongruity (as well as the 
undermining effect of) of such forceful “subduing” with the constitutional order.  
At the end of a long debate, the abolition of the caliphate was accepted by the 
parliament, and the law pertaining to the exile of the Ottoman dynasty members was 
resolved.78 According to this law, the dynasty members were to leave the country within 
ten days and the ownership of all imperial property including palaces, mansions, and 
various other types of real estate, furnishings, art works, and other items found within 
those premises were to be confiscated for the use of the “people.”79 What started as an 
elaborate and highly technical discussion led by the Justice Minister was followed by a 
series of congratulation notices sent to the parliament (by local administrators, 
businessmen, educators), which condemned the caliphate as an institution. Even the sufi 
leaders and religious officers (the kadı and müftü) condemned the institution, some 
                                                
77 Ibid., 53. 
78 See ibid., 67 for a debate against the exile of female members of the dynasty. 
79 Note Tunalı Hilmi Bey’s correction of terminology: it was no longer imperial (mal-ı miri) but 
republican property (Cumhur malı). TBMMZC, 29.11.1339 (1923), 647. 
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blaming it for sucking the blood of the people for so many centuries, and others arguing 
that it was never a legitimate institution in its long history to begin with.80 
What the republican state set out to do was to redefine its political and legal 
institutions, eliminating both the political dualism mentioned above and the institutional 
bifurcation in the legal realm. As has been partially discussed in previous chapters, 
family law, which also regulated slavery, was exempted from earlier attempts of legal 
reform, due to a fear on the Ottoman government’s side that it would cause unrest among 
the Muslim populations of the empire.81 The Mecelle Commission, which oversaw the 
codification process of other areas of law had been the target of Meşihat’s attacks earlier 
in the mid-nineteenth century. Being a “thornier” area than criminal law, insisting on a 
reform of family law would produce only more strife and bring on more attacks by the 
office of the Şeyhülislam.82  Only a year before the empire’s collapse, the Ottoman 
government made any attempts towards the codification of Ottoman family law, which 
yielded the Ottoman Law of Family Rights of 1917. Having been promulgated at the very 
end of the empire’s existence and in the midst of World War I, the new arrangement was 
inevitably short-lived and according to the republican deputy from Sinop, Yusuf Kemal 
Bey, it was unconstitutional as well, as it was not drawn up by the legislature (understood 
as “the people”), but as a governmental order:83 
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81 M. Akif Aydın, İslam-Osmanlı Aile Hukuku (Istanbul: Marmara Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi 
Vakfı Yayınları, 1985), 133. 
82 Aydın, İslam-Osmanlı Aile Hukuku, 134. Aydın further argues that the urgency of such a legal 
arrangement was not high. This was not the case, at least for slaves, of course.  
83 TBMMZC, 17.2.1926, 233; The order was signed by the Ottoman sultan Mehmed Reşad, the 
Grand Vezir Talat and Justice Minister Halil (Menteşe) as a temporary law (muvakkat kanun) on 
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Even in the Constitutional era, the Family Law did not pass through the Parliament 
but rather enacted as a governmental order. [...] Mecelle is before us. All of its 
items were accepted/enacted through imperial decrees. The Family Law is before 
us, it too is an order. Regulations on the Criminal Proceedings (Usul-ı 
Muhakemat-ı Cezaiye) is a governmental order. Regulations on the Legal 
Proceedings (Usul-ı Muhakemat-ı Hukukiye) is also an order. The Commercial 
Law is via imperial edict. In short, none of these were discussed and voted at the 
parliament. Now we should accept this [the Civil law of 1926] with full courage 
and responsibility, and again with complete courage we advocate it to the people. 
[...] It is important to note however that for the well implementation of this law, 
there are several institutions that needs to be established. These should be 
established at once, and we as the parliament should support it as much as we 
can.”84 
 
The bifurcation within the legal practice, which characterized the Ottoman legal 
realm for most of the nineteenth century, did not solely emerge because there were 
simply different legal systems that conflicted with each other. In the aftermath of the 
1908 revolution, for instance, the fight between the Ministry of Justice and the office of 
the Şeyhülislam, particularly visible in regards to the cases related to slavery and 
freedom, was not only due to a set of conflicting views on slavery and abolition but also 
these two institutions’ efforts to maintain their respective areas of influence and control 
in administering law and justice. While the Ministry of Justice tried to extend its 
jurisdiction to the maximum (including the matters related to family and slavery), the 
                                                                                                                                            
25 October 1917, and was printed in the Takvim-i Vekayi, the official journal of the Ottoman 
government on 31 October 1917. The order/law was also printed as a booklet the same year with 
the title Hukuk-i Aile Kararnamesi (Istanbul: Kader Matbaası, 1333 R/ 1917) accessed through 
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MAZC). 
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office of the Şeyhülislam clung to its only remaining area of authority, producing an 
institutional duality which was carried over “into the Republican period, as part of the 
Ottoman legal heritage,” and remained part of it until the Republican civil code 
promulgated in 1926.85 This was particularly apparent in the parliamentary debates that 
related to the proposed takeover of the Şer’i courts by the Ministry of Justice, which also 
took place in 1917. When the items of the proposed law were debated and voted in the 
parliament, it was clear that despite the prospective takeover, Şer’i courts were expected 
to maintain their specific procedures and regulations. The goal was not to attain a 
procedural uniformity in adjudicating legal cases, but rather an institutional blending for 
administrative purposes. Even after these two institutions merged, however, the Ottoman 
legal system could not rid itself of its bifurcated character. For instance, the article 7 of 
the proposed law came in two versions; one was proposed jointly by the government and 
the Islamic clerics and the other by the Ministry of Justice. The Ministry of Justice 
suggested that following the merge/takeover, all legal procedures should be under the 
authority of the ministry alone. The government and the Ulema on the other hand 
suggested that, the Justice Minister and the Şeyhülislam should both have authority over 
this seemingly unified legal realm and the law was enacted in accordance with the latter 
suggestion.86 In other words, the Ottoman government (as it had done previously in all 
slavery-related debates and arrangements) once again sided with the Islamic legal body, 
over the Ministry of Justice. In that sense, the foundation of the new legal institutions, 
which Yusuf Kemal Bey deemed crucial for the implementation of the newly enacted 
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Civil Law in 1926, did not only point towards the necessity of establishing new legal 
institutions. It also meant doing away with these tensions, which had resulted more often 
than not in institutional crises in the past.  
The legal arrangements of 1917 were partial efforts to reorganize the legal system 
and codify the family-related legal rules and regulations within the Şer’i law. The enacted 
Family Law covered only marriage and divorce-related matters and did not make a 
specific mention of slaves and slavery. Only in article 90, it stated that it was prohibited 
for the families and relatives of the bride to demand payment (in cash or kind) from the 
groom, when they married or “surrendered” (teslim) their daughter to him.87 
Nevertheless, the order was significant not because it made specific stipulations in 
relation to slavery.  Rather, its importance came from the fact that it gave the authority to 
adjudicate family-related cases to the Ministry of Justice.88 Although the Şer’i courts 
were still partially governed by the office of the Şeyhülislam, this was rather an 
unprecedented move on the Ottoman government’s side, who traditionally had, as has 
been argued in the previous chapter, ample reluctance in the matters related to Şer’i law. 
This reluctance was still not entirely overcome by the time that 1917 legal adjustments 
were made. When these changes were debated in parliament, for instance, one of the core 
questions was related whether the Şer’i courts, now operating partially under the 
authority of the Ministry of Justice, would follow Islamic jurisprudence or not. The 
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Justice Minister Halil Bey had to assure those who had “doubts” about the takeover, by 
saying that there was not even need to pose such a question, and added that “of course” 
the Islamic rules and regulations would apply to all Şer’i procedures and thinking 
otherwise was simply preposterous.89 Moreover, not only the government’s, but also the 
majority of the deputies’ choices/approvals/rejections were characterized by a similar 
kind of reluctance and hesitation similar to those in the immediate aftermath of the 1908 
revolution. Concerned about the takeover of the Şer’i courts by the Ministry of Justice, 
the Denizli deputy Mehmet Sadık Efendi expressed his fears that this merge might yield a 
“terrifying [legal] void.”90 For the Mamüratülaziz deputy Mehmet Said Efendi on the 
other hand, the real concern was to make sure that the “divine” aspects of the law would 
endure.91 In sum, that the family or civil law was largely exempted from all the legal 
developments of the nineteenth century mainly had to do with this general “conservative” 
character of the late Ottoman government. As Akif Aydın argues, in addition to the 
political circumstances, the eventual annulment of the Family Law in 1919 was brought 
upon by a conservative group led by the Şeyhülislam himself, as they tried to reconcile 
new legal adjustments with the political reality of their time. 92  
When the 1926 Turkish Civil Code was eventually unanimously accepted at the 
parliament, it was not only that the law itself (a comprehensive one, adapted for the most 
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part from the Swiss Civil Code) was different but also the political reality of the republic 
was different. While the issue of slavery did not appear in its own terms, neither in the 
code itself nor in the parliamentary debates about it, the Justice Minister Mahmut Esat 
(Bozkurt) Bey inadvertently drew the connections. “In my view, the saddest figures of 
the Turkish history are the Turkish women,” he maintained, and “the family and 
inheritance related provisions of the new bill will honor those [...] who had ordinarily 
been dragged here there like a slave.”93 The new law banned many of what the Aksaray 
deputy Besim Atalay Bey called “the rotten legal remnants of caliphate,” among which 
was polygamy. With a touch of regret in his voice, Şükrü Kaya Bey reminded his 
colleagues that this was not a consequence of the civil code, but rather a necessity of the 
civilization.94 The practice of slavery as another “rotten” remnant of the empire was 
never dealt with in actuality, until its abolition was finally resolved in parliament and the 
respective law was promulgated in 1933. By then, slavery had already become no more 
than a remote international problem (and presented at the parliament and in the bill 
strictly as such), the solution of which was again a matter of civilization.95 “A number of 
countries including ours, where the practice of slavery virtually does not occur,” the bill 
stated, “we have come to an agreement to prohibit the practice and trade of slavery in 
support of this humanitarian cause.” 
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Conclusion 
The abolition of the caliphate, the dissolution or disposal of the physical, political, 
or legal remnants of the Ottoman Empire, and the corresponding laws had somewhat 
clear-cut descriptions. In practice, however, they were laden with ambiguities, for the 
Ottoman heritage was not wholly undesirable but only partially so. Thus, the debates 
about erasing the markers of the Ottoman past carried a great degree of ambivalence also. 
For instance, the proposal to remove all Ottoman coat of arms and imperial 
seals/signatures from government buildings, schools, hospitals, etc., met as much 
objection as support in parliament.96 Another instance of this ambivalence was related to 
the manner the items/furnishings found at the palaces/harems put into reuse. Shortly after 
the abolition of the sultanate in 1922, many of the palaces/harems were already partially 
emptied. Such was the case with Fer’iye Palace for instance, when the harem inmates of 
then runaway sultan Vahideddin was relocated there.97 Shortly after the abolition of the 
caliphate, parliament began debating about turning the Dolmabahçe Palace (the abode of 
many, but particularly the last Ottoman sultan) into a museum,98 while their contents 
began flowing to and decorating the ministries in the new capital city of Ankara, public 
schools, or hospitals across the country, as well as embassy buildings across the globe.99 
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The portraits of the sultans were to be removed from display in Dolmabahçe Palace,100 
but apart from those, most other items of artistic value were made public at the newly 
established museums or were put into use in state/public institutions/buildings etc. The 
items that matched up with the imagined majesty of the Ottoman past continued to 
ornament the republican banquets or the museum displays, while the unwanted part of 
that history was condemned and erased. That an emerald pin, a set of diamond earrings, a 
gold layered bowl, or a mahogany-colored piano (given to the court women for, among 
other things, their sexual services) were once embodiments of the Ottoman state had no 
place in the republican imagination. When comparing two different modes of rule, 
Naciye Meyyal, the wife of an elite imperial administrator, measured the Turkish state’s 
might with the number of furnished buildings, offices, etc. it had in its possession, ready 
to be utilized at any time by those who served the state.101 If the old regime lost 
credibility in the eyes of its people, it was, for Naciye Meyyal, due to its failure in 
functioning as a state organization and lack of authority in putting its assets in use, 
particularly of its ruling elite. The “might” of the republican state came from the material 
world of the old regime as well as the ways in which that material world was dissociated 
from its political significance. 
The initial perplexity of Nazikeda Kadınefendi (one of Sultan Vahideddin’s 
wives) and her cariye Leyla Açba soon turned into a peculiar and arduous episode of  
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dislocation.102 In the days that followed the law of exile, Fer’iye palace, where they were 
virtually held captive, were raided by a group of men, who took away all the remaining 
items, including the women’s clothes and shoes, although many of them reportedly 
managed to hide away their jewelry.103 Leyla Açba too, had a few valuable items, some 
of which she quickly chose and hid under her dress, particularly those she thought to be 
the most precious, such as a badge given to her by Sultan Vahideddin himself.104 On 
March 10, 1924 Leyla Açba’s mistress Nazikeda Kadınefendi left for San Remo, leaving 
Açba and many of her cariyes behind. Those who had families or relatives reportedly 
went to live with them, whereas another group of older cariyes managed to obtain a 
house for themselves and left to live there.105 Leyla Açba was among those who had no 
family, although she owned a house that she inherited from her father. When she and two 
of her colleagues went there, however, she found out that the house was confiscated by 
the new government.106 By March 15, 1924, she reported, they were left both “without a 
master or a home.” Like many of their colleagues, the young women had to leave 
Istanbul and eventually took up residence in the provincial town of Sivas, where Açba’s 
aunt lived, and where her perplexity lasted until her death (roughly about six months 
before of the official abolition of slavery in the Ottoman Empire), evident in the way she 
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concluded her memoires. “If a government fails to provide a sarayi with a home” she 
wrote, “does it not mean the whole new order is wrong?”107  
 
 
                                                




I began writing this dissertation when the conflict in Syria was gradually turning 
into a full-fledged, vicious war that eventually killed and uprooted (and to this day 
continues to do so) millions of Syrian men, women, and children, the biggest toll of 
which has fallen on those who were least able to bear it.1 As the fights were turning more 
brutal, bloodier, and more systematic than the prior sporadic clashes, an article appeared 
on BBC News, which in the ensuing months would be followed by numerous others. The 
article told about young Syrian refugee women and children, who were being sold for 
marriage in Jordan. One refugee among 500,000 in the country (the vast majority of 
whom were reported to be women and children), an 18-year old girl named Kazal faced 
harsh conditions of refugee life since she and her family fled Homs and came to Amman; 
conditions eventually forced Kazal to consent to what the article called “survival sex” 
and marry a 50-year-old man from Saudi Arabia in exchange of $3,100. It was not that 
these marriages between young Syrian girls and older men from the Gulf did not happen 
before the war, but as Kazal’s mother asserted, many of the families would not turn to 
such measures, had they not been forced by the difficult conditions of the war. Kazal’s 
mother reported how hard their life as refugees have been and that they received very 
                                                
1 As of July 2015, the registered number of Syrian refugees is given as 4,015,065 individuals, 
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young, Syrian and a refugee in the streets of Beirut,” 
http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/7/18/to-be-young 
syrianandarefugeeinthestreetsofbeirut.html and  
http://www.ozgur-gundem.com/haber/138965/iste-buyuk-ekonomi-budur. 
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little aid. They could not afford to pay the rent or buy food. “So I had to sacrifice Kazal” 
she said, “to help the other members of the family.”2 
Kazal’s marriage was arranged by an NGO that normally provided aid to the 
refugees, in the form of cash, food, and medicine, but there were other types of agents 
arranging these marriages as well. For one, a certain Um Mazed, a 28-year-old Syrian 
woman who called herself a matchmaker, also a refugee from Homs, presented more than 
a hundred Syrian girls to older Arab men, most of whom were between 50 and 80 years 
of age. Most of these men asked for girls who had white skin and blue or green eyes and 
demanded that they be no older than 16 years old. They paid Um Mazed an amount $70 
for an introduction, and $310, when it resulted in a marriage. If the marriage ended with a 
divorce in a short while, it was not Um Mazed’s fault, as she was only a matchmaker. 
What the girls consented to did not count as prostitution, she contented, as there was a 
“contract between the groom and the bride.” Still, Um Mazed was not proud of what she 
was doing, the article reported, but she claimed she had no other choice. 
The story of Kazal and her family, and that of Um Mazed for that matter, looks 
only too familiar to that of Müzeyyen, Sıdıka, Şirin, Fatma Leman and many others that 
this dissertation talked about. Like that of Kazal and Um Mazed, their stories too were 
shaped or given new meanings during such instances of crisis as the Circassian expulsion 
in the 1860s, the Russo-Turkish war in 1877–78 and the Armenian genocide in 1915, 
during which ethical boundaries in relation to power, coercion, violence, slavery, or 
                                                
2 Beth McLeod, “Syrian Refugees ‘sold for marriage’ in Jordan,” BBC News, 10 May 2013, 
accessed online 18 May 2013. Similar stories, pertaining to the Syrian refugees in Turkey 
appeared in Turkish press also. See “Suriyelilerle evlilik ticarete dönüştü,” in Milliyet, 27.1.2014, 
or “Suriyeli kızlar yaşamak için evlendiriliyor,” in Al Jazeera Turk, 27.1.2014. 
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freedom among other things were severely altered. During the Circassian expulsion, for 
instance, many families and their “white skinned, blue-eyed” daughters fell prey as much 
to men and women like Um Mazed, who took advantage of their peculiar “insider” 
positions, as to professional slave dealers. Similarly, in the aftermath of the Russo-
Turkish war, abductions or kidnappings abounded in number. In one of these cases, 
which opens chapter 3, a band of three “amiable” abductor women used their own freed-
slave experiences (not without ample amount of despair on their side) and connections to 
persuade a number of poor immigrant families to surrender their “flaxen haired” and 
“blue-eyed” (or, ma’iye meyyal, “blue inclined,” as an interrogation report poetically put 
it) daughters to them, whom they sold not only to various prominent households in 
Istanbul, Cairo, and Baghdad, but even to the imperial harem. In the aftermath of the 
Armenian genocide, abducting of young Armenian women and children and placing them 
in Muslim households took on new meanings and became a government policy that 
delineated the female body as a “site of vengeance” as Lerna Ekmekçioğlu called it.3 
Nevertheless, these new meanings also built on familiar structures exploited by the 
longstanding practice of slavery in the Ottoman Empire. 
This dissertation told the story of the legal making and perpetuation of 
“Circassianness” as an “enslavable” ethnic category, although African slaves are not 
                                                
3 Lerna Ekmekçioğlu, “The Female Body as Site of Vengeance: Armenians and Turks at (Great)  
War, “ paper presented at the 47th MESA Annual Meeting, October 10–13, 2013. New Orleans, 
LA. For excellent accounts of the abduction and sale of Armenian women and children and 
international humanitarian discourses and campaigns organized around those incidents during and 
after the genocide, see Keith David Watenpaugh, “The League of Nations’ Rescue of Armenian 
Genocide Survivors and the Making of Modern Humanitarianism, 1920–1927,” The American 
Historical Review, vol.115, no. 5 (2010); Lerna Ekmekçioğlu, “A Climate for Abduction, a 
Climate for Redemption: The Politics of Inclusion during and after the Armenian Genocide,” 
Comparative Studies in Society and History, vol. 55, no. 3 (2013).  
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entirely absent from it. In the first chapter, for instance, they come in to help emphasize 
the contrasts between different modes of enslavement and their relation to Islamic state-
building and expansion processes, particularly the deployment of jihad ideology, to 
demonstrate that Circassian slavery was not necessarily Islamic, and if it was, it became 
so during the course of the five decades long Russo-Circassian war. In the second 
chapter, they have an indirect presence as references to Circassian claims to freedom in 
the aftermath of the Circassian expulsion. In the remainder of the chapters they come and 
go, at times appearing as a pivotal actors within the practice. Such is the case with Şirin 
Kadın in chapter 3, a manumitted African slave turned slave dealer, who ran a clandestine 
slaving business together with a manumitted Circassian slave, for instance. She is central 
to the story, especially in regards to her remarkable network that included her husband in 
Cairo who oversaw her “exports” to that city, a number of manumitted slaves living in 
different neighborhoods in Istanbul who alerted her about the “eligible” young girls in 
their vicinity, captains of merchant ships that docked in Tophane port, as well as a 
eunuch from the imperial harem, who bought slaves on behalf of one of the kadınefendis 
(official wives) there. Even then, however, the focus remains on the Circassian slaves 
(and occasionally prostitutes) she traded and handled, with a particular effort to come to 
an understanding how the ethnic boundaries were drawn within the trade.   
This decision of giving Circassian slaves a primary presence throughout the 
dissertation requires a brief contextualization and explanation. First and foremost, to 
reiterate the obvious, this is not to imply that their presence or experiences bore any more 
significance than that of African slaves in the Ottoman Empire. As has already been well 
established, particularly by Ehud Toledano but others as well, African slaves exceeded 
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the Circassian slaves in number particularly in the nineteenth century and their 
predicament was by no means milder, either. 4 In fact, recurrent depictions in both 
archival and literary sources illustrate their vulnerability and exploitation to be exceeding 
that of the Circassian slaves. All in all, the reason why Circassian slaves have a larger 
presence is not due to the numbers involved, the severity of the work they performed or 
the physical and psychological coercion they were subjected to (the major traits that 
characterized slavery in the boom-time antebellum South, for instance), but to the 
Ottoman non-adherence to strict racial boundaries as well as its rigor in making and 
“consuming” black and white slaves with similar ease. This ease, however, is not taken 
here as a general laxness or lack of race consciousness or classification in the Ottoman 
Empire. On the contrary, the Ottoman government’s ways of marking blackness and 
whiteness, the slave traders’ ways of determining their price in the market, and slave-
holding intellectuals’ ways of portraying them in literary sources all constitute proof that 
this was not at all the case. Rather than laxness or indifference, their seemingly 
indiscriminate attitude is read in this dissertation as a decision on the Ottoman policy 
makers’, slave traders’ and slaveholders’ side to deliberately extend the practice to 
everyone who was vulnerable enough (or made so, through political processes, as in the 
case of Circassian expulsion or Armenian genocide). Probing this deliberate decision and 
the ways it interacted with liberalism as a new and specific form of governmentality 
taking root (or failing to do so) in the Ottoman Empire during the second half of the 
nineteenth and early decades of the twentieth centuries, is the primary objective of this 
                                                
4 As one British consular report stated in 1869, “the respective totals of the two categories are 
nearly balanced.” FO 195/946 from Palgrave to Clarendon, 21 September 1869. 
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dissertation. It is my conviction that this objective helps to place slavery more firmly 
within a context of “power and exploitation,” the importance of which has been 
insightfully argued in a discussion a decade and a half ago, where David Brion Davis’s 
call for a transnational approach to study slavery was complemented by a claim “to 
reconsider not just how [to] teach and write about slavery, but how [to] think about past 
boundaries of all kinds,” made by Peter Kolchin, Rebecca J. Scott, and Stanley L. 
Engerman.5 The present study is an effort to think along similar lines, in that it proposes 
an account of slavery that is delineated not only along racial but also ethnic boundaries, 
which were simultaneously mediated and manipulated by social, political, and legal 
practices. To add to Davis et al.’s statement is the question highlighted by Dylan 
Penningroth about the viability of the pursuit of “a solid and unified ‘subaltern 
presence’,” which has increasingly been posed by historians with different temporal and 
geographic focus. As Penningroth writes:  
[B]lack churches have grappled with conflicts over gendered 
“respectability,” “[a] leader of a movement can. . . go home and beat up a 
wife or children,” colonized people could be colonizers themselves, and 
some of the strongest resistance to European colonialism came from 
slaveholding Africans. It would be a mistake to assume that such power 
relations merely echo, or are ultimately less meaningful than, the story of 
white-on-black oppression—or that studying the former necessarily means 
downplaying the latter. Probing the internal dynamics of subaltern families 
and communities—issues of conflict, authority, and change over time—
demands new interpretive frameworks that can complement the familiar 
                                                
5See the forum entitled “Crossing Slavery’s Boundaries,” in the American Historical Review, 
Vol. 105, No. 2 (Apr., 2000). 
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dyads of race and resistance: master and slave, colonizer and colonized, 
white and Other.6 
In this context, limiting the scope of this dissertation to the Circassian slaves allowed me 
to better investigate these dynamics in general and trace the legal making and 
containment of the ethnic category of “Circassianness,” in particular. Secondly, in a more 
practical sense, my aim is to demonstrate how two distinct systems of slavery, that is 
Islamic and Caucasian, underwent change when they merged following the Circassian 
expulsion. The existence of more than one systems of slavery, combining with the policy 
change with the ban of trade in African slaves, shaped not only the practice of slavery but 
also the Ottoman polity as a whole in the subsequent years. Last but not least, focusing on 
the Circassian slaves is also conducive, as the fourth chapter below explores, to probe 
“the internal dynamics of subaltern families and communities” who struggled to come to 
terms with their enslaved status, freedom promised by the constitutional regime, and their 
“Ottomanness” and “Circassianness” at once. 
Despite the fact that the Ottoman slaves’ attempts were largely unsuccessful, their 
strategies and the sophisticated debates they made offer highly transparent cases to study 
multiple political and social dynamics in the late Ottoman Empire and early Turkish 
Republic. Once placed properly in its political context, slavery emerges as a practice 
jointly produced and perpetuated by a pluralistic legal system with inner conflicts, a 
government that was “conservative” particularly in protecting male and Muslim (to be 
more specific, powerful and Sunni) prerogatives, as well as its strict adherence to a 
                                                
6 Dylan C. Penningroth, “The Claims of Slaves and Ex-Slaves to Family and Property: A 
Transatlantic Comparison,” The American Historical Review, Vol. 112, No. 4 (Oct., 2007), 1045. 
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corporate notion of citizenship. That the Ottoman government was caught between its old 
habits of rule by coopting the local elites (that it preferred to side with Circassian 
chieftains over slaves’ claims, for instance) at the expense of undermining the new 
political and legal order it aspired to attain in the post-Reform Edict Ottoman Empire, is a 
good example of the conditions of this “joint production,” as chapter 2 illustrated.  
Placing the Ottoman practice of slavery within a larger political context, as the 
above chapters sought to do (rather than portraying it as an anomalous practice that 
existed in and of itself that happened and ended in the past), is important for a variety of 
other reasons as well. For one, doing so provides hints as to how Circassian slaves 
perceived themselves as Ottomans, Circassians, and Muslims at once. Unlike the non-
Muslim or heterodox communities of the empire, Circassians (being Sunni Muslims, 
however nominally) considered themselves entitled to be full members of the Ottoman 
society, as evinced by the many slave petitions that support this study. In that respect, 
tracing their aspirations and setbacks offers insight to understanding what the Ottoman 
and Turkish state on the one hand and the slaves on the other, understood of slavery, 
freedom, or citizenship. Moreover, “de-exoticizing” slavery, as this dissertation aims to 
do, also helps in connecting different instances of coercion and violence in the late 
Ottoman Empire and early Turkish Republic. For instance, such is the case, as chapter 4 
suggests, with the stories of the enslavement of Armenian girls during and after the 
Armenian genocide in 1915. The “climate for abduction,” as Lerna Ekmekcioglu calls it, 
emerged not independently from earlier “climates.”7  
                                                
7 Lerna Ekmekçioğlu, “A Climate for Abduction, a Climate for Redemption: The Politics of 
Inclusion during and after the Armenian Genocide,” Comparative Studies in Society and History, 
vol. 55, no. 3 (2013). 
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This dissertation ends in 1933, when the republican government promulgated a 
law that prohibited slavery and slave trade in the Turkish Republic. This was done, in the 
republican government’s own words, to give support to a “humanitarian cause” that 
remotely happened elsewhere. Written off as a “rotten remnant” from the Ottoman past, 
slavery was erased and forgotten in congruence with the republican “project of regulated 
amnesia.”8 In the following decades, slavery as a practice was at best forgotten or 
exoticized and at worst denied, but never confronted in the Turkish Republic. Like other 
cases of state-produced (or, at least state approved) coercion and violence, it continued to 
reproduce itself whenever the conditions allowed it. For one, the forced schooling of 
young girls in Dersim in the aftermath of the Dersim massacre of 1937–38 bears striking 
resemblances to the enslavement of young girls in the previous century.9 More recently, 
the stories of coerced migration of the Kurds continue to be interwoven with that of the 
descendants of African slaves, in such poor neighborhoods as Kadifekale in Izmir.10  
Roughly around half a century earlier than this present story began, another (and 
no doubt a more potent) one culminated on the far side of the Atlantic. “If we live in a 
world in which democracy is meant to exclude no one,” Laurent Dubois has stated, “it is 
in no small part because of the actions of those slaves in Saint-Domingue who insisted 
                                                
8 Murat Ergin, “‘Is the Turk a White Man?’ Towards a Theoretical Framework for Race in the 
Making of Turkishness,” Middle Eastern Studies, 44:6 (2008), 837. 
9 Zeynep Türkyılmaz, “Nationalizing through Education: The Case of ‘Mountain Flowers’ at 
Elazığ Girls’ Institute,” (MA Thesis, Boğaziçi University, 2001). 
10 For an overview of these interactions, see Michael Ferguson, “‘It’s Not Destruction, It’s Urban 
Renewal’: The Transformation of Urban Space Atop Kadifekale, Izmir.” Paper presented at the 
Quatrième Journée d’étude du groupe d’études turques et ottomanes (GÉTO): « La République 
Turque : histoire, culture, société », Université du Québec à Montréal, Montreal, Quebec, Canada, 
8 March 2013. 
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that human rights were theirs too.”11 We do not know whether the enslaved men and 
women of the Ottoman Empire, who seem to be concerned more with their own 
immediate lives, ever heard of a group of enslaved men, who succeeded in “creating a 
society in which all people, of all colors, were granted freedom and citizenship.”12 
Drawing direct connections between the motives and actions of the Haitian 
revolutionaries and the Ottoman slave representatives or insurgents may be far-fetched, 
but whenever the latter claimed what they believed to be their rights, their voices 





                                                
11 Laurent Dubois, The Avengers of the New World: The Story of the Haitian Revolution 
(Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2004), 3.  
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